common criticisms

Critics of PM never tire of writing paragraphs like these:

"The worst of it is that this deficiency is not a matter of institutional structure, nor of misplaced priorities, nor of temporary inattention. It arises from the hollowing out of Western culture as a whole. This a sententious, even grandiose, way of putting it, perhaps, but if we avoid thinking about the malaise of our larger society, across decades rather than years, I doubt we'll be able to plumb the morass into which American higher education - and, probably, the community of scholars throughout the world - has fallen.

"We not only lack guidelines and precepts to conduct us through the life of the mind, we lack the sense that such principles are even possible. The needed vocabulary hasn't vanished from our language, but it is sodden with irony, rotten from years of coarse abuse. Consider words like 'justice', 'objectivity', 'beauty', 'integrity', 'nobility', 'progress', 'honour', 'virtue', 'fairness' and 'righteousness': it's not only the postmodernists among us who reflexively snicker at these terms; all of us do so, automatically."
see: http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CADAC.htm

The above does represent a bit of an advance over the usual: at least the author does not exclusively blame postmodernists. But I certainly want to deny that all these terms are just meaningless. In fact, I would bet that postmodern types use words like 'justice' and 'fairness' all the time. Some of the other values mentioned seem like hangovers from the pre-modern period: nobility, honour, and virtue do sound strange in the mouth, and seem vague in the head. Maybe today we use other words for some version of the same thing. If someone comes to a meeting of, let's say, a department on a campus, and right after the meeting goes running to the dean to rat out someone who criticized the dean, we might not go up and accuse that colleague of 'lacking honour.' Instead we would say, "Hey rat -- I hear you went scurrying over to the dean's office to report on confidential conversations. Did you get an extra portion of rat food in exchange?" But in both cases an ethical judgment is being made.

Denying that terms like 'justice' have universal meaning is not the same as claiming that the word 'justice' has no meaning. One almost feels like saying 'duh' here, but I swear to God that's the way anti-postmodernists (APMs) think (namely, that to deny that justice has universal features is the same as to deny that the term 'justice' has any meaning at all). And pointing to the limited and even exclusionary features of a dominant notion of justice is not the same as saying "forget justice."

But also: the APMs display their ignorance of the philosophic tradition when they claim or imply that the challenge to justice is of such recent vintage. What does Hume say, for instance -- someone who I bet the APMs don't have the courage, much less the theoretical chops, to confront. All we need to do is look at the heading from _Treatise_, Book III, Section I.

Book III, Part I, 'Of virtue and vice in general'

Section I: 'Moral distinctions not deriv'd from reason'

I want the APMs to attack Hume! Hume doesn't just say that reason has nothing to do with morality. He's *dismissive* of the idea. Contemptuous. He says:

"Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. Every rational creature, 'tis said, is oblig'd to regulate his actions by reason; and if any other motive or principle challenge the direction of his conduct, he ought to oppose it, 'till it be entirely subdu'd, or at least brought to a conformity with that superior principle."
(_Treatise_, Book II 'of the passions,' in section III, itself titled 'of the influencing motives of the will')

And here comes his contempt:

"On this method of thinking," Hume continues, "the greatest part of moral philosophy, antient and modern, seems to be founded . . . "

Let me interrupt Hume to note that he is opposing not just Platonic moral theory but also 'modern' moral philosophy; that is, the kind associated with the Enlightenment. To continue:

" . . . nor is there an ampler field, as well for metaphysical arguments, as popular declamations, than this suppos'd pre-eminence of reason above passion. The eternity, invariableness, and divine origin of the former have been display'd to the best advantage: The blindness, unconstancy, and deceitfulness of the latter have been as strongly insisted on. In order to show the fallacy of all this philosophy, I shall endeavour to prove *first*, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and *secondly*, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will." (From Book II, Sect. III, 'Of the influencing motives of the will')

The phrase above that quickens my perhaps-too-easily-quickened heart is this: "In order to shew the fallacy of all this philosophy . . . " Hey Hume, don't hold back. Don't be so cautious. Go on ahead and really tell us what you think.

It is, then, a long established claim in the Western tradition that morality is a purely subjective phenomenon -- which doesn't mean it can't be disputed. But the APMs project this onto a much more recent philosophic turn, and confuse their readers by saying or implying that no one in their right mind has ever thought along such lines before.

Comments

[Jodi]

What is the payoff in confronting APMs with Hume? The following occur to me:

1. They have to recognize that a critical relation to reason and morality is already part of the Enlightenment tradition;

2. They cannot racialize or nationalize theoretical concerns such that the French are the problem;

3. Perhaps the combination of the two above: they have to recognize that their own effort to produce a purifies 'reason' or 'morality' collapses in on itself, eating its own tradition; differently put, they have to acknowledge the effectively irrational and genocidal push of their arguments.

[Alain]

Ransomswift

This is a great post. I think you are touching on something that is inherent to any discussion of PoMo: Skepticism has been an essential part of the western tradion from its origins. Plato thought it a serious enought challenge to address it in several of his "Socratic" dialogues. And ofcourse transcendental philosophy began with Kant himself being awakened from his "dogmatic slumber" by Hume.

The extension of the criticism of PoMo then works its way into the whole "culture war" non-sense. The "relativists" are put on trial for crimes against the humanities, and subesequently blamed for promoting nihilism. This is all in the service of some revisionist ideology of "the good old days."

[roger]

Ransom, Interesting series of posts about Hume.

I think there are a lot of problems in making Hume's notion that reason is and should be the slave of the passions the precursor of postmodernism. To my mind, in order to figure out what Hume is doing, one eye should be cocked on what Hume believes about politics. It is here that we get the payoff for encoding morality as, essentially, a response to the human capacity for pain or pleasure. This relocates rationality in the total effect of the system. In other words, like Adam Smith's notion that the blind greed of the small grains dealer results in a system wide benefit as though he were led by an invisible hand -- efficiencies in production, diminishment of costs -- in Hume, the meditation on the passional foundation of ethics leads to sometimes strange disjunctions between private vices and public virtues. There's an interesting paragraph in Hume's essay on politics as a science in which he says:

"The ages of greatest public spirit are not always most eminent for private virtue. Good laws may beget order and moderation in the government, where the manners and customs have instilled little humanity or justice into the tempers of men. The most illustrious period of the ROMAN history, considered in a political view, is that between the beginning of the first and end of the last PUNIC war; the due balance between the nobility and the people being then fixed by the contests of the tribunes, and not being yet lost by the extent of conquests. Yet at this very time, the horrid practice of poisoning was so common, that, during part of a season, a Prætor punished capitally for this crime above three thousand persons in a part of ITALY; and found informations of this nature still multiplying upon him. There is a similar, or rather a worse instance, in the more early times of the commonwealth. So depraved in private life were that people, whom in their histories we so much admire. I doubt not but they were really more virtuous during the time of the two Triumvirates; when they were tearing their common country to pieces, and spreading slaughter and desolation over the face of the earth, merely for the choice of tyrants."

What does this mean? There are several ways this could skew. One of them is that justice, which has to be the enigma at the center of an ethic of pleasures, removes itself from ethics. Hume, like the guy in Kafka's story, sits before the door of the law; but unlike the guy in Kafka's story, it turns out that the door is not for him alone -- in fact, no individual can enter that gate, only a collective can. So, in a sense, justice can't be part of morality.

But I don't see how this leads to postmodernity.

[Jason]

"*first*, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and *secondly*, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will.""

This could be read as more or less upholding an ethics based on self-interest, rather than on altruism or objective morality. Humans are unlikely to sacrifice their own good for the benefit of some supposedly rational ideal or cause--thus a sort of abstract ethic based on a Kantian imperative (what if everyone acted in this manner), or the Proletariat would seem to be implausible. But an ethics and politics based on individual self-interest is quite workable: the social contract from Hobbes forward can be viewed in these terms. (when have PMs argued for contract models of politics or ethics ). Reason and logic as a whole may be in service to the passions--to assist in obtaining necessities for life, etc.--but I doubt Hume would claim that it is therefore less important than desires, instincts, inclinations etc. Strong arm robbery may work for some thugs; the more sophisticated criminal prefers hacking, fraud, or ID theft.

But a purely self-interested ethics (which Hume seems to point to)--means that it might be in the mafiosos best interest to kill his rival and his rival family; and that even if your own suicide bombing of a nazi hall in Munich in the 20's would have prevented WWII (and you knew this) that would not be sufficient grounds for performing the act. A contractural view of ethics seems to lead to a type of amorality where there is no obligation not to be, say, Al Capone. Yet I would like to read PMs argue for some opposing view to contractural and/or utilitarian ethics, ala a Kantian imperative (which they seem to hint at when claiming that analytical philosophers had an obligation to recognize the Holocaust which they failed to live up to). Thoguth they won't admit it most PMs are closer to idealists, to Plato or Kant, than they are to Hume and the English really.

[John S. Ransom]

There are two senses in which we can think about Hume and postmodernism. 1. Hume's relationship to the 'popular' intellectual treatment of postmodernism and 2. Hume as actual intellectual forefather of postmodernism.

When I read a criticism of PM, I often carry out the following test: 'A' is the APM (anti-postmodern) author. 'X' is the postmodern position that is being criticized. 'Y' is another philosopher in the Western canon that has said something similar or very similar to 'X.' If 'A' is criticizing 'X' but not 'Y', my conclusion is that the author is not a very deep thinker on the topic being discussed. Rather, what's happening is that 'A' is using 'X' as an excuse for attacking the whole philosophic tradition.

Here's a supposed postmodern position, our 'X' above: morality is not universal but is relative to environment (where 'environment' is broadly conceived). 'A' gets all hepped up about 'X', but neglects to mention that, say, Montesquieu was doing cultural relativism back in . . . 1722; that is, that Montesqueiu is a 'Y' in my incredibly simple formula.

So: there's using Hume or Montesquieu or Diderot or someone else as a check on the intellectual value of criticisms. Then there's: what is there in these thinkers that is a genuine precursor of what is called postmodernism on the theoretical side? I need to keep these two senses separate. I think someone like Hume is helpful in both senses.

Read the right way, both Hume and Adam Smith are precursors of postmodernism. There's nothing strange about this -- at least as a possibility, as this claim has not yet been sufficiently argued for. There are elements of modernism in the ancient Greek polis. When we think about it it's not the least bit strange that current philosophic developments are characterized by their affinity with this or that echo from the past, as well as dissonance.

[John S. Ransom]

Jason writes:

"*first*, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and *secondly*, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will."" (excerpt from Hume)

This could be read as more or less upholding an ethics based on self-interest, rather than on altruism or objective morality.
(end quotation from Jason)

Yes, I do agree that this looks like a self-interest argument about how society works. Fable of the Bees, Mandeville stuff. But Hume is *very* subtle. In fact, he wants to navigate between two dangerous reefs. First reef: self-interest is the only real factor at work when humans interact in society or elsewhere. Like Hobbes.

Second reef: human societies can be based on reason, with the understanding that 'reason' as seen from the 'point of view' of the social whole is quite different from the calculating 'reason' that a pleasure-maximizing individual would employ at society's base.

And why does Hume want to navigate between these two reefs? Because he has a different view of what human beings are? Another, third theory? Well, in part the answer's yes, but I think Hume would want to say "no, it's not that I have this competing theory of human nature." Remember that Hume is introducing the scientific and observational method into questions of morality. Hume *does not observe* (around himself) a society that is filled with utterly self-interested individuals, nor one that is run exclusively according to the dictates of reason. Neither approach explains the phenomenon around him.

There's something wrong both with Hobbes and with Plato. True, if Hume had to choose between those two, I think he'd have to lean towards Hobbes. But if not forced to so choose, he would say that neither gets very close to what's going on. Both Hobbes and Plato have thoeries that do not correspond to the real world, and that ought to be a problem for any theory!

If you observe the world around you, what you see is an awfully high incidence of compliance with moral norms. That's why instances of non-compliance make such fun reading in the newspapers. Today (10/20/05) I read in the newspaper that a young woman was arrested in San Francisco after she allegedly threw her three young children into the San Francisco Bay. Assuming it's true, this horrible crime makes the news precisely because that's *not* the kind of thing that the over- overwhelming majority of parents do with their kids. Most people are moral! What explains it? Neither the appeal to reason from Plato nor the appeal to self-interests in Hobbes.

[Jason]

I would tend to disagree with identifying PM with Hume or Adam Smith; there is far too much Marx and Nietzsche in that parisian roux, isn't there. There is an ethical relativism perhaps, but I read JD and Foucault as dealing with the failures and limits of marxism. The subject himself is still viewed more from a marxist perspective--part of a class, a proletarian or bourgeois--than as some individual possessing rights and acting from rational self-interest (though I am not defending marxism at all, and do think ethics must begin with the perspective of the rational citizen --if there are any remaining--and start with entitlement rather than "property of the state").

But in regards to Hume, I don't think his pespective on ethics could be called anything else than a sort of subjective hedonism, not really even relativism. You cannot obtain an "ought from an is" according to Hume. So even a type of utilitarianism based on consensus seems to be ruled out; whatever one defines as good or pleasurable is good or pleasurable--a great ethics for a scottish Baron. I doubt he is that consistent in his skepticism, but if he denies the possibility of any sort of objective duties or obligations why not Caligula--or Pol Pot-

Of course self-interested individuals, realizing they are at danger in a state of nature will work out agreements, laws, contracts--the powerful feudal landholder though with his knights might not agree to those covenants of course as Hobbes realized--as did Nietzsche didn't he?. So I m not sure where the point on Hume's dismissal of ethics is going.

I think PMs also have enough Freud in the mix, maybe even some determinism as well: a broad who wants to dump her kids in the Bay in hopes they will be devoured by sharks is not acting in her own interest, she is psychotic. And psychosis, pathopsychology, thanatos, eros, etc. seem far closer to the PM mindset than Hume; though I do think there are still some hints of idealism in the PM mind. But Hume recognizing the limits of reason and the existence of the "passions" (early view of instincts perhaps?)--I guess that's sort of naturalism and even Darwinist to a degree.
Are you saying postmods acknowledge the biological basis for behavior or something? I would agree--they do, but not sufficiently, given their suspicion of sciences and "structuralism." It's as if they want to be ethicists as well as psychologists and semanticists. I just think their views on language are mistaken and not really worked out, and the rest--the relativism, or psychology or politics, or hopes at ethics--are sort of futile given the bizarre nature of the language critique.

[Jason]

I would tend to disagree with your identification of PM with either Hume or Adam Smith; there is far too much Marx and Nietzsche in that parisian roux, isn't there. There is an ethical relativism perhaps, but I read JD and Foucault as dealing with the failures and limits of marxism. The subject himself is still viewed more from a marxist perspective--determined to some degree, part of a class, a proletarian or bourgeois--than as some individual possessing rights and acting from rational self-interest (though I am not defending marxism at all, and do think ethics must begin with the perspective of the rational citizen --if there are any remaining--and start with entitlement rather than "property of the state").

But in regards to Hume, I don't think his pespective on ethics could be called anything else than a sort of subjective hedonism, not really even relativism. You cannot obtain an "ought from an is" according to Hume. So it seems that is cloer to self-interest contracturalism than to a imperative. Even a type of utilitarianism based on consensus seems to be ruled out; whatever one defines as good or pleasurable is good or pleasurable--a great ethics for a scottish Baron. I doubt he is that consistent in his skepticism, but if he denies the possibility of any sort of objective duties or obligations, and doesn't really do the Hobbesian or Rawlians thing (however flawed) and address how any sort of consensus may be worked out by those self-interested humans, why not Caligula--or Pol Pot-

Of course self-interested individuals, realizing they are at danger in a state of nature will work out agreements, laws, contracts--the powerful feudal landholder though with his knights might not agree to those covenants of course as Hobbes realized--as did Nietzsche didn't he?. So I m not sure where the point on Hume's dismissal of ethics is going. My own view if you care, is that ethics really points to psychology (norms of behavior, deviancy etc.) and that until the cognitivists figure out all the neural and genetic pathways of "action"
and intentions, a sort of top-down behaviorism, sort of Malthusian really, is really the best way to control the human primate: 'Zine for the masses.

I think PMs also have enough Freud in the mix, maybe even some determinism as well: a broad who wants to dump her kids in the Bay in hopes they will be devoured by sharks is not acting in her own interest, she is psychotic. And psychosis, pathopsychology, thanatos, eros, etc. seem far closer to the PM mindset than Hume; though I do think there are still some hints of idealism in the PM mind. But Hume recognizing the limits of reason and the existence of the "passions" (early view of instincts perhaps?)--I guess that's sort of naturalism and even Darwinist to a degree.
Are you saying postmods acknowledge the biological basis for behavior or something? I would agree--they do, but not sufficiently, given their suspicion of sciences and "structuralism." It's as if they want to be ethicists as well as psychologists and semanticists. I just think their views on language are mistaken and not really worked out, and the rest--the relativism, or psychology or politics, or hopes at ethics--are sort of futile given the bizarre nature of the language critique.

[Jason]

Apologies if that's a bit unwieldy or colloquial. I think along with literature departments, philosophy should be downsized in a major way. Marx felt that way--that philosophy was the sort of elite grove for the rich bourgeois where they can speculate endlessly and narcissistically about everything, or question the existence of the material world as in Hume's case. Most humans don't really care about Derrida or Plato or Hume or Russell or question the material world: they care about making money and finding something nice to screw. At least Freud starts with that realization. Postmod. brings back the metaphysical ghosts, the clericalism, the obscure scholarship, when they were on the ropes, not only due to beatings from analytical philosophers and scientists, but from behaviorists and other psychologists.

Bastante

[Amie]

John,
Apparently, the APMs are for whatever "reason(s)" unwilling to engage. Tant pis.
Anyway, a couple of questions, while waiting for APMs,( to quote Beckett.)
The first Q involves the APM ignorance of the philosophical tradition which you justly note. (It can often take worse forms than ignorance of course, as in the Straussian inspired translations of Plato for example, but that is not exactly my question, though I do think "translation" is essential to all this.) The question is: so yes, Hume and Monty have already a long time ago posed aporetic questions relating to PM, but then does this not inevitably raise the question of the *rapport/relation* to the tradition, and is not PM precisely the problem of such a relation/relating? It's a question because PM and APM can perhaps not be resolved dialectically, i.e, in an anti- mode?
The second Q is more precisely about Hume's subtlety in navigating Scylla and Charbydis, by "observation", as this begs the question of who is the observer, able to unify the observations, and so Descrates -- and the evil demon -- is not far from coming up, no?

[Jason]

the APM ignorance of the philosophical tradition

Ah postmodernists upholding tradition now, eh. Which APM and which specific tradition are you referring to? You want to uphold Hume then you are arguing for some inductive methods anyways and eventually Popperian criteria--sort of diametrically opposed to postmod.

How about we turn to some pages in the 1st Critique where Kant makes it clear that knowledge requires acquaintance with sensible objects and perceptions: analytical philosophy from 1800.

You're no philsopher, you're an aesthete.

[Jason]

Anyways the "philosophical tradition" is based primarily on the L-word (no, not Lesbo--Logic). But count me in on the tradition. Couragio!

So tradition: you have Ari's square of opposition handy? Nearly analytical phil., circa 400 bc

[Jason]

hey dots yr scaring the Lay-day.

E.O.Wilson, socio-biologist and Harvard professor on PM:

Wilson sees post-modernistic philosophy “...as the polar antithesis of the Enlightenment; ...[whereas] enlightenment thinkers believed that we can know everything, radical postmodernists believe we can know nothing.” According to Wilson, “postmodernists challenge the very foundations of science and traditional philosophy. ... [They see] ...reality as a state created by the mind, not perceived by it. In the most extravagant version of this constructivism, there is no “real” reality, no objective truths external to mental activity, only prevailing versions disseminated by ruling social groups. (Wilson, Consilience, p. 40)

There's a real APM for you. It would seem if the PM were consistent he would srop driving his car, quit using his computer, and not visit his doctor: all of which are based on techniques derived from science and Enlightenment rationality.

E0 Wilson 1; PMism, 0

[Ray Davis]

I've enjoyed some supposed "PM"s much as I enjoy Hume, right. Sharp, challenging, engaged, agile, and willing to be and conscious of being ridiculous as necessary. But if I was flooded with complaints from friends about how their empty-noggined power-dizzy Hume-huffing authority figures bullied them with nonsense (as I would have been if I'd hung around different academies at a different time), I might sometimes sound less fond of Hume than I am.

(If this comment was a paper, the title would be "It's Not the Humedity, It's the Heat".)

Anyway, I haven't been around much lately and won't be much for a bit yet, but if any of you are able and willing to convey fan mail to the self-disappeared CR, please pass along my regards. He received short shrift given the sincerity and fecundity of his provocations, and I remain grateful for their products.

[CR]

Hey - thanks Ray.

I'll be back once I've, um, gotten some work and child rearing done.

But not sure I'll be back on the Valve threads ever. Just no use. (Not all Valve threads - not yours. You know what I mean!)

[roger]

John, I'm a little disappointed when you write: "Read the right way, both Hume and Adam Smith are precursors of postmodernism. There's nothing strange about this -- at least as a possibility, as this claim has not yet been sufficiently argued for. There are elements of modernism in the ancient Greek polis." It certainly pulls the carpet out from under the conceptual shock of saying, hey, Hume's a Postmodernist if you are going to add so many others to the list -- Ezra Pound, Winston Churchill, Woody Guthrie, you name it -- that it becomes a block party.

Myself, I gotta admit, I don't like the term "postmodernism" because it has a tendency to mean anything -- if the ethical relativism of the Enlightenment thinkers, or the authorial gameplaying of the Romantic writers are all postmodern, to my mind the term has lost its function. It doesn't set any boundaries. I like boundaries. In the movie, the Blob, I liked it when they killed the Blob. And I think that's how I feel about postmodernism.

[John S. Ransom]

Periods writes:

College-boy lit hepsters love their Hume. His philosophy is pretty shallow and dismal
(end periods commentary on Hume)

Thanks periods. Hume is shallow and dismal? I look forward to more giants of the Western tradition being treated this way by APMs. Hume is shallow and dismal! Just wonderful. So, periods would put, say, Derrida and Lyotard in the same camp as someone like, say, Hume. But what are you going to do? Kant says that Hume woke the former from his dogmatic slumber. And so Kant didn't think Hume was shallow and dismal. But Kant is the sine qua non of the APMs (APMs equals anti-postmoderns).

Oh but tripping up these APMs -- it's like shooting fish in a barrel.

[Jason]

Why not respond to the actual claim?

I would amend a bit: Hume's writings appear a bit shallow and makeshift in comparison to the history of continental Rationalism, and even to Hobbes and Locke. But that isn't really the point: as I indicated in the post above, Hume, like Kant a few decades later, upholds the analytic/synthetic divide as a correct description of knowledge (though Kant denies that all facts are derived from experience, right, and that the laws of physics are syn. a priori, not syn a post.). So there are axiomatic, a priori truths of math and logic, and physical "laws" based on facts of experiencee (which according to Hume are not necessary truths). PMs often deny this distinction, as well as both analyticity and induction. So Alex, I'll take Epistemology for $200: the place where the conceptual schema known as PM situates itself on the Big A/S dichotomy.

[Jason]

Erratum: that is, Kant holds that the laws of physics are syn. a priori, not syn. a posteriori as Hume did

Come on, man, let's hear your denial of the truths of both logic/set theory, as well as any sort of knowledge resting on inference and observation.

[Jason]

John Ransom must be occupied with some pressing ontological issues and not able to cleave the A/S divide so to speak, but I know what the PMs might yawp: the analytic/synthetic divide of both Hume ad Kant is one of those Grand Narratives, right, characteristic of Enlightenment Rationality, and PM has done away with them....at least until the young PM'ster catches a case of hep or the clap, and making a quick logocentric inference (and falling back into those bourgeois binary oppositions of cause-effect), must go down to see the imperialist Oppressor Dr. Benway and obtain some of that hegemonic penicillin. Fo' shizzle

[Jason]

That's sort of irrelevant. Do you or don't you uphold the analytic-synthetic divide? T v F. DO you need like John Searle to ask it of you? You want to see the proper credentials so to speak?

Anytime a substantial point is raised--in this case I bring in quotes from Hume's "Enquiry" showing that he upholds the A/S divide, along with pointing out that Hume believes that no physical laws are necessary truths--the PM evades it or will find some way to get around any sort of direct answer. Agreed it's no that profound or "ontological" in the typical PM fashion, and that I m not trying to phrase it in the approved PM belle-lettrist format (nor did Hume), but it is a rather critical point which would separate both Hume and Kant from PM. You either deny it or call it meaningless or you confirm it. So.....philosopher---which is it.

[.....................]

I'm leaving but with the observation that PMists will wrap themselves in the robes of philosophical "tradition" and make some little remarks about how PM is part of the "tradition,"--and also make plenty of Sartre-like ad hominems--"you Schtupid Amerikan, vull-gar, yada yada yada"--while never engaging at all in the tradition--which does revolve around questions relating to analytic/synthetic divide (raised by Leibniz, Hume and Kant) as well as materiality (even addressed by orthodox marxists), and intention/determinism and any number of other "traditional" issues which the PMs evade. Like the usual liberal they do go with the ethics stuff--i.e. "Hume appears to be ethical relativist or subjectivist so he's PM"--deeeeep- while avoiding any of the meatier issues.

PMism has a lot vested in its dogma ( as do the marxists) so any sort of say basic Humean points--i.e. that PM is based on observations and facts of some sort or another (it's certainly not axiomatic) and thus the "truth" of its claims ( anti-claims?), are contigent and inductive to some degree--are skirted over in hopes of keeping the appearance of some sort of consistent body of knowledge intact.

Derrida was doing a bizarre conceptual anthropology in Of G. and thus its empirical (apart from a few strange Heidegger-Hegel aspects) and as subject to doubt as any empirical endeavor--in fact more, since he uses little to no sort of data or sampling.

(now back to yr regularly scheduled LS belle-lettrist wank-off masquerading as philosophy)

[John S. Ransom]

Jason writes:

Why not respond to the actual claim?

I would amend a bit: Hume's writings appear a bit shallow and makeshift in comparison to the history of continental Rationalism, and even to Hobbes and Locke. But that isn't really the point: as I indicated in the post above, Hume, like Kant a few decades later, upholds the analytic/synthetic divide as a correct description of knowledge (though Kant denies that all facts are derived from experience, right, and that the laws of physics are syn. a priori, not syn a post.). So there are axiomatic, a priori truths of math and logic, and physical "laws" based on facts of experiencee (which according to Hume are not necessary truths). PMs often deny this distinction, as well as both analyticity and induction.
(end Jason's comment)

I repeat: Hume is not writing a book of epistemology. He doesn't care about any of this theory of knowledge stuff in the sense of thinking it fundamental. For him the question is: morality. That, too, was the question for Kant. They were much more worried about morality than about the grounds of human knowledge. That's because of the tactical situation they faced at the time.

You write above: Hume seems superficial in comparison to Hobbes and Locke. You are wrong in this. Hobbes and Locke are beginners compared to Hume. Beloved beginners, valuable beginners, but beginners. And if I'm right that you're wrong about it, and I succeed in pointing that out (to be seen, no doubt), then there's no reason not to agree with me, or rather with Hume.

Don't listen to me! Listen to Hume!

'Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction. 'Tis also obvious, that this emotion rests not here, but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect. Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and according as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation. But 'tis evident in this case that the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it. (Book II, Of the Passions, Sect. III, 'of the influencing motives of the will', p. 461 in the Penguin edition)

And so is Hume merely repeating Hobbes' argument? Compare:

Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is, that the object of man's desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ only in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired. (Chapter 11, Part 1 of Leviathan)

The answer is "no, they are not the same." Why? Because Hobbes -- blinded a bit by the clarity of the insight that reduces humans to mere registers of pain and pleasure -- *stops* where Hume *begins.* More soon.

[John S. Ransom]

If -- pace Hobbes -- humans were mere pain/pleasure seekers, morality would be impossible. Maybe it would be possible to establish a civil society with a government based on Hobbes' 'fear of death' factor in Chapter XIII of Part I of Leviathan. But soon after that the looming 'threat of death' would recede and the emotional, subjective state that produced the original agreement to go along with the unlimited power of a despot would fade. Hobbes then argues that the despot should continually reintroduce the 'threat of death' in order to keep it fresh in the minds of its subjects, but here the argument just starts creaking. And at the time everybody thought Hobbes was not that relevant; not that persuasive. Too theoretical. Too much of a Platonist -- though I don't know if they put it that way.

From Hume's perspective, Hobbes is just silly. Hobbes talks himself into it too much. He allows his theory to hijack his thinking the actual world around him. Very similar to the problem with Plato, such that with both authors, it's very hard to see how their theory would work in practice. They provide 'ideal types' more than workable theories.

Hobbes' argument is condemned by Hume because his account isn't doesn't correspond to the way morality works at all. Human nature is certainly characterized by self-interest; selfishness. But Hume says:

"I am sensible that generally speaking, the representation of this quality [that is, selfishness] have been carried much too far; and that the descriptions, which certain philosophers delight so much to form of mankind in this particular, are as wide of nature as any accounts of monsters, which we meet with in fables and romances. So far from thinking, that men have no affection for any beyond themselves, I am of opinion, that tho' it be rare to meet with one, who loves any single person better than himself; yet 'tis as rare to meet with one, in whom all the kind affections, taken together, do not overbalance all the selfish. (Book III, Of morals, Sect. II, 'of the origin of justice and property,' p. 538 of the Penguin.)

[Jason]

I will give it a shot, though I object in principle to what is called "ethics"--either empirical/utilitarian or Kantian/theist variety--and feel ethics exists as a subspecies of social psychology more or less. Where does Hume condemn Hobbes principle of self-interest exactly? I tend to think they are quite close in their views regarding passions, desire, "felicity", aversion/attraction: it's more a matter of degree separating them. Hume might object to what Hobbes does with his materialist ethics and subsequent "contract," but I don't think he denies that Hobbes, like himself, proceeds from a "hedonistic" ethical perspective: people are drawn to pleasurable objects/events and that is "good"; and they tend to avoid non-pleasurable objects/events, and those are "bad"--the basic premise of utilitarianism really, though maximizing the Good might not necessarily follow
(perhaps some people get pleasure from something but don't want it maximized--though I think maximizing what is defined as Good seems to be a common principle).

Perhaps Hume is saying Hobbes overlooks the fact that pleasure can be had by altruism or benevolence as well as by acquisition or lust or whatever, but that's beside the point. They both are basing their ethics on human passions, desires, appetites, and not on objective or transcendental imperatives, whether those be theist or Kantian or whatever. Obviously you understand how that could lead to lots of problems. A consensus of people all acting out of their own self-interest might, say, proclaim a law allowing cannibalism (or vote for Hitler, etc.): a obvious instance of tyranny of the majority, from Rousseau. Any pure hedonist ethics or even utilitarianism, which allows "Good" to be defined purely from individual standpoint, could result in cannibalism defined as a Good. (Thus some form of "deontological" ethics would seem to be necessary: it is always wrong to kill innocent, say).

A majority did support Hitler. Most would say that was completely unacceptable and an affront to Justice: in fact I wager most PMists would agree to that. Justice should not be decided by consent, by people who have defined their own "Good." But the hedonistic and egoist ethics of both Hobbes and Hume could very easily lead to that. This is a fairly traditional objection to both contract ethics and utilitarianism: Rawls gets around it, perhaps, by arguing that anyone asked to select or participate in a proposed society should do so only if there is a high probability of he/she living in it; i.e. the marxist may not be so gung ho about instituting slave labor camps for 75% of the population if he has say a 50/50 chance of living there. The only way to get around the possible tyranny of the majority would seem to be something like this--a lottery or probable consequence for those voting or choosing a social contract (and assuming that people would not select a society that had high chance of totalitarianism or injustice, if they had to live there). That or moral strictures or theistic laws.

PMists never seem to engage in this though they often seem to make nearly Kantian types of moral claims (see the typical liberal whines about Katrina above, or the point on anal. phil. as moraly wrong for not acknowledging the Holocaust). Even Rawls assumes a great deal--that people do make rational choices for one, and that somewhere a contract creation occurs (does it have to be renegotiated regularly?).

I have read a few passages of Nietzsche which criticizes the social contract theorists as naive if not mistaken : humans don't come out of the state of Nature to form a consensus and select a sovereign to enforce their agreed upon laws: instead a group of marauders takes form in the wilds and seizes whatever it can--perhaps then some rules are decided upon -- a Dane law--(i.e don't rape a Dane's wife and children) but that is always subject to revision or to being ignored. And PMists would do better to acknowlege that Nietzschean and yes Darwinian naturalism rather than proceed with any sort of ethics based on bogus idealism, methinx.

(btw I think Hume's theory of knowledge is as at least as important to the history of philosophy as his statements on ethics--Popper for one takes Hume's ideas on induction to create his system of falsification , right)