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When will this labour end?
Labouring against work. Mulling over the contributions and remarks made during the course of these readings, this is what strikes me as the first paradox, which is also the specific paradox of abstract labour and concrete labours that, in turn, characterises Marx's distinctive account of capitalism, that which brings all others paradoxes to the fore and makes them boil over. It's all about specificity, the difference and the cut. And is there anything more paradoxical than communism, a class politics that gears itself toward the abolition of class society? Operaismo - ie., workerism - against work. And Tronti's essay is nothing if not paradoxical.
Who would have guessed that a discussion of the refusal of work would result in so much toil?
Passivity in relation to wage labour given expression with passionate exertions. Boredom, too, is a kind of passion.
But the difficulty I keep returning to at these moments - and it might well have something to do with my fatigue - is whether and how Lazzarato is right. Whether the command to work assumes, in the register of an increasingly self-managed organisation of the exploitation of cognitive labour, the very particular form of the injunction: Become Subjects!, communicate, circulate, network? And what might this mean with regard to a 'becoming labourious of existence' or, to articule this difficulty in another way, the absurdity of imagining that there might be some kind of future labour that does not involve pain, fatigue, exertion, difficulty - and particularly so as to recall the sense of 'giving labour'. But, still, there has been an extravagance of labours here (and here).
This is how Lacoue-Labarthe describes the paradoxical in "Diderot: Paradox and Mimesis", as an extravagance. For him, the paradox "is not simply a contradicting or surprising opinion", but suggestive of "a passing to the extreme, a sort of 'maximisation'", through which "the equivalence of ordinaries is established (probably without ever establishing itself) - the contraries pushed to the extreme, in principle infinite, of contrareity." And, he adds, that "paradox is defined by the infinite exchange, or the hyperbolic identity of contraries." I mention Lacoue-Labarthe, and this particular quotation, because I find myself constantly turning around and between the philosophers of the désistance and the theoreticians of the refusal, and oftentimes playing one against the other.
But it's this quote from Lacoue-Labarthe that springs to mind when, on this occasion anyway, I re-read Tronti's essay. The derisory remarks on the veneration of work, the renunciation of Leftist morality tales of proletarian impotentia, the critique of social democratic understandings of 'globalisation', the savaging of understandings of consciousness as pivotal to the struggle, the refusal to defer to the figurative and representational terms of democracy or socialism, the demos or society. And more besides.
Tronti is nothing if not extravagant in his refusals. And deeply elliptical, if not strictly paradoxical: labour is capital, capital is labour. And so on, pushing the contraries to their extreme, a hyperbolic identity which never settles, is always tense, because we are in the present tense, in the time of the 'interval' that secures no grounds for intervention - but decide we must, in the form I think of a decision also that this 'we' amounts also to a 'no' - and where this vacillation between abstract labour and concrete labours, among other things, remains in play, and cuts both ways.
Basta.
By s0metim3s | March 27, 2006 in Communism, Democracy, France, Lacoue-Labarthe, Nancy , Post-politics, Refusal, Tronti | Permalink
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» Differentia specifica from archive : s0metim3s
Consider this post as a follow-up to the brief discussion below and a previous posting elsewhere, as it might elaborate on the difference between this labour and labour as such. As well as an extended footnote to a post on Spivaks Specu... [Read More]
Tracked on Apr 9, 2006 12:34:35 AM
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For those interested (and with the language access) there is an interview with Tronti published 2 days ago here: http://www.centroriformastato.it/crs/Testi/interviste/Marx/mariotronti
Here's a roughly translated grab:
Marx knew the structure of capital (this is the fundamental theme of his work), but did not deepen the consciousness of labor power. He deepened it insofar as it is part of capital, variable capital, living labor and so on. But he did not deepen it in the sense of its possible autonomy. And autonomy understood in the strong sense, before being sindicalist or political is anthropological.
Posted by: Brett | Mar 27, 2006 7:26:42 PM
The perfect text! Self-enclosed and open-ended, saying everything and nothing!
Sincerely, thank you for this symposium, so elegantly summarized (and though without merely "summing up," or any impatient rush to...wholesale (en)closure) here.
Posted by: Charles | Mar 27, 2006 7:43:12 PM
Can someone parse what 'anthropological' means in this context?
Reading (with difficulty) the interview, the sense I got was that he means something like really, the scientific study of the concrete forms of the worker, analisi scientifica della figura operaia, to counterpose the bourgeois (would it be too much to say metaphysical) anthropology of the homo oeconomicus of Adam Smith.
He then mentions a 'negative mythology of work' - and this, is the reason why rufusal was not ridiculous, but a very serious matter.
What is the relation of the scientific analysis of the form of the worker to this negative mythology? Is there an implication here that the refusal was a historical moment, but a mythological one still?
And doesn't the account here hinge fundamentally on precisely a consciousness, contra Angela's remark above?
Posted by: TCO | Mar 27, 2006 8:15:53 PM
Heartfelt thanks Charles.
And many thanks are due to Matt, whose labours during the symposium were mostly invisible.
--
The easy answer is that sense of consciousness derived from analyses of class composition is of a different order to that bequeathed as an ism.
Though, to explain something of where I was wandering with the above post, which I decided in the end to bend toward an emptying of the summation (as Charles recognised), it would be to pick up the thread of the juxtaposition between Lacoue-Labarthe (Typography) and Tronti, and have a think of the topic of mimesis, subjectivity and the political, as it complicates the sense of 'class composition analysis' as science versus writing.
But, while I slowly muddle my way through the interview Brett, am I right in recalling that Tronti passes through Arendt at some point?
Posted by: s0metim3s | Mar 28, 2006 12:31:04 AM
There is no explicit reference to Arendt in the interview. Although there is another affirmation of the Marx-Schmitt-Lenin triangle.
On anthropology: it's clear that this is not meant in the disciplinary sense with all its complex entanglements with colonialism. Later in the interview there is one of Tronti's classic dismissals of third-worldism, when he says that the quantitative growth of the working class in China, India etc. does not seem to transfer into the qualitative political consciousness of class.
I too wonder about the sense of consciousness here: would be interesting to see an account of 'class consciousness' (a term we no longer hear much) that crosses the discussions of cognition, AI, subjectivity, general intellect, etc. that have informed the debates on cognitive labour, composition, etc.
It is true that the workers' anthropology that Tronti believes Marx to lack is contrasted here to the bourgeois anthropology of Adam Smith. What seems to be at stake is a contestation of the individual-Leviathan couple that provided the basic structure of social relations in the modern state. A workers' anthropology, I guess, would need to account for the waning of the state form, the mutations of the modern individual, cultural and transcultural codes, changing configurations of work, biopower, etc.
In any case, I think it's important that Tronti talks here about anthropology as opposed to ontology. Although I don't think there is a strict separation between the two, it's a nuance that marks a difference from both Negri and Agamben.
Posted by: Brett | Mar 28, 2006 6:28:01 PM
Then there's Virno, who does something of both an anthropology and an ontology. I have difficulty reading those moves as something other than a reach for guarantees.
Posted by: s0metim3s | Mar 28, 2006 10:29:04 PM
May it's because I am one of those terrible colonialist Third Worldist anthropologists, but I find that kind of outlook by Tronti to be unbelievably parochial. I think it is plainly eurocentrist, and at a minimum it is an implicitly nationalist way of thinking about things. As if the proletariat that is in China now weren't Italy's or Australia's proletariat. Anyway, that's besides the point.
I tend to be extremely suspicious of what was once called 'philosophical anthropology'. I kind of fail to see how it is not just an area of ontology, ie, the ontology of the human, viz. Jaspers: A yawn inducing attempt to intuit man.
But it is not that that is meant, or is it?
Posted by: TCO | Mar 28, 2006 10:49:56 PM
Sorry this is such a humourless comment, but Gary S-T also had a post here perhaps of interest.
Posted by: Matt | Mar 29, 2006 12:12:22 AM
I strongly agree about Tronti's eurocentrism and parochialism. But if we want suspect anthropology why don't we just go straight to Marx?
What's the harm in mixing anthropology and ontology? I'm no fan of borders, disciplinary or otherwise.
Virno's guarantees seem strangely to be without guarantee. What is one moment 'biological invariables' the next are incompleteness, openness, 'neotenia', etc.
'Philosophical anthropology' was one spectacular disaster both with respect to philosophy and anthropology. Some are now mining it for insights regarding institutional form, etc. but I don't think anyway takes the 'essence of man' claims seriously.
Posted by: Brett | Mar 29, 2006 4:48:46 AM
Phew!
With ontology and anthropology, I was reacting to the suggestion there was a kind of opposition there. I agree, I can't really see that there is one, clearly there is an overlap. But there is a tendency for a certain kind of philosophical anthropology to preempt ontology in absurd ways, and vice versa. It could be my disciplinary bias (I am an anthropologist - or rather, I study the politics of people with complicated families at the very margins of the world system: that's as good a definition of the 'discipline' as any) but I do tend to think that the approach to understanding an anthropology - more or less in the sense Tronti seems to be getting at - is through fieldwork. That's a long story, of course.
But to cut it short, when I read Bologna, I read him as almost an ethnographer. At their best, I thought these guys approach a certain ideal of political historiography that resonates with the way I set about studying people. They wrote the factory, but also the factory that could cease to be, its negative potential. Now, the suggestion about the negative mythology of labour, that's really fascinating. I could work with that.
It's interesting to think of the history of radicalism in England from the perspective of such a negative mythology. Take a lefty stalwart like Winstanley and the Diggers. Labour there is God, pure and simple, in an utterly radical and ultimatley extremely dangerous way. But you get the sense reading him that he wasn't really a fun guy to hang out with, more like puritan. On the other hand, there is long history of folly and jest. I'd love to look at this underground current of the aleatorical spirit.
Posted by: TCO | Mar 29, 2006 7:23:26 AM
hi all,
Maybe I'm using the term differently or wrongly but I've always taken 'philosophical anthropology' to be anthropological speculation by philosophers: writing about human nature and so on. Loads of folk do this without calling it that or making it explicit, especially people with minimalist accounts. In that regard, then, I think ontology in Negri and others largely functions as a philosophical anthropology, that's what they use it for rhetorically/politically: being is X such that Y human activity is possible. That strikes me as largely unnecessary (one could simply assume Y activity is possible) but if it meets a need then great.
I like the characterization of the operaisti as historiagraphers and ethnographers. Bologna's got a piece somewhere on this - theses on militant historiogrpahy, I think it's called.
best,
Nate
Posted by: Nate | Mar 29, 2006 9:57:05 AM
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