more on Hume

There is no substantive difference between intellectual inquiry in the social, human, or natural sciences.  Even the process of intellectual inquiry is the same. What we all do, regardless of field, is come up with a claim about how something works, and then provide argument and evidence in support. At that level of abstraction, there's no difference. This applies to Derrida or any other thinker one might want to mention.

Hume has a claim! His claim is: reason has nothing to do with morals or ethics. Reason is strictly limited in application. He, too, is doing a critique of pure reason -- critique of reason as a tool, isolated from the uses made of it. His claim is that he can make complete nonsense of anyone claiming that reason has even just a little bit to do with morality.

Reason is a calculator. Reason talks about efficacy and inefficacy. Errors and truth about facts. I see a big fat moon in the sky -- I think it's close -- but that's a mistake, reason assures us. The moon is actually really far away; precise distance could be provided. I want two things: I want to lose weight and I want to eat a king-sized butterfinger. But these two desires cannot be satisfied at the same time. Which 'end' am I going to choose? Mouth full of repressed homosexual rage king-sized butterfinger *now*, or speculatively thin *later*? Reason can't say a word about those two desires. All it can say is, "if the goal is weight loss, here's the caloric price of that candy bar," and "if the goal is perverse sensory overload, here's where the all-night 7-11 is located, you drunk in-denial pig."

Hume writes:

Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood. Truth or falshood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas,or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason. Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities,compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions,volitions, and actions. Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason. [end Hume, _Treatise of Human Nature_, Book III, Of Morals, Part 1, p. 510 in Penguin version]

This is Hume's section on morality. Why is he so worked up about dismissing reason as a participant in moral thinking? His position is not that humans are immoral, especially because reason can't make them moral. He is not saying, 'everyone is just after whatever feels good at the moment,' although that is actually what he's saying, though not the way someone might think. In fact, Hume looks around himself in eighteenth century Scotland and sees (as I may have mentioned before) all sorts of people acting morally. That's why he's not a Hobbesian: he doesn't think people need some weird non-civil society Leviathan to guarantee cooperation and social peace. His point goes like this: (1) in fact, people are moral a lot more often than not; (2) reason is not the basis of this moral action; (3) what accounts for the moral behavior that is observable?

Comments

[YH]

Not sure that the approach to enquiry in the social, human and natural sciences is the same. The critique of Comte's positivism that occurs in the social sciences c. 1900 would need to be taken into account. There's also an historical separation of 'spheres of reason' that would need to be taken into account, even if in the last instance, that separation is to be critiqued. Not sure too that reasoning is a claim about 'how something works'. Would this capture Kant on 'the kingdom of ends', for example? Sorry to be the Socratic nerd in the corner.

[......]

Hume also says that, since there are no rational grounds for ethics (one cannot infer ye olde "ought from an is") that there is no difference between him pricking his finger or half the population of the world perishing tomorrow. So, at least from a Humean perspective I am not obligated to feel sorrow or compassion or any sense of injustice at say a Stalin or Hitler, if it really does not cause me any pain or discomfort.

You are, I think, overlooking a rather obvious point and failing to see the amorality implied by Hume's subjective ethics.

[John S. Ransom]

In response to ......:

Thank you for pointing to this important moment in Hume's argument, though I disagree with the conclusion you draw from it. It's located in _Treatise of Human Nature_, Book II, 'Of the passions,' Section III, 'Of the influencing motives of the will.' This is the same section where Hume throws down his gauntlet: referring to the various claims by philosophers that reason must or can be dominant over the passions, Hume says he will "shew the fallacy of all this philosophy" (Penguin 460). So he is addressing this point directly.

What he's not saying, however, is that because reason has nothing to do with moral action, we all are or should be amoral. Instead, he's saying that 'reason in command' is not the way morality works. His is, in part, an observational point. He's not saying we should be amoral, and in fact, when he looks around himself, he doesn't see most people acting immorally. Most people, when they learn about the incredible injustices of Hitler or Stalin, do feel the compassion you talk about. And why? Not, according to Hume, because their 'reason' led them to 'sense' the injustices. To simplify a little dangerously: all reason can do is point out what to do if we want a specific end. What it can't do is provide us with the motive needed to pursue that end. Thus, reason can point out that eating the hot fudge sundae will ruin the diet, but it can't provide the motive for refusing to violate it. It's easy to see, from this example, how people confuse reason with morality or ethics. If I give in and eat the sundae, I might yell at myself: "Why weren't you more reasonable! You knew eating that sundae would blow the diet!" And then I could conclude that what is going on is a contest between 'reason' and 'appetite.' But that's a mistake, Hume thinks. What's really going on is a battle between two appetites: the one that wants health benefits from weight loss and the one that wants sensory satisfaction from the sundae. From the same section we are discussing:

"Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse; and if this contrary impulse ever arises from reason, that latter faculty must have an original influence on the will, and must be able to cause, as well as hinder any act of volition. But if reason has no original influence, 'tis impossible it can withstand any principle, which has such an efficacy, or ever keep the mind in suspence a moment. Thus it appears, that the principle, which opposes our passion, cannot be the same with reason, and is only call'd so in an improper sense. We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. As this opinion may appear somewhat extraordinary, it may not be improper to confirm it by some other considerations." (p. 463 in Penguin edition)

Note that Hume is quite aware that he is saying something that could seem strange and counter-intuitive. But: when he says that reason can and ought to be the slave of the passions, he's not saying that we 'should' run around giving into our passions. Nor is this the kind of behavior he observes around him. His position is: reason is the slave of the passions AND that people develop moral views and behave morally.

What makes a passion unreasonable? Only two ways this can happen, Hume says. First, if I have a passion that is based on a misunderstanding of the facts. A plane crashes, I am sure my girlfriend is on the plane, I grieve and suffer horribly, but then it turns out she wasn't on the plane and my grief and pain now becomes unreasonable. The second way is if I choose means that are insufficient for achieving the desired end. Instead of putting coins in the coke machine, I sacrifice a chicken in front of it. No coke comes out. I have behaved unreasonably, or irrationally. And here comes, finally, Hume's money quote:

"Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. 'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. 'Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledge'd lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter. A trivial good may, from certain circumstances, produce a desire superior to what arises from the greatest and most valuable enjoyment . . . " (Penguin 463)

That's right! It's not contrary to *reason* to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my little finger! But that doesn't mean there's nothing out there that will get us to prefer saving the world over scratching our finger.

[perezoso]

Effective analysis, but I remain unconvinced that Hume's view of reason as a slave of the passions leads to any sort of practical or objective ethics. And there have been critiques of the "no ought from an is" argument. Any sort of view of ethics which begins not from "passions," but basic needs and requirements, will seem to give rise to "oughts" if not to obligations and indeed rights. People have stomachs and must eat; therefore they ought to be able to eat (i.e. be allowed some degree of freedom, and also employment which allows them to obtain money to buy food). You could deny the ought as a good Humean might. "People need to eat, but it is not a fact that they ought to be able to eat" so it doesn't matter either way. That is what Hume would lead to. Or "They ought not to be able to eat" (be free to do so).

Most people would argue that the "need" (food) creates some sort of obligation here, which is not simply a matter of taste or whether the granting of freedom brings pleasure. Say you are the Party Leader of some State Farm. If you grant that people need to eat (a fact, and really not debatable) then isn't preventing them (assuming that they have not performed any sort of great crime themselves) from doing so some sort of infringement, if not crime? Not according to Hume: for that pleasure--denying someone's right to work--could be just as pleasurable as allowing him that "right": i.e. Hume does not show how passion could be worse than another (and your example with the sacrificing a chicken in front of the soda machine and then calling it irrational seems to show that passion can be irrational,--unreasonable--which means that passions ARE being measured by reason).

Many human requirements are not "passions" anyway, but needs and necessaries which are biologically determined, and these needs give rise to an "ought," at least in the context of a civil society (a problem really--in Malthusian scenarios, nothing but brute force--or weapons--might matter in terms of obtaining needs). Surely from the perspective of an individual the ought is recognized: X does think he ought to be able to go to work (to get money to buy food, pay for necessaries). Most forms of a social contract start from that premise: needs give rise to "oughts" (which is another way of indicating a right). To deny that--to say you ought not to be permitted to go to work and earn your money to buy food, would of course be a crime (were someone to restrict your movement) and "unethical" to most people. And in a very real sense that is what totalitarian governments--fascist or communist--often do: they deny that people do have some innate right to procure their own livelihood for some reason. And if that brings them pleasure, satisfies their passion, the Humean cannot really object, except by maybe claiming that it's not to his particular taste.

[Michel]

"We murder to dissect" the honorable Wordsworth once said. We categorize, pigeonhole and label everything. We breakdown language, nuance and inflexion into mathematical formulas and abstrations. Medical science has determined that our spirit can be described by a thesis on seratonin and that our brains are simply 3 pounds of meat, awash in various chemicals.

The reason that the majority of people plod through their philosophy courses with their heart rate barely above flatline is that they are subjected to these types of arguments.

But philosophy is a study that some people find thrilling and I wouldn't fault anyone for engaging in that. No more than I would criticize someone who enjoyed watching professional sports (Man U forevah!) eventhough I think it's a monumental waste of time and, in the aggregate is simply an exercise in distraction (opiate of the unwashed masses?). It's endemic to our Western civilization - if you go to your psychologist and you are late, then you are 'passive-aggressive'. If you are on time you are 'submissive' or 'perfectionist'. If you are early then the doctor will label you "anal-retentive" (should that be hyphenated? ha..ha..). You can't win. You're doomed the moment you walk in through the door. I'm not judging, the spirit of my writing is as a conscientious observer.

Perezoso and Samson, I think arrive more at the mark of Hume's arguments. "Nature abhors a vacuum" and sometimes reason is the justification for moral behavior - "Do unto other as you would have them do unto you" We use our reason to remember times when we were treated badly and we resolve to treat others in a kindly way because we know from experience that we would like to be treated in a dignified manner, thus we should treat others that way.

I had 8 years of Theology and 4 semesters of philosophy at a Jesuit university. The Jesuits single-handedly caused Joyce to denounce Catholicism. I'm sure there is a kernel of wisdom somewhere in that observation.

Thanks.

[John S. Ransom]

Postedby Michel:

The reason that the majority of people plod through their philosophy courses with their heart rate barely above flatline is that they are subjected to these types of arguments. [end Michel]

But it's not true that the majority of people plod through philosophy courses with heart rates barely above flatline. For more and more students, philosophy courses, especially introductory ones, are completely elective. Philosophy courses are full. The assessment above of the response of students to these courses is inaccurate.

[John S. Ransom]

Michel writes:

Perezoso and Samson, I think arrive more at the mark of Hume's arguments. "Nature abhors a vacuum" and sometimes reason is the justification for moral behavior - "Do unto other as you would have them do unto you" We use our reason to remember times when we were treated badly and we resolve to treat others in a kindly way because we know from experience that we would like to be treated in a dignified manner, thus we should treat others that way.[end]

Yes, sometimes reason is a justifier, a rationale. That's one of its utilities. Hume, you know, is a theorist of 'sympathy.' He doesn't mean that in the sense of feeling sorry for someone, though that is one of the 'faces' of this human characteristic. A lot of Scottish theorists were interested in this 'sympathy' idea as an explainer for human society. And so let's say we are excited by a passion. Someone has plagiarized in a class and has been caught. Being caught plagiarizing frequently requires a lot of people giving you long and critical looks. Your parents are mad, professors mad, administrators mad, all sorts of painful and unpleasant meetings and consequences stretch out as far as the eye can see. To relieve this agony we must 'justify' ourselves to others. We may want to be mere bundles of self-interest, but if all these people are clucking their tongues at me, it starts to kind of hurt. That's when I ask reason to come up with a defense, please. Point out someone's hypocrisy. There must be a counter-attack available that will at least challenge, if not defeat, all this negative energy! And then reason is very good at coming up with arguments. But that just endorses Hume's conclusion that reason can only be a slave of the passions.

When we were treated badly, we experience high levels of discomfort. Then we turn around (a lot of us, anyway) and treat others fairly and equally, and non-badly. Why? Because we 'universalise' the bad feeling we had when we were mistreated. *I associate the bad feeling I experienced from being bullied to the activity of bullying in general, and refrain from bullying because of the bad, painful memory I have of being bullied." Hume's point is that this is not a reasoning process. That's why it's wrong to use the "Do unto others..." line when talking about Hume. "Do unto others . . . " is a *rational* line of thinking. Hume is more like Freud: our thoughts happen behind our backs much more often than under the bright light of reason. A bully at school pushes me around and verbally 'invalidates' me, as is said. I am humiliated in front of a crowd. Then it's my turn as Scout leader but instead of copying the bully's behavior, I negate it by being fair, helpful, and respectful. Human motivation is very complex! That's why I like Hume, because that's his subject, not unlike Adam Smith's _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, which also could be read in this context.

[perezoso]

Michel's point is correct in that the Golden Rule--even construed from a purely secular standpoint-- is closer to objective ethics, and to Kant's imperative really, than is Hume's psychologizing. It could be phrased in the negative: if you do bad things to people, expect to be treated badly in return. And that is how the law, for better or worse, works, as does the mobster code of "Omerta," which I think you overlook when you claim that people will often do good after being treated poorly. That is incorrect: most humans are not buddhists, and when treated badly want revenge (or perhaps a settlement). But by a Golden Rule standard, if they know that when they cause someone pain they will (most likely) be recompensed with pain (or charged with a crime), they will hesitate. The Golden rule is rather pragmatic, really, and again I think quite close to Kant, in that universalizing say "respect" across society (more or less, imagine an ethical rule as objective law) is entirely proper, since most sane humans expect (and desire) to be treated that way as well. Of course the GOlden Rule ethics sort of assumes people act consistently, and that isn't the case, but Humean ethics doesn't do anything about that either. (A Darwinian perspective might suffice however)

[Michel]

Thank you both for taking the time to post those illucidations. They are both poignant and clear. I can sleep in the arms of the angels tonight knowing that I have learned one more small thing about life.

Hume is more like Freud and that is probably why I have issues with him ... I'm much more a Jungian when it comes to metaphysics & mythology.