il n'y a pas de hors-texte

There is nothing outside of the text.  And that is neither becasue Jean-Jacques' life, or the existence of Mamma or Therese themselves, is not of prime interest to us, nor because we have access to their so-called "real" existence only in the text and we have neither any means of altering this, nor any right to neglect this limitation.  All reasons of this type would already be sufficient, to be sure, but there are more radical reasons.  What we have tried to show by following the guiding line of the "dangerous supplement," is that in what one calls the real life of these existences "of flesh and bone," beyond and behind what one believes can be circumscribed as Rousseau's text, there have never been anything but writing; there have never been anything but supplements, substitutive significations which could only come forth in a chain of differential references, the "real" supervening, and being added only while taking on meaning from a trace and from an invocation of the supplement. (Of Grammatology Pgs. 158-159)

I thought of this notorious passage as I have been reading the recent discussion regarding Theory.  I am not qualified, (nor am I all that interested in) getting into the thicket of that debate.  But I think it worth looking at Derrida's idiosyncratic use of the notion of text, particularly now when discussions of T(t)heory are taking place within a larger cultural context that is anti-intellectual.

Of course the phrase lends itself to misunderstanding.  It sounds as if Derrida is advocating a position of "linguistic Berkeleyianism" which reduces reality to words and books.  Or, perhaps more plausibly, it seems as if the "play of signifiers" leaves us in a position of meaningless confusion, where "anything goes," and context becomes subjective.  Both versions of this interpretation share the misunderstanding that Derrida has completely abandoned the concept of reference.  Derrida's response is emphatic:

It is totally false to suggest that deconstruction is a suspension of reference.  Deconstruction is always deeply concerned with the 'other' of language.  I never cease to be surprised by critics who see my work as a declaration that there is nothing beyond language, that we are imprisoned in language; it is, in fact, saying the exact opposite.  The critique of logocentrism is above all else the search for the 'other' and the 'other of language...'  Certainly, deconstruction tries to show that the questionof reference is much more complex and problematic than traditional theories supposed.  It even asks whether our term 'reference' is entirely adequate for designating the 'other.'  The other, which is beyond language and which summons language, is perhaps not a 'referent' in the normal sense which linguists have attached to this term.  But to distance oneself thus from the habitual structure, to challenge or complicate our common assumptions about it, does not amount to saying that there is nothing beyond language.  (Sited in The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, Pgs. 16-17)

Clearly Derrida does not want to do away with the notion of reference, but rather problematize it, and find its hidden assumptions and exclusions.

But we still are left wondering what Derrida actually means by the term "text."  One of his clearest and most political statements on this issue occurs in his polemical exchange on apartheid, "Racism's Last Word."  He tells us that "text" as he uses the term is not to be confused with the graphisms of a book:

It is precisely for strategic reasons... that I found it necessary to recast the concept of text by generalizing it almost without any limit that is.  That's why there is nothing "beyond the text." That's why South Africa and apartheid are, like you and me, part of this general text, which is not to say that it can be read the way one reads a book.  That's why the text is always a field of forces: heterogenous, differential, open... That's why deconstructive readings and writings are concerned not only with library books, with discourses, with conceptual and semantic contents.  They are not simply analyses of discourse...  They are also effective or active (as one says) interventions that transform contexts without limiting themselves to theoretical or constative utterances even though they must produce such utterances. (Cited in An Allegory of Modernity/Postmodernity Pg 211)

What is of particular interest about this exchange, is that two political scientists accuse Derrida of being ill equiped to step outside the area of his expertise.  In fact, they accuse him of reducing apartheid to a political language game, his analysis reduced to mere playing with words.  But Derrida employs textuality in his discussion for the purpose of showing that "there is no racism without language:"

The point is not that acts of racial violence are only words but rather that they have to have a word. Even though it offers the excuse of blood, color, birth - or rather, because it uses naturalist and sometimes creationist discourse - racism always betrays the perversion of a man, the 'talking animal'. It institutes, declares, writes, inscribes, prescribes. A system of marks, it outlines space in order to assign forced residence or to close off borders. It does not discern, it discriminates.

Perhaps we can discern here the possibility of an alternative to the "Messianic" direction of the later Derrida? I am not sure. It always seemed odd to me that the radicality of his early works evolved in a post-secular direction, more rabbinical and less poetic. But of course, he would always refuse the blackmail of having to choose between the two figures: he was always operating between the two, never willing to settle on either.

Comments

[hum]

a link to a derrida text from 1994, that might interest some. in french. do not have a reference for the english version.

http://www.philagora.net/philo-fac/derrida.htm

[alphonsevanworden]

I'm with you Alain; but with another asterisk. I think the theory exists and is indeed in use and is not so complicated and has been known if not definitively forumulated since the night of time; what is lacking now is only agreement on it, but the real problem remains the existence of an antagonist which is stronger.

[alphonsevanworden]

Thanks, bat. Very rousing.

[Matt]

hum, would you be so kind as to drop me an email sometime?

[bat020]

>> I am doubtful that the current conditions and the strength of capital is owing to humanity's lack of radical enough philosophy. <<

For sure - I'm not suggesting that a radical philosophical breakthrough is any kind of pre-condition of a political resurgence on the left. If anything it's the other way round.

[bat020]

Oops, there should have been quote marks round the first para above.

[alphonsevanworden]

Bat - I didn't meant to impute this view to you. But there is this shtick D developed in his last years, a marginal tick, I am making notes about it. I think what appears to be the depoliticization of his philosophy is actually a conclusion he came to that philosophy had fewer angles to play than he once thought - all defensive. That it had no offense basically, that the positive work of liberation was handled better elsewhere. He was really alarmed by the contempt some antiwar acivists showed for the enlightenment conception of the citizenry and liberté egalité fraternité in the pragmatic sense. I think he began to have reservations about unravelling the fabric of the commitments of anarchist and socialist militants.