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Possible? Maybe. Necessary? No.
In The Sublime Object of Ideology, Zizek considers democracy to be impossible but necessary, an idea I think as kin to notions of democracy as a regulative idea or a Derridean democracy to come. In all his later work, he rejects democracy as inadequate to confronting the situation of global capitalism and racist fundamentalism. I agree with this view (and, explore it further here--cue, self-promotional link). In this little post, though, I want to raise a few questions as to whether democracy is possible and what this possibility might mean in a few other, very generally described, locations.
Liberal democrats, and there newest siblings, deliberative democrats, find that a set of procedures are necessary for democracy. The procedures are supposed to guarantee free and equal access to information, free and equal access to the means of participations understood as speech, voting, and the opportunity to be elected, and the accountability of the elected to those who elected them. Now, without even picking on the problems with all these requirements, the way that capitalism (with its entrenched inequalities, global scale, and installation of neoliberalism's so-called market 'requirements') and racism (with its 'obscene supplement' or nightly law, to use Zizek's terms, that foreshorten and deny officially established laws even as they bind together those who will count as the commmunity), we can see that the underlying presuppositions work against democracy: presuppositions of shared notions of truth, of value, of reason; presuppositions of literacy and specific cognitive, moral, and cultural competencies; presuppositions of time and interest.
Older views of democracy, take Jeremy Benthams, didn't have this problem: they presumed from the start that only elites would take on the hard tasks, that a middling group of interested, somewhat informated people would provide input and feedback, and that the majority wouldn't care. Versions of elite democracy in the 20th century continue this line of argument. The point is that contemporary liberal and deliberative democrats face a problem: the people. The people that they posit as democrats don't exist. (Which reminds me of a line that Zizek attributes to Trotsky: "But, Lenin, this is the only working class we've got!").
How could liberals get their democratic populace? By non liberal means.
Ok, so what about so-called radical democrats? Posthegemony has been running an insightful set of posts about radical democracy (unfortunately, in a not particularly positive review of a book edited by a friend, but, oh well). If we think of radical democracy in Laclau's terms as a struggle to articulate together differing groups within a larger empty signifier or symbolic identity, then we can see how changes communication make symbolic identities less available. I understand these changes in terms of Zizek's notion of the decline of symbolic efficiency. The idea I'm trying to push is that with the decline of symbolic identities (black, worker, woman, citizen), imaginary identities move to for (celebrity, criminal, goth, MILF, Nascar Dad, drag queen) that don't provide the sort of larger empty signifier able to filled in by multiple contents and hold together an articulatory chain.
Butler, in Excitable Speech, emphasizes resignification as pregnant with democratic potential. The problem is that she presumes that this resignification will necessarily move in democratic and progressive directions, two different matters. So, she doesn't consider that democratic directions may well be nationalist and militarist. Not does she consider that specific assemblages, say those of government or capital, might do their own, malign significations: Swift boat controversy, anyone?
So, deliberative democrats can't account for their people, radical democrats depend on signifying structures that are no longer operative (which is why Zizek, in my view rightly, rejects Badiou's emphasis on naming), or on suppositions of the way that open, resignified language will lead.
I had found deliberative and radical democracy the most promising accounts of democracy available, Unfortunately, they can't uphold their promises. So, the left needs desperately to return to and develop visions of socialism adequate to the present. I don't know what these will look like. I know that they are incompatible with the current main stream media climate and the current prominence of religious, fundamentalist, and conservative ways of thinking.
By Jodi | July 14, 2006 in Democracy | Permalink
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Comments
This is so cute and indicative of a certain form of prevailing fundamentalism I had to share it with you, praise G--. Rooting for the Apocalypse (via Think Progress).
Posted by: cynic librarian | Jul 14, 2006 12:18:00 PM
How do you, then, level this critique against the myriad real examples of deliberative democracy being used to work TOWARDS a more social democratic aim? Take, for instance, the municipal government of Puerto Alegre which effected a form of deliberative budget planning that, in turn, lead to more opportunity/ more local control -- etc.
This, in turn, seems to raise a bigger questions: how do critiques such as those you discuss in the post stand to (and this term is somewhat suspect) real political practice. That is, one might be able to point out formal problems with deliberative or radical democracy (can't constitute the people, etc) but how does this critique stand in relationship to the possible execution of the ideas?
For while these policies and practices may not really. And the prospect of developing another new socialist practice seems far less important than advocating for these ones we have (and, in turn, tinkering with them). Or perhaps your point is that these have zero chance of 'clinging'
Hm.
Posted by: Piscator | Jul 14, 2006 12:35:47 PM
Often forgotten in our memory of democracy is that no one wanted representative democracy in the first place. We see this in both the American and French Revolutions. (See Bernard Manin's Principles of Representative Government for a concise history.)
Classically, the vote was understood as an aristocratic institution - Montesquieu, for instance, in The Spirit of the Laws, goes on at length distinguishing between democracy and aristocracy, both of which he understands as a variation of republican government. He points out that "voting" is common to both forms (thus making them both republican government), but, in one, "the people as a body have sovereign power" and, in the other, "sovereign power is in the hands of a part of the people." Thus, the establishment of the right to vote (i.e., a properly republican constitution) "are fundamental in this government" because it is "important in this case to regulate how, by whom, for whom, and on what issues voes should be cast." The essential distinction between "the whole" and "the part" is in the voting mechanism itself: "Voting by lot is in the nature of democracy; voting by choice is in the nature of aristocracy."
What there is to note, of course, is that we've (and I mean here, at least, England, Canada and the US) developed is a combination of the two: "everyone" or "the people as a whole" votes by choice, electing a representative body, which actually governs. That is, just as the American "Founding Fathers" wanted, there is a "natural aristocracy" that emerges through the democratic mechanism. Of course, one may want to discuss the degree to which the "natural aristocracy" is actually composed of those who are, naturally, the best...
Posted by: Craig | Jul 14, 2006 1:40:31 PM
I don't want to rain on the socialist parade, and so, notwithstanding all the problems inherent in this continued need to dream up new socialist alternatives, let me just ask: how do you think these alternatives would come into existence, assuming their viability?
Posted by: Kenneth Rufo | Jul 14, 2006 3:09:11 PM
A couple possible answers to Kenneth's question:
1. Catastrophe: Namely, because of the sinking wage rates of the workers in the world, because of fear, because of a stock market crash the 'system' as we know it must be significantly rewired. This does not mean a revolution; merely that options which seeme impossible today (social democracy, anarchy, communitarianisms, radical democracy -- etc) become probable, even essential. However, the only way we can work with this (barring attempting to make a catastrophe, and we're all too well-heeled and fed to do that) is to be ready and to be open. Lukas said that the best Bourgeouis realist writer's (Mann Father and Son, Romain Rolland) are distinguished from their counterrevolutionary peers by an openness to socialism: perhaps that is the best we can hope for.
2. Immanent tendencies:
a. the increase in inequality will force some redistribution of consent.
b. the 'representative machinery" of the country will break down so much (through fraud, through discontent) that it must be opened again, bringing with it an increase in civic culture, etc.
c. possible 'democratic' majority, sometime in the possible future.
3. It isn't: doom and the hope for a finish.
Posted by: Babeuf | Jul 14, 2006 4:01:53 PM
Ken--I would simply say "non democratically" if we are using something like the present as a starting point. But, that's not a disaster or 'recipe for totalitarianism' insofar as we don't have democracy--or anything close to it--now.
Posted by: Jodi | Jul 14, 2006 7:50:17 PM
In an American context something like the Panthers might be an example. Although the do-it-yourselfism that both the panthers and radical Indian groups worked for in the 60s/70s would no doubt be welcomed with open arms by neoliberalism.
Posted by: Amish Lovelock | Jul 14, 2006 9:21:13 PM
how do you think these alternatives would come into existence, assuming their viability?
The way they are coming into existence in South America. We could bicker about the individual cases there, but it is undeniable that there was been a general turn, nearly continent-wide, against the Washington Consensus and neo-liberal inevitabilities.
Posted by: CR | Jul 14, 2006 9:42:11 PM
Jodi, I may be missing something, but it seems to me that your post confuses two senses of necessity, the material or effective sense on one hand and the ethical (for lack of a better word) sense on the other. Whatever its content, formal and empty or substantive ("radical," "deliberative," etc.), isn't it an ethical precondition of any legitimate political program or stance that that program or stance be characterizable as essentially "democratic"? Isn't that so regardless of whether a political program or stance is materially effective -- e.g., materially effective enough to successfully combat the pathologies of capitalism or racism? We've already seen what socialism without democracy looks like -- personally, I'm not interested, pace Zizek's posturing about the wonders of Leninism. "Democracy" in this (ethical) sense is necessary, even if, at least standing alone, it's also "inadequate to confront[] the situation of global capitalism and racist fundamentalism." Thus, I would say that "democracy" is in fact (ethically) necessary even if it isn't materially sufficient (or even, arguably, ethically sufficient, since I don't have a great deal of respect for teary-eyed or otherwise symbolic political gestures that don't hold any chance of improving actual people's actual lives). If that means "democracy" constitutes a regulative ideal of some sort, so be it (although I don't think it has to be "regulative" in the traditionally normative sense of the word). For me, the interesting questions thus concern the content (or productive contentlessness) of the term "democracy" and the manner in which it "regulates" the political (my own view of the latter, coming out of Derrida and Levinas, being that "regulates" is the wrong word here, but that's a whole other long story, obviously). That's in fact how I read your analysis of the weaknesses of "democracy" of the deliberative and radical kinds (and with which I largely agree, I think) -- i.e., as a contribution to the question of the content of the term "democracy." But to jettison "democracy" entirely as a criterion for a legitimate politics -- I guess I'm not convinced, despite my own frequently bleak reservations about the current state of the American polity and identitarian cant (and/or wide-eyed utopianism) of too much of the American left.
Posted by: Adam Thurschwell | Jul 15, 2006 1:29:22 AM
Adam,
I would say that the question of what makes a regime 'legitimate' is an open one. If your criterion is democracy, then there is no legitimate political regime. Habermasians, say, make democracy only one of two criteria, the other being universality, which is not quite the same thing because it is rooted in communicative reason (operative word here being reason). The idea here is only those validity claims are justified whose consequences and side affects could be agreed upon by all concerned in actual discourse (carried out according to the demanding standards of discourse ethics). The formality of the procedure becomes a way to judge existing forms and a way to justify democracy in the long run. As you know, this whole thing is highly contested--for its cognitivism, limited view of rationality, etc.
I don't think I'm confusing material and ethical notions of necessity: I'm saying that with respect to democracy, these are inseparable. If we are talking about a democracy that involves people (rather than say rational beings as such) then the material conditions are ethical and the ethical conditions are material.
I will say, though, that it is hard for me to understand how you are combining Levinasian ethics with democracy here. I don't see the fit. What do you mean when you say that democracy is ethically necessary?
On jettisoning: I think that there are other kinds of mobilizing ideals--universality, say, raised in the way that Ranciere and Laclau (differently) use it, Truth in Badiou's sense. To my mind, democracy is a political arrangement, a way that the people govern themselves. To overload this with an ethics right from the start seems to me immensely problematic, especially insofar as it gives a moral priority to claims to democracy that democracies do not deserve: after all, they are simply forms of governance enacted and practiced by the people, in all their differences and errors.
Posted by: Jodi | Jul 15, 2006 10:09:55 AM
Hmm, as I'm trying to think through my own contribution, perhaps I could ask Jodi to clarify what she means by "political arrangement" and ask Adam to clarify what he means by "ethically necessary?"
Posted by: Kenneth Rufo | Jul 15, 2006 12:10:27 PM
Kenneth:
On political arrangement:
arrangement of rights and responsibilities, opportunities, service, offices, the procedures for determinings these rights, responsibilities, opportunities, services, offices, the procedures for securing the funding what is necessary to secure, maintain, and carry out these rights, responsibilities, opportunities, services, and office. Another word for this 'arrangement' is goverance (as in democracy as self governance) but I found myself moving against governance because of the other term, political;
so, I qualified arrangement with the term 'political' as a way of acknowledging the necessarily antagonistic aspect of governance (the splits within the governing and governed at any given time and place, in any actually operating arrangement); but, rather than saying antagonistic arrangement, I chose "political" because I also wanted to acknowledge the ideal, utopian, or universal aspirations (some might call this the ideological component) tied to an arrangement of offices etc.
I'll explain this universal element: Zizek, in my mind rightly, notes that any political formation cannot rest purely on brought force; there has to be an element that captures something ideal, something hoped for, some kind of real possibility or desire capable of motivating or animating the people; such desires can be for justice, for equality, for order, for abundance, for freedom, etc. The idea is that these ideals are not simply vehicles for ideology; they have a power, an aspirational force; they are worth believing in, despite the ways they are manipulated and materialized.
This does not, of course, immunize them from critique, or mean that they are in some way equivalent or anything like that. The claim is weaker, simply a way of pointing out that even authoritarian regimes can simply oppress the people; they have to oppress them in the name of something ideal.
Another way to understand this might be in terms of the double sided nature of political authority: force and ideal. To my mind, the central feature of 'the political' is this combination of force and ideal which can never be overcome as long as there is politics; differently put, in any arrangement that does overcome this is not political.
Clearly this notion is indebted to Schmitt--the force side would not come into play in a pure community of friends. But I think it might be a bit more useful insofar as it doesn't begin with a set of identity categories. Or maybe not--my intent here is a not a full blown defense of this notion but rather a gesture to a working definition or concept for as long as it is useful (which, may not be all that long).
Posted by: Jodi | Jul 15, 2006 12:32:44 PM
Jodi, I'm not sure I follow you - how does your insistence that there are no democracies at present relate to a willingness to explore non- or a-democratic politics? The first claim is usually followed by assertions that democracy should, therefore, be enhanced, acheived, and so on. (Just to be clear, though, it's the claim about the absence of democracy that I disagree with, not the willingness to explore a-democratic paths.)
Posted by: s0metim3s | Jul 16, 2006 12:45:14 AM
Sometimes--just to be clear: you reject the assertion that there are no democracies at present?
my view is that there are no democracies (no existing regimes that meet their own criteria for being democracies) and that continuing to understand them as democracies gives them a moral claim and political legitimacy that they lack, putting the political burden on those who would try for something better, for political change; so, democracy is the worst form of government but better than all the others (or whatever the oft quoted line is supposed to be).
Further, my own position (and, my sense is that I haven't laid it out well here in this post or thread, which is my error, but I do make the argument in Publicity's Secret and buttress, supplement it in a some following articles) is that attempts to improve democracy (increase participation, increase information, for example) have the effect of worsening the problems.
Does this address your comment?
Posted by: Jodi | Jul 16, 2006 10:31:13 AM
Kind of makes more sense. I should read the book, hey ...
Anyway, I think there are good reasons to talk about democracy in the sense of really-existing democracies - in part, because it's that moral claim (of proper representation and the sovereignty of the people) which I have problems with. Because while it's often transcendentally posed, it nevertheless does have some connection to the organisation of existing states, politics, etc.
Care to elaborate on the makes things worse aspect? Is this specific to the question of democracy, or?
Posted by: s0metim3s | Jul 16, 2006 1:00:16 PM
Sometimes--ah gee, if I elaborate I give too much away. There has to be some reason for you to break down and read the book! ;)
Posted by: Jodi | Jul 17, 2006 9:40:53 AM
hi Jodi,
I don't understand your remark that actually existing democracies are "forms of governance enacted and practiced by the people." Actually existing democracies are enacted and practiced by some people upon others, such that there isn't a people who enacts and practices democracy. Unless you want to say that those who enact and practice democracy are the people and those get it enacted and practiced upon them are somebody else (in which case "the people" as a category gets its range narrowed such that it just becomes "some people."). This is related to the move you make from democracy as self-government to democracy as governance, wherein there are the governing who govern others, the governed. The move is predicated upon taking there to be a demos as a self that acts (a count by one?), rather than as a relationship of force between actors.
On a similar note, I disagree with the claim that political formations can't consist of pure operations of force. Any lethal exercise of state power and many non-lethal ones demonstrate to my mind that sometimes brute force can be enough for the bad guys to win. This is not to say thought and desire aren't present. They are, because political formations are made of people and people have thoughts and desires, but this doesn't distinguish the political from anything else.
Take care,
Nate
Posted by: Nate | Jul 18, 2006 1:30:32 PM
Nate--I'm not sure where you are getting the quoted passage (I'm lazy and only skimmed). In one of my comments above, to sometimes, I say that I think there are no actually existing democracies.
Also, in the comments to Kenneth, I explain that I insert the term political into my description of democracy as a political arrangement precisely in order to include the dimension of antagonism; this dimension alerts us to the inevitability of contestation and struggle in democracy (and, here I am still speaking of a kind of democratic ideal, not of anything that exists), such a struggle will of course include who counts as one of the people.
A lethal demonstration of force--a bombing--is not the same a political formation or a government. A political formation requires some sort of relation between rulers and ruled; the maintenance of the relation requires that it not be rooted in force alone; it requires power (good old Arendtian distinction here).
Posted by: Jodi | Jul 18, 2006 3:34:11 PM
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