Historical Enlightenment

"The nation must know the universal on which its ethical life is based and before which the particular vanishes away, and it must therefore know the determinations which underlie its justice and religion… This spiritual self-consciousness is the nation’s supreme achievement… All this is the work of the spirit, which knows how to bring the un-reflected – i.e. the merely factual – to the point of reflecting on itself. It thereby becomes conscious to some degree of the limitation of such determinate things as belief, trust, and custom, so that the consciousness now has reasons for renouncing the latter and the laws which they impose. This is indeed the inevitable result of any search for reasons." Hegel from the Philosophy of World History

I got the urge to peruse Hegel's Philosophy of History from a recent post by Mark Kaplan, as well as from an exchange with Alphonse.  As Mark points out, the idea that reason is always already involved in self critique is as old as the enlightenment itself.  Of course Hegel was rather optimistic regarding the effectiveness and results of this crtique.  "This dissolving activity of thought also inevitably gives rise to a new principle…Spirit in its new inward determination, has new interests and ends beyond those which it formerly possessed." 

There is a transformative quality to Spirit's interrogation of itself. "If Spirit knows that it is free, it is altogether different from what it would be without this knowledge."  For Hegel, consciousness of the assumptions and conditions of a form of life necessarily lead to both an enrichment and a transcending of that life. "The aim of world history, therefore, is that spirit should attain knowledge of its own true nature, that it should objectivize this knowledge and transform it into a real world, and give itself an objective existence." And Ultimately Hegel's account is a beautiful, bloody, and immoral theodicy of freedom. 

But what if Spirit reaches an impass, a stumbling block over which it can not move to another, higher shape of life?  What if we "dizzying postmoderns" are stuck between the world that has grown old and the one that is yet to arrive?  Hegel (paradoxically) believes that as long as existing institutions are still standing, the discredited conception of Spirit is still valid (though it is no longer rationally justified). This can lead to an extended period of decadence, in which people grow more isolated and cut off from one another.  The ethical community becomes a spectre of its former self.

While Hegel's account of "world historical individuals" (Napolean as "Spirit on Horseback") is notorious, I am really intrigued by his description of the "dominant nation" which both embodies, and is responsible for bringing forth "the immediate natural principles" of an epoch.  Interestingly, he seems to imply that there is only one dominant nation in any given epoch, "and only once in history can it have this epoch making role."  And perhaps most striking:

"In contrast with this absolute right which it poses as bearer of the present stage of world spirit's development, the spirits of other nations are without rights, and they, like those whose epoch has passed, no longer count in world history." Philosophy of Right {347}

Certainly, Hegel has a very specific understanding of what it means to "no longer count in world histroy."  Still, it is hard not to think he also means it in a broader sense - that any epoch defining nation is rationaly justified to do anything it wants to any other nation. 

What is disturbing to me is how Hegel's language is so similar to the rhetoric of the neocons, who have evoked an "imperialism of virtue" as part of their justification for pre-emptive war.  All the talk of "American exceptionalism," the need to use military and economic power to further the "cause of freedom,"  even their scorn directed at the so called "Reality Based Community" - all this suggests a sense of mission and purpose that cannot be judged from the perspective of morality, or even conventional politics.

Of course the key difference is that for Hegel, world historical individuals and nations act unconsciously, their motives are usually petty and selfish (perhaps not so different?).   But when an ethical community grows stale, it is precisely these immoral figures who overturn the old order, and pave the way for the next stage in human freedom.  I am not suggesting that we look at Bush & Company as world historical figures.  But I am suggesting that they may look at themselves in this way, and that is why they are so dangerous.

But beyond this delusion is the larger question of whether there is anything in Hegel's account that we can accept today.  It seems right to me that the seeds of destruction for any nation are always immanent within the principles it embodies.  It is the articulation of these principles that brings an awareness of their limits and imperfections.  Much of the last 50 years in the United States (and western Europe) attest to this.  But is history anything like the ongoing actualization (or articulation) of Freedom?  On the face of it, this seems like a purposterous suggestion.  But then how else do we judge history?  From what point of view or what criteria do we use?  And who are we even to judge?  It seems Hegel is very useful at reminding us to raise these questions, and to be cautious not to assume the answers.  Almost all historical epochs come to see their own limitations but almost none can ever anticipate what's next. 

Comments

[YH]

Just a couple of very brief points, Alain, as I don't have time right now to say more. But I think Hegel can be rescued from any neo-con similarities by a deeper reading of the motto of the Philosophy of Right, 'the rational is the actual, and the actual is the rational'. The point is to read this statement as a speculative statement, as one of non-identity as much as of identity, as Hegel tells us to read all of his propositions. Now the Right-Hegelians read this statement non-speculatively, as a simple identity, as indicating that what exists must have reason and must be rationally justified (the theodicy you mention); thus the Prussian state was the highest embodiment of reason. The Left or 'Young' Hegelians on the other hand tried to be true to Hegel's word, to read it speculatively, and emphasising the second half of the statement, interpreted it as 'what is actual is _to become_ rational, is _to be made_ rational', a non-identity seeking an identity. From this they drew revolutionary and republican implications. To follow in the footsteps of the Left Hegelians today would be to realise that what is true of the reason which the Prussian state used as self-legitimation is also true of our contemporary Empire's self-justifying ideology. Ceterum censeo.

Second, I don't think that the thrust of the Lectures on the Philosophy of History's main thesis - that Western history has seen a 'devolopment of the consciousness of freedom' - has actually been falsified by the many unfreedoms of the 20th century. Remember that it is the _consiousness_ of freedom that is at stake. I think Hegel is actually right that freedom is more of a central value to us now, and to a greater number of us, than it was during the pre-modern period, even when, and especially when, that freedom goes unrealised, un-actualised, or only contradictorily actualised. If you think of how hyper-sensitive we are these days (rightly so) to infringements of rights and civil liberties, illegitimate uses of power, and unfreedoms dressed up as freedoms, as 'Operation Freedoms', and think too about what we are part of right here in the flourishing political blogosphere, I think one can see that freedom, our consciousness of its value, is very much what guides us.

[bat020]

"What is disturbing to me is how Hegel's language is so similar to the rhetoric of the neocons"

This isn't a coincidence - Fukayama's End of History explicitly markets itself as a right Hegelianism. Also: imperialism has always justified itself as an imperialism of virtue - and liberals have always fallen for this line (cf JS Mill's apologias for the British empire).

The critical question that springs to my mind from the Hegel extracts you've quoted is - what exactly do we understand by "nation"? For instance if we substitute "nation" with "class" we get the classical Marxist understanding of history, with the proletariat as the singular class that can actualise universality...

[Alain]

YH

Thanks for the feedback. It has been many years since I have read Hegel and I feel as if I am starting over.

I am familiar with the Left/Right distinction. I think I wasn't very clear in my post but I generally agree with the Left Hegelian view, that Hegel is best read as pointing to our consciousness of freedom. And he rightly indicates that this consciousness has emerged dialectically over time. World history is his account of this process.

My only caution is that Hegel's insight is couched in a rhetoric that justifies all sorts of violence. I think you would agree that he has a tendency to glorify blood and guts, and talk of its "necessity" even when it does not necessarily follow from his argument. And then there is all the racist/nationalist stuff, Jews hate themselves, etc... This does not diminish Hegel's achievement but it should give us pause.

Again, I am really only a beginner with Hegel but I have always admired the grandeur of his thought. I have always taken his challengeto think historically, without being a relativist, very seriously.

If you ever get the time, I would really enjoy it if you would post something on Hegel.

Thanks again.

[Alain]

bat020

I am very familiar with Fukayama's book and you are absolutely right. But when I read it almost 15 years ago, I never imagined that this view would actually influence real life political leaders. I was pretty naive.

Regarding your larger question about what constitutes a nation, or a class for that matter, is essential. I am just beginning to think about these issues so I am not sure what direction to go in.

[alphonsevanworden]

I just have to say, Alain, if we were giving out MVP awards for this blog, I'd vote for you. Wonderful chain of posts. So thanks.

[YH]

Alain, I take the point about blood and guts. The thing is, you're reading Hegel's two most unsympathetic books! Beiser is good on the numerous compromises Hegel had to make to his right-wing censors in order to get anything published during the 1820s, and even to stay in his job. I'd recommend instead the 1805-6 Jena Lectures, trans as Hegel and the Human Spirit, and of course the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit.

btw. Adorno's 1960s lectures on Hegel's philosophy of history (coming out in translation shortly) make a similar point to you about the apparently theodical nature of Hegel's argument.

[Alain]

YH

I know you are right about the Phil of Right and World History lectures. But they are also among Hegel's most accessible works. I tried reading the Logic in a reading group and nearly lost my mind. But I worked through the Phenomenology in a graduate seminar and absolutely loved it! And I will definitely get "Hegel and the Human Spirit."

Thanks again for the feedback.

[Alain]

Alphonse

Thank you for the compliment. Coming from you (with the quality of the posts you write) it means alot.

[bat020]

Picked up that Beiser book yesterday evening, very readable and informative.

[Phritz]

"It thereby becomes conscious to some degree of the limitation of such determinate things as belief, trust, and custom, so that the consciousness now has reasons for renouncing the latter and the laws which they impose. This is indeed the inevitable result of any search for reasons"

One doesn't need Doc Beiser's cribsheets to realize this is the old Lutheran dispensation outfitted with the Hegelian-Kantian coat. In other words, something like Lebensraum, or perhaps Dutch Schultz in terms of "normativity": that's not to say that's necessarily mistaken.