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Fleeting Demos (How I learned to love democracy)
A funny thing happened on my way to a contribution. I found I had nothing to say. I thought I had something to say, but it turns out - this shouldn't come as a surprise - that nope, not a thing of value. I read what had already been posted and was struck by how different were the conceptualizations of democracy being put forward. So, in a very short post, I tried to hint at the notion that perhaps democracy is precisely the form of government or subject of government that corresponds best to contesting its content. But I also offered an afterthought, that perhaps democracy is the form of government that best maintains the hyphen seen in the ethico-political. Adam insightfully suggested that these were indeed the same definition, something that I think is true, more or less.
It's worth exploring this definitional co-identity further, but before I do so, I want to offer some context. And so, contrary to my normal giddy theoreticism, I want to try some personal backstory.
Before I started participating at LS, for about a year and a half I was writing regularly for another collective blog, one called Progressive Commons, which collected 6 or 7 folks from different academic backgrounds, all of whom had an interest in the intersection of language and politics. In some ways successful, in some ways a failure, the project left me with a healthier appreciation for the difficult work of day to day semantic choices and the role that hegemony plays in current political configurations. It also made clear to me that there are indeed significant differences between America's Democrats and Republicans; not at the level of policy, which are sadly similar in many ways, but in the language strategies the two employ and the fallout that these language strategies have. Sadly, the Dems these days suffer from a real paucity of imagination, and so their language choices have not been as interesting or as productive as their Republican counterparts. Forced to play on a particular semantic terrain (alright, not forced, more like unwittingly playing), progressive voices within the Democratic party have been marginalized over the last few decades, with only the last 5 or 6 years marking an upsurge in progressive presence, at least within the debates within the Democratic party.
I should note in passing that this was an interesting experience for me, and surely it's not something that will be shared by everyone. A fan of Baudrillard, and of Murray Edelman's work on political spectacles as structure and strategy, I am often tempted to think the whole thing a canard of the highest order. Two parties locked in faux-opposition, exhausting the political resources of the populace while ensuring that nothing changes, and the rich get richer, the poor get poorer, and the earth gets fucked. Democracy isn't broken, I figured, rather its producing ruin after ruin is in fact the sign that it's working how it was designed. Those were my concerns, in very truncated form.
Working on Progressive Commons made me rethink my concerns, but my rethinking coincided with another research endeavour. I began working on a project on fascism that I will likely never complete in its intended form. The project was as follows: let's try to understand what is properly fascist about fascism, or put a different way, let's try to understand what structure has to be in place for history to recognize the manifestation of fascism, or more interesting, what might make that recognition difficult. In exploring the histories, the primary literature, the theorizing that had been done in the wake of the two great historical European fascisms, as well as the sampling of other fascisms that have percolated through the last century, it struck me as increasingly obvious that (and you'll need to forgive this precisely for its obviousness, but it's worth repeating) fascism was never opposed to democracy, but instead took the conditions that made democracy desirable and necessary (mass enfranchisement, mass media, population growth, changing economic relations and the rise of a permanent if somewhat blurred middle class) and attempted to seem more democratic than democracy could be.
Mired in procedural mechanisms, what we think of today as big-L Liberal Democracy is incapable of responding with haste to the pressing concerns of the Demos. Fascism promised (and promises) that such incapacities will vanish - though it's important to note that they fashion this answer differently. Most often, a myth of the great leader is constructed, one who can be the primary synecdoche for the people, but this myth is an arduous and artificial creation and requires not just some form of propaganda, but also cultural conditions that make such machinations acceptable. There are other ways that fascism has and might be fashioned that would suture the gap between demos and policy–the gap instituted by liberal democracy. An eschatological destiny tied to race or religion does nicely. But it could be tied to class just as readily, and the pressures faced by the Soviet population for being the world-historical vanguard of communism should provide ample evidence of the negative consequences of such revisionary historical destinings. Anyway, the point is that fascism wants to allege as near a 1 to 1 correspondence between government and demos as possible, even as it actualizes a fairly radical disconnect from or redirection of the demos.
Part of the fascism project was a desire to understand how it is that some populisms turn out progressive and others turn out fascist, given my belief–following Laclau–that populism is not an outside to democracy but is in fact the essential structure of any democratic form of politics/government.
Certain tropes/topoi, I am sure, lend themselves to fascistic impulses. Citizenship, emergency, speed: those I'm sure about. I'm increasingly suspecting that "solidarity" (sorry Jodi, you know I was very favorable when you first suggested solidarity as a positive value) is the fascist incarnation of the progressive "community", but that's something I'll talk out later (for now you can watch this video in full). Identifying these tropes might be helpful, but by itself it doesn't do anything other than highlight the need to pay attention to our own theoretical and semantic choices, since I believe that the work of thinking ends up manifesting in the banality of politics (thanks to that thing we call the political, which I'll get to in a second). What these tropes often have in common, though, is that they attempt to extend the realm of the political to a universal. An "injustice" at one school–an atheist valedictorian, or a white student denied admission possibly because of some black student and affirmative action, or even a school shooting–is political. When one purchases something, they must understand this as a political act. When one watches something, they must understand that it is political. The mythology of the 1 to 1 correspondence demands nothing less.
I'm talking here about a theoretical/philosophical predicate to fascism, a sort of intellectual groundwork that needs to be laid in order for actual fascists to find a receptive audience. So I am also indicting the whole feminist "personal is political" slogan, for which I heartfully apologize. You can castigate me at your leisure for that one, I feel bad enough about it to just accept it. The problem is that the political is one of those rare things that actually does disappear into the void the more universal its application and appearance becomes. It is the universalization and extension of the political that makes it possible to "aestheticize politics," to use Benjamin's expression. So the more we make everything political, the more readily fascist does the application and content of the political become, even if this readily fascist (which is to say an imaginary receptive to it) rarely translates into actual fascism.
So what does any of this mean? Well, my concern is that democracy must be defended. I'm not sure there's another option, at least not if we're assessing the viability of alternate governmental systems at this point. The nation-state may be an historical accident, but at this point its built up the way centuries of river sediment reshape the course of the river itself. The conditions mentioned above, those that make democracy viable and desired, are unchanged. If anything, they are intensified. And so work must be done to rescue and maintain democracy, not because it works so well, but actually because it doesn't work well at all, which is actually an amazingly good thing. I'm not saying that government doesn't work–it does, and it's worth trying to figure out how to demonstrate and defend that proposition–but democracy works through breakdowns that force reinvestments in the system, and that is, in my opinion, a very good thing. The only realistic alternative–and we are already seeing its not so stealthy creep–is fascism.
So what does this mean? Pragmatically, it means work–hard work–must be done at the nitty gritty level of political language; that antagonisms and hegemonies must be challenged and begun anew in a way that can alter the political terrain, away from fascist tendencies and conservative ideologies and towards non-fascistic progressive ends.
Theoretically, it means recognizing that the ethical is the realm of thinking and action that keeps the political's universality at bay. It means, in other words, reconciling simultaneously the insights of Carl Schmitt and Emmanuel Levinas. The ethical realms has been sacrificed these past few decades, the sex-appeal of the political too strong, I suppose. But it needs to be reclaimed, or else the ethical will be sublimated to the political (isn't that what faith based sex ed, prayer in schools, abortion laws, domestic partnership and gay marriage laws are all about?). It needs to be marked out as a distinct terrain.
I'm not saying simply give up the political ghost; I'm saying that, for example, when I buy something, it's an ethical act to shop or not shop in a store that uses sweatshop labor or cheats on employee health care, and it's a political act to lobby for or against regulations that would prevent companies from doing either of those things.
The hyphen between ethico and political needs to be maintained; it's what democracy does best, better than any other form of government. But it doesn't do it on its own.
By kenrufo | July 25, 2006 in Democracy | Permalink
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This was originally posted over at Long Sunday, and I'll leave any comments for over there, but I wanted to reproduce it here. A funny thing happened on my way to a contribution. I found I had nothing to say.... [Read More]
Tracked on Jan 2, 2007 6:49:45 AM
Comments
I should make it clear that I think the ethical work more important than the political work, though far less sexy and probably far more difficult.
Posted by: Kenneth Rufo | Jul 25, 2006 11:49:23 AM
This strikes me as a pious sermon, built on a nonsensical definition of fascism, which is certainly not, as you claim, tantamount to the generalized extension of the political into every sphere of waking life. If anything, fascism predicates itself on direct opposite of this: the political smugly and simply declared absent, so that decisions become figured as simple matters of fact, before inevitable certainties. You see this in Heidegger, for whom government in the machine age had become an inherent matter of ontology; in Hitler, elevating the German volk into a mystical, transhistorical force which reached beyond politics; or even the ceaseless claims of Fox News that it is fair and balanced.
In all of these cases, the turn away from politics, and towards the ethical - in fact, exactly the strategy which you propose today. Extremely worrying.
Posted by: daniel | Jul 25, 2006 7:34:07 PM
Daniel, I don't think you have a good grasp on the history or function of fascism. The arguments I made about the extension of the political have been offered by a number of historians: Berezen's Making the Fascist Self, Paxton's Anatomy of Fascism, Stern's Politics of Cultural Despair, and in a more limited extent, in several of Mosse's books. So when you say "certainly not" and "if anything", I'm curious as to what data makes you so sure of your reversal? It's true that decisions were declared fact, but they were declared as such because those decisions best replicated the will and destiny of the Volk (in Germany at least, will and destiny were coterminous - though that's not the case with Italy). There was never any desire to produce the absence of the political or to dismiss the political; in fact much effort was placed on hyping the appearance of the political. Benjamin points to this, as I've already mentioned. And you can't read Goebbels' theories without thinking about the effort that went into the political clothing of fascism. Now I agree that totalitarian regimes attempt to abolish the political in the manner you describe, but fascist regimes, to my knowledge, do no such thing.
Besides, my argument is that the extension of the political is tantamount to its disappearance, so it's possible we're not really disagreeing, though who knows.
I have no idea what your complaint about Heidegger is, or even what you're saying about him. I'm not sure what would make something a matter of ontology and something else an inherent matter of ontology. But if you want to unpack that some, I'd love to consider it. Though I'd preemptively suggest Lacoue-Labarthe's book on Heidegger: Art and Politics, which is the most fascinating consideration of the intersections of technology, ontology, and politics in Heidegger's work.
And my vocabulary isn't necessarily that vast, but doesn't pious mean commendable? Don't know if that's how you meant it, but thanks if it was.
Posted by: Kenneth Rufo | Jul 25, 2006 9:53:18 PM
Ken - what is the distinction you are making between fascism and totalitarianism? In my understanding, fascism and communism are variants of totalitarianism.
Posted by: Craig | Jul 25, 2006 9:57:32 PM
hi ken, the lacoue-labarthe text you refer to is called 'la fiction du politique'.
'heidegger, l'art et la politique' is its subtitle. for some reason the english translation opted for the subtitle while effacing the title!?
since you bring up this book, why do you think PLL takes issue with the knee jerk reaction of defending democracy because well it ain't fascism?
Posted by: Amie | Jul 25, 2006 10:33:15 PM
Yeah, that's common, and not wrong necessarily. I'll present the argument for a different view, perhaps not a viable one, but regardless, here it is. Any time you're talking about taxonomies of government, about ways of classifying the form that government or politics takes, you're going to prioritize one set of characteristics as being more salient than others. No classificatory scheme will be objectively true or perfect within itself, since there's so many distinctions even between allied governments with massively similar political systems (Italian Fascism vs German National Socialism, for instance). This much is obvious, but it still means asking what we gain and lose from one particular set of priorities. If we lump together fascism and communism (at least in the sense of repressive communist party governments, like the USSR or PRC), we are prioritizing the notion of repression, or possibly of the degree of violence a government can do openly to members of its own population, or something similar. We know that democracies do violence, of course, and we know that democracies are often repressive (Prohibition, anyone?), but these things are categorically different (or at least sufficiently different in degree so as to seem categorically distinct). The problem is that communism does not base the reasons for its repression, nor the methods by which that repressions becomes politically palatable to the population, on the same sets of objects that does fascism. Fascism doesn't want to overthrow one political system in favor of another one ostensibly more egalitarian and communist, rather it wants to maximize the representational value of a system on behalf of an increasingly politically integrated populace. Now this isn't to say that a fascist state won't be totalitarian or even vice versa. Mussolini, for example, used to talk about how he wanted to create a "totalitarian state" as the eventual successor to parliamentary democracy in Italy, though his actions went contrary to this, as he routinely reigned in party members who worked towards this end, even as he hyped it in his speeches. Regardless, while totalitarianism might be a potential goal of fascism, it should be clear that at least to fascists, they thought of it as something distinct from their own endeavours.
So I guess I'm saying there are distinctions worth noting between the two. Importantly, fascism is perfectly compatible with a certain thinking of democracy, whereas totalitarianism is not. So if we maintain a distinction between the two, it's because we're prioritizing engagement (as a means to justifying repression) over the act of repression per se.
One concern that has been raised (Mann does this somewhere) is that the West had a fairly obvious incentive to lump communism together with fascism, so as to associatively taint the new enemy with the old one, when the old one was considered unquestionably evil. So there's a concerted effort by the U.S. state department, for example, to speak of "Soviet fascism" at the start of the cold war, and to talk about how "Soviet terrorism" is replacing "fascist terrorism." This worked out well for the U.S. and the West, of course, but I doubt its overall heuristic value. More likely, this ends up making the analysis of either more difficult, or as Paxton puts it: "The totalitarian image may evoke powerfully the dreams and aspirations of dictators, but it actually obstructs any examination of the vital matter of how effectively fascist regimes managed to embed themselves in the half-compliant, half-recalcitrant societies they ruled."
Posted by: Kenneth Rufo | Jul 25, 2006 10:34:52 PM
I think because fascism and democracy aren't distinct entities in PLL, or in Heidegger, they're just two sides of the same coin. So it makes little sense to celebrate one simple because it isn't the otehr. Which is partly why, and this is obviously not congruent with PLL, I actually think Liberal/procedural democracy is worth all its headaches. But it's also why it is that I think the ethical remains so crucial as a check against political encroachment, as it supplies one of the checks on any naive triumphalism. The other check, of course, being the antagonisms that emerge from the structural failures of liberal democracies to live up to their promise (which will always exist), even though certain ideologies/imaginaries are developed to justify those antagonisms in a way that removes their agonistic potential (which is what I think conservatie political philosophy does, by and large).
Posted by: Kenneth Rufo | Jul 25, 2006 10:40:07 PM
Your point is taken, Ken, but it seems a bit simple to suggest (if I understand your hesitation correctly) that subsuming both fascism and communism under the sign of totalitarianism is inherently part and parcel of the Cold War State Department ideology! Part of the point here - and I nod to Claude Lefort, a radical anti-totalitariani-ist if there ever was one, who attacks the so-called left for failing to engage with communism and fascism as a variant of the same form of society. He suggests the cause of the failure is precisely the same one you give: "totalitarianism" was perceived as a "right wing" concept.
Lefort, for instance, points to a number of common features: the People-as-One manifested in, on the one hand, the Party and, on the other hand, the Leader; the universalization of the social (i.e., pointing back to Daniel's point, albeit in a different way); the erasure of antagonisms 'within' the social and their displacement to 'foreign agents' from outside; a combination of machinic and organic metaphors. In brief, he suggests, totalitarianism "signifies a regime in which state violence is practised on society as a whole, a system of generalized, detailed coercion - scarcely more than that."
With Foucault, you could say, enigmatically, that totalitarianism is 'the truth' of democracy - at the very least, the threat of this new despotism emerges at the same time as democracy. See, for instance, Tocqueville.
Posted by: Craig | Jul 25, 2006 10:49:02 PM
Yeah, I certainly don't mean to imply that LeFort, or you, or anyone here, was simply duped by clever State Department PR, only to suggest I look at that very strategic effort on their part and it makes me cringe. Gives me pause for thought, tis all.
I think LeFort is completely correct to see the similarities of effect - "coercion, scarcely more than that" - but as Paxton notes, that focus on effect ends up missing the button question as to how fascism take root, develop, etc. If they are internal to democracies (in fact, in some ways are more democratic than democracy can rightly be and still function as such), it's worth trying to be as nuanced as possible in thinking those things that challenge democracy as a functioning system.
I don't really want to play anti-LeFort, as I like his work and find it extremely stimulating. He's not wrong to say that fascism and communism both trend to and possibly result in totalitarianism. But it is wrong to reduce the differences between the two simply because of a theoretical/eschatological effect. Doing so, for example, makes it difficult to understand the role that propaganda and mass media play; makes it hard to understand the very different conceptions of historical destiny and temporality at work in the two movements; and makes it extremely difficult to imagine what new forms of fascism will look like, since the focus on the totalitarian component or end-state of fascism (when it has reached its highest level of radicalization) means that you're not paying attention to its incipient developmental stages.
And I again don't think there's tension between the universalization of the social argument you're citing and the one I'm referncing regarding the universalization of the political, the extension of the one is also its moment of indistinction, wherein the political and the social coincide. What I'm suggesting is that the appropriate, affective response to this possibility is to carve out a zone of ethical action (and here I find Levinas to be the flag-bearer) that serves as an outside to the political.
Posted by: Kenneth Rufo | Jul 25, 2006 11:03:53 PM
You talk about the universalization of "the political" - as if it were itself a coherent object of discourse.
I would like to suggest this cannot be the case; if there is something called the political, than it is a concrete universal generating a number of distinct particular formations, in short: politics. There is no political as such, or at least no singular political sphere, since every actual political group will possess a different conception of the political; and not just different positions in respect to a unitary political.
In fact, to suggest that there is such a thing as unitary and singular political, in respect to which it is only possible to take different positions, never radically change the frame, is the essence of fascism, and indeed it is the essence of contemporary capitalist realism.
This essence expresses itself quite simply in the form of the following slogan: there is no alternative.
If what you meant by the generalized extension of the political was the paradoxical suppression of politics iself, than perhaps we are closer than I thought. However, I would still nonetheless like to make a couple of points here.
First, you write: "What I'm suggesting is that the appropriate, affective response to this possibility is to carve out a zone of ethical action (and here I find Levinas to be the flag-bearer) that serves as an outside to the political."
This move cannot be sanctioned, firstly, because the fateful demarcation of political space is an absolutely political gesture, and secondly, *because there is no outside to the political* - for the reason that the political is already itself and outside, an outside of politics.
The task is not to carve out a zone of ethical action. It is to carry out, in zones, politicizations.
Posted by: daniel | Jul 26, 2006 5:56:37 AM
So Daniel, let me see if I understand a few things.
Originally you thought me wrong because fascism declares the political absent or non-existent, now I'm wrong because there is no such thing as political?
You think I'm suggesting the political is singular, and unitary, and that universalization of the political implies uniformity?
You believe fascism and capitalist realism are united by the fact that they produce/impose a belief that there's no alternative or outside to their ideologies, but you're certain there's no outside to the political?
And finally, you believe there's no outside to the political because you are deciding to code any effort to think an outside as political? And I'm assuming you don't think that this theoretical predisposition is related to the above beliefs?
You can understand why, I think, there's not a lot of there there to this particular comment, despite all the "in fact," "indeed," and copious "essences" being tossed didactically about.
From Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy:
The project of a theory or a science of the political, with all its socio-anthropological baggage (and consequently, philosophical presuppositions), now more than ever necessitates its own critique and the critique of its political functions. But vigilance is not enough here; and simple critique would probably be too quick and ineffective faced with the almost undivided domination of anthropology. This is why our insistence upon the philosophical - beyond any critical exigency, which is the least of our worries - was intended to mark, before anything else, the following: that what today appears to us as necessary, and hence urgent, is rigorously to account for what we are calling the essential (and not accidental or simply historical) co-belonging of the philosophical and the political. In other words, to account for the political as a philosophical determination, and vice versa.
And later:
In this epoch where the political is completed to the point of excluding every other area of reference (and such is, it seems to us, the totalitarian phenomenon itself), we can no longer decently ask ourselves what theory would still be in a position to promise a political solution to inhumanity, because we now know what the desire for a social transparency promises, the utopia of the homogenisation of the 'social body'...
There's a certain allegiance to Heidegger in this thinking, and of course I think they are a bit too loose with the term totalitarian (though they go to great pains to make their reasons for being loose explicit), but still captivating insight, I think.
One more, this time from Nancy alone:
How can the community without essence (the community that is neither 'people' nor 'nation,' neither 'destiny' nor 'generic humanity', etc.) be presented as such? That is, what might a politics be that does not stem from the will to realize an essence? ... One thing at least is clear: if we do not face up to such questions, the political will desert us completely, if it has not already done so. It will abandon us to political and technological economies, if it has not already done so.
Good stuff, yes?
Posted by: Kenneth Rufo | Jul 26, 2006 7:46:51 AM
Let us say this:
1) The concept of the political is an abstract concept. It relates to no concrete reality insofar as it not connected to concrete practice, specifically, the concrete practice that produces the particular concept of the political in question. One can say, in this way, that there are various concepts of the political, in contestation with each other, but no singular concept of the political itself, except to the extent that such a concept is defined as a warzone, pure and simple, between competing universalities on an ethically neutral plane of immanenence. Any invocation of morality, ethical evaluation of the enemy, results in the negation of this concept of the political, for the reason that such evaluations are ultimately politico-rhetorical evaluations taking place from inside the political, are, in other words, manifestations of politics being mobilized under a different name, in the hope of achieving by this subterfuge a greater rhetorical power.
In this way, we can say that there is a concept of the political, but it can only be defined politically, and therefore rhetorically, and therefore misleadingly - from the perspective of the eye in the sky, since to define the political is already to take a political position, and take a political position is already to negate the political.
In this sense, it can be claimed on the one hand that the political does not exist (for it cannot exist in discourse, at least not in any pure indifferent state) and on the other hand, by way of critique, that fascism declares the political absent, by eliding this fact, and claiming that they have and hold the pure Thing itself. In order to issue this statement, it is necessary for fascism to claim some special power, often the idea that they are simply inherently more connected to the real world, often the notion that they enjoy some ethical superiority over their opponents - especially powerful, for obvious reasons, are these two different justifications working in tandem, since they are mutually reinforcing.
I hope this has succeeded in relieving you of your confusion, and I wonder whether you are not being needlessly obtuse. Do you, or do you not recognize my reading in your writing?
It is no good simply reciting what you take to be my points back at me and claiming they are insubstantial, the question is, do you recognize your own position in them? I further uncertain as to why you have seen fit to provide the citations you have; I do not understand how you are using them. From what I can gather, in the service of a critique of essentialism, which you presumbably percieve in my own position, which would be strange, since it seems you also wish to claim that my use of words such as essence is *simply* rhetorical -"there is not a lot there."
In any case, IF anti-essentialism is indeed the logic here, I reject this identification completely, and wonder even why you might have thought I did not - since I have been using the term essence only to talk about concepts in discourse, not any Thing in the Real World that I claim to possess privileged knowledge about. Furthermore, for what it is worth, I reject - like the good Badiouian I am - the detour into political philosophy which I see Nancy moving towards here.
Posted by: daniel | Jul 26, 2006 10:10:55 AM
Let us not say anything of the sort.
"One can say, in this way, that there are various concepts of the political, in contestation with each other, but no singular concept of the political itself, except to the extent that such a concept is defined as a warzone, pure and simple, between competing universalities on an ethically neutral plane of immanenence."
You can't really expect this to be taken seriously, right? There's no singular concept except for your singular conceptualization, which is oh so pure and simple? And the idea of an ethically neutral plane of "immanenence" would be laughable if it wasn't incoherent jargon jumbled together with the hope of profundity.
Suffice it to say that I, naive in the coherence of my own thoughts on the subject, do not recognize your incoherent, contradictory, and cryptically jargon-riddled readings in my own positions.
Incidentally, I love how the outside of politics is actually political because the attempt to think an outside is rhetorical, but your use of essence is actually not essential because the attempt to speak of essence is just rhetorical.
And as an aside, Nancy says explicitly that he is in fact not detouring into political philosophy, but rather wants to open up the space that makes of all philosophy a politics and all politics a philosophy. But don't worry about, you know, reading it, cause as a good Badiouian, you'd just end up rejecting it anyway.
I'm sorry to be so acerbic in my reply, but your pretense of certainty in the absence of actual engagement or data, and your unwillingness to even reply to data I'm citing about the historical functioning of fascism because it doesn't fit well with your view of it is, well, annoying. So at this point, let's just let bygones be bygones, we'll agree to disagree, and I'll go back and think about political and ethical reform while you hang out on your uber-cool ethically neutral plane of whateversuch.
Last thought: have you read much Baudrillard? I think, oddly, that he might actually help resolve our impasse. I think theory is simulacral, you think it's revelatory; I think the thinking of the universality of the political is its own precursor to fascism, you think it's necessary to ward off rhetorically savvy power-grabbers. The move by which theory itself becomes responsible for the things it discovers, in effect recognizes its modular/simulacral production of its own revelations, is a move Baudrillard makes around the time of Symbolic Exchange and Death. I'm sure you'd have reason to reject JB too, and I have no desire to make of you a convert, but it might help explain why we aren't seeing eye to eye (maybe it's an ethically neutral hill?).
Posted by: Kenneth Rufo | Jul 26, 2006 10:32:06 AM
Look, I think the thing I'm finding annoying about your responses, Daniel, is that you act as if I'm unaware that there is no actual, concrete outside to the political, or that I might think the political is some thing in and of itself, sporting a name card and a lapel pin. And you act as if it's an insight to let me know that the debates over its boundaries are rhetorical. All of this is already assumed. I'm saying that the rhetoric matters (because theory/philosophy is rhetoric, as is politics, and they are nothing but), and the rhetoric should be on the side of an ethical space that supercedes the political, and not the other way around, for reasons that I explicitly detailed in my original post. I'm saying that the theoretical extension of the political, such that it is a warzone on or through which all other issues are contested, is a dangerous and proto-fascistic theoretical apparatus.
So it's not that I'm confused and you need to relieve me, it's just that I responded to this line of criticism long before you made it. So when you remark that fascism claims some special power, I just raise my eyebrows - don't all political systems claim some special power? Isn't that what makes of them something like a system or form, rather than a completely random collection of phonemes? It's not like reification is a novel concept. Besides, I've already tried to stress this, again, in the original post, and have argued that certain special powers, which are of course ground in certain theoretical proclivities, tend to be more fascistic than progressive, something that finds empirical evidence in the historical record.
Now you disagree that the ethical provides an appropriate defense, which is great. I just wish that your disagreement didn't seem based on assumptions I've already included and responded to within the internal formations of my argument, and further, that you didn't act as if you've suddenly discovered the very things I take for granted within the logic of the post. Now if you want to take issue with Nancy/Levinas/Derrida and their arguments for the importance of the ethical, that's fine, and I think that would be a productive, fascinating conversation. Maybe.
Otherwise, I'll apologize for my tone, again. It's ill-suited to good discussion, and reflective of far too much ego investment. I'll practice smiling from now on before any additional replies.
Posted by: Kenneth Rufo | Jul 26, 2006 11:49:21 AM
Ken, I think your reading of J-LN is somewhat off the mark. And I'm not sure why you characterise fascism as asserting a correspondence between the demos and the kratos. The 'hyphen' you seem to want to avoid is that which connects demos to kratos to give us democracy.
Also, on the question of 'doing the work to rescue democracy', might I suggest Werner Hamacher's "Working Through Working", in Modernism/Modernity, 3:1, 1996.
Posted by: s0metim3s | Jul 26, 2006 11:50:55 AM
I don't want to avoid the hypen; I want to maintain it. Though I think we're talking different hypens...
And I'm not being entirely faithful to Nancy, and apologize if I gave the impression I wanted to be. This post is, if this makes any sense, an amalgam of Lacoue-Labarthe, Nancy, and Heidegger in one corner, Agamben in another, Levinas, Bauman, and Derrida in a third, and as I noted earlier, a gold-suited Baudrillard in the fourth. And they're all boxing me in the middle, and they're beating the crap out of me. Regardless, I'd love to hear your disagreement/reading.
And thanks for the cite, I'll check that out next week when I get back from Ohio.
Posted by: Kenneth Rufo | Jul 26, 2006 11:55:32 AM
You are getting increasingly nasty, Kenneth, and this is a shame, because our conservation is quickly devolving into junk as a consequence. I admit that I am not totally innocent of this myself, and therefore suggest that we both tone down the bile.
I have several problems with your last comment. First, you seem to continue to misunderstand me, for whatever reason, when I talk about the concept of the political. I am a patient man. I will make another effort at clarification.
My major point here is as follows: the concept of the political is a formal concept, which exists in itself, as pure forms may be said to exist in themselves, on what Deleuze liked to call the plane of immanence. The plane of immanence, as Deleuze understood it, is ethically neutral, is indeed totally neutral, since it contains no content, since it contains all content. In this way, it contains the concept of the political, but only in the sense that the concept of the political is itself a concept: the concept of the concept of the political, which embraces in a philological way all particular concepts of the political, without finally, in the last instance, being reducible to any of them, for the reason that it exists between them.
To put this in Heideggerean, there is Being and there are beings, with the gap between these terms internal to the gap between beings. This is to say, Being is not located in some beyond of beings, in some super-outside, but is rather already immanent to beings, in the sense that particular beings equate to the different particular solutions that our incomplete universe has offered to the concrete universal question of Being.
This is true of beings, and equally true of concepts, since, after their own fashion, concepts are beings too. Particular concepts of the political relate to a concrete universal concept of the political, just as beings relate to Being. In this way, it can be readily percieved that between, always between, different particular concepts of the political, is the concrete universal concept of the political. Precisely because this concept is concrete universal, it cannot be totally grasped by any particular concept of the political, some excess and/or residue will always resist totalization.
I believe, though I am ready to be corrected, that our difference of opinion is located at precisely this point of failed totalization. From here, you draw the conclusion that this residue amounts to ethics, that it calls for ethics, that ethics is the only way it can properly be thought. My argument against this is that this is not at all the case, that it respect to this excess, politics itself is demanded. I believe this, because I believe that this excess cannot be substantially universalized, it does not contain inherent content susceptible to indifferent inference by any subject whatsover. Rather, it must fought over, passionately and militantly. This is what I mean by politics.
Posted by: daniel | Jul 26, 2006 12:07:57 PM
I think Amie was on the right track in suggesting that there is rather something too problematic in defending democracy because it is not fascism.
And sure, we might be talking about different hyphens, maybe. But, correct me if I'm wrong, it seems as if you want to invest the demos with that ethical component, and the kratos with the political aspect. Or, that's how I read your remarks.
Problem is, democracy makes this connection between kratos and demos. Brett suggested another way of thinking about the demos, outside its connections to kratos, but this in no way implies defending democracy.
Co-written with Brett, this on Nancy and democracy - bearing in mind that it departs from Nancy but, hopefully, presents some of his deliberations on democracy as he's written them.
And I can send the Hamacher essay around to anyone interested who can't access it via MUSE.
Posted by: s0metim3s | Jul 26, 2006 12:33:00 PM
Feel free to send me a copy of the essay, I'd love to read it and won't have time to inquire as to the current password until I'm back.
And no, I would never envision anything like a proportion, wherein demos and ethico operate together while kratos and political operate separately. For me the two are intricately related/connected in many ways, though I'm not sure this relationship really gets to what I'm trying to suggest, which I have likely not made clear. I'm not suggesting we maintain a defense of democracy merely because it ain't fascism; I'm suggesting that democracy is the best system of government for preserving the ethical against the encroachment of the political while still maintaining the relationship between the two. Hence the maintenance of the hyphen I keep stressing, a relationship where ethico precedes political, the two remain relational and structured accordingly, but the two do not reduce to each other, nor do they permute into some amalgam of the two that reduces their conceptual differences.
And Daniel, I do sincerely appreciate your patience. But I actually do believe I understand you; I just don't agree. The theoretical assumptions you're willing to make, of a Deleuzian bent in this particular comment/case, are not assumptions I find compelling.
Posted by: Kenneth Rufo | Jul 26, 2006 3:16:11 PM
"I actually do believe I understand you; I just don't agree."
Fair enough, but I am not sure I understand you, and I want to be very clear on what exactly our disagreement consists of, you and God willing.
Does my last post succeed in capturing the essence of this, or not?
Posted by: daniel | Jul 26, 2006 8:12:24 PM
I tossed the Hamacher piece up here, likely with some formatting problems, no footnotes - and perhaps difficult to read (but a cutnpaste onto word or txt should get over that).
And, I too am unsure of where this supposed ethical dimension enters into it in your take, if not on the side of the demos, conceived as an a-political (or pre-political) aspect. Arguments for better, adequate or more authentic representation are, I think, premised on this. As are arguments which want to revive something like popular control against the excesses of the state.
Anyway, all things to ponder in due course.
Posted by: s0metim3s | Jul 26, 2006 11:13:06 PM
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