Theory and the Man

Why is it that even the most post of the posties end up caught up in adulation of or resistance to single great thinkers? Why is the hold of a Master so strong even after decades upon decades of critiques of the subject, of agency, of originality, of individuality, of authenticity? Is it precisely because of these critiques? That answer seems too easy.

Perhaps one answer lies more in the structure of the academy, in its patterns of the transmission of knowledge and structures of authentication and validation. If that's the case, should those committed to ideas of structures, systems, contingencies, networks, assemblages, and discourses eschew identifying views with single persons--Agamben, Badiou, Foucault, Lacan, and, why not, Zizek?

Academia, particularly in the non science and non business areas, tends to follow ancient patterns of instilling/installing knowledge through relations to a master. These patterns involve personal, affective, and erotic attachments as well as practices of critical interrogation and response. It's as if the years from graduate school through assistant professor are a kind of apprenticeship where one demonstrates to those who have come before that one has mastered the craft. Only thereafter can one become a Master.

I confess to finding benefit in this system. For one, I like that it is not the same as a corporate, go getter, efficiency model that values profit and innovation. I like the slowness and the transmission of knowledge over time. I even like the disciplinary effects: new assistant professors generally think that they are the only folks to have had an idea; they tend to feel vastly superior to those who hired them. I was that way--completely confident and obnoxious. It's hard to learn when one already knows everything. It's hard to remember that the institution into which one was hired had long done quite well before one's arrival.

The structures of authentication and validation in the humanities and some social sciences also contribute to an attachment to the Master. Who blurbed one's book? Who writes one's letters? Who shares the podium or panel? In a sense, acquiring the validation of more senior people helps one establish to others that one is worth reading, worth taking seriously. Without that, how do we know? There are lots of books and article out there, lots of interesting ideas. It's not easy to make one's way through the thicket without some kind of guide. In effect the words of experts, of Masters, provide these guides. They provide ways for us to group ourselves in tribes, or schools of believers, of adherents and adepts; they provide opportunities to get the endorsements from the Masters.

Yet, if we posties (and this 'we' is rather odd considering I'm not all that postie, but, well, whatever) continue to hang on and propagate the Masters' words, why should we not expect the structures of masterful hegemony to continue? Doesn't it make more sense to try to circulate an idea (the dependence of resistance on that which it resists, the retroactive determination of meaning after an event, the unavoidable stain of drive) not constrainted or held in place by the Master's name?

Perhaps I should have called this post "the parallax of self-criticism."

Comments

[Adam Kotsko]

Presumably this "objet petit a" of the apologists is completely and totally different from the "subversive core" that Zizek finds there.

"Adam, Isn't that a bit like maintaining the study of alchemy..."

The Jesus business, whether fundie or the catholic-canonical type doesn't simply reinforce Scriptural dogma, it generally maintains the 1st estate (monarchy and aristos) and thus gives sustenance to the 2nd estate (clerics, priests, divines). Note that the big private schools (Ivy League, Steinford, USC) generally feature theology schools; state schools don't. Yet one could hardly deny that postmodernist dogma (especially of the Heidegger-Hegelian variety--but then Descartes does as well) also has a pronounced clerical and theological aspect; indeed one of the great existentialist themes may be how the rise of materialism, empiricism, positivism, etc. was a tragedy, "cold," vulgar, etc.

AS Russell and others often noted , the zealous True marxist Believer does not seem distant from the zealous True xtian Believer; and one could instantiate "poststructuralist" in for xtian as well. Yes, there are somewhat empirical marxists and progressives, but few postmods seem troubled by data or induction of any sort: a "fact-aversion" syndrome they share with fundies and catholic-monarchist right .

The <"fact-aversion" syndrome they share with fundies and catholic-monarchist> is mainly a characteristic of self-proclaimed postmodern "followers" not of the original teachers of the ideas.

If you propose a new approsch to ontology you start *before* the facts, as any ontological hypothesis does, including those of the *standard model* of western science.

Is there any evidence to support the claim that "postmodern" author X intented to start something like a school, or rather a "church" to rival or replace christian churches?

[Sinthome]

Adam, sure. There's no subject in anthropology, or rather the subject is reduced to the object, whereas Zizek is talking about a subject. However, is Zizek a believer or a Christian, or is he attempting to lift something out of Christianity that he sees as relevant to political engagement? I take it that Zizek's espousal of atheism and materialism, coupled with his claim that the big Other does not exist support the latter reading (hence my remark in the initial posts as to what is misguided in believers that try to appropriate Zizek and Badiou for their own aims). The parallel would be Lacan drawing on the story of Narcissus and Echo, in elaborating voice and gaze as objet a. Lacan certainly doesn't believe in Greek mythology, but sees them as elaborating a certain structure of subjectivity. Badiou is quite clear that he thinks the teaching of the cross is a pseudo-event or nonsense, but admires Paul for the model of militant engagement without grounds he provides. Just as you pointed out in a previous post, one need not be a believer or a Christian to find something worthwhile in mythological texts such as the Torah, Bible, or Koran. That is, these texts can be read in a secular fashion, as I originally claimed. Certainly I find nothing objectionable in that, given that I myself have found plenty worth thinking about in the myths of the Bible. What I'm objecting to are the existence-claims. Just as we no longer have sets of communal practices organized around Greek mythology, I wouldn't shed a tear if we no longer had political and communal practices organized around Christian mythology. As a materialist and an atheist, I'd be a hypocrit were I to argue that I have no particular desire to see religion leave the earth. In many respects, I think this is what Zizek finds admirable in fundamentalism... That it takes its belief seriously and doesn't advocate a "low-fat" form of belief where we simply keep our beliefs private and out of the public space, thereby desiring belief without belief, but actively pursue the transformation of the world in terms of that belief. Of course, it's impossible to keep one's belief private anyway, as we act in the world and relate to others based on our beliefs. Echoing Wittgenstein's claim that there is no private language, it could be said that "there is no private belief." Another persons beliefs are my misery, as I have to live with how they act on the world based on these beliefs.

I think certain aspects of the Sermon on the Mount and the Beatitudes, coupled with certain aspects of Pauline universalism, are as great as the next person, but given that I've never seen, in practice, a form of Christianity that isn't riddled with sexual and ethnic intolerance and a guilt producing relation to the Law calling us to give way on our desire, I think we're better off without it. I'm personally of the view that the fact that certain ideas arose within religion does not entail that they're intrinsically religious. Socrates, for instance, argues that injustice should never be returned with injustice in the Crito without referring to divinity, which is nearly identical to Christ's "turn the other cheek". If such claims can be arrived at independently, why introduce all the divine baggage that tends to muddy things anyway? As a result of this divine dimension, we get an entire population of people that ignore those moral teachings, and instead fetishize the figure of Jesus or the divine or Mary or this or that Saint or all manner of supernatural imaginings, ignoring the communal and moral teachings altogether, being more fascinated with finding the face of Jesus in a potato chip. And insofar as they call themselves "Christian" they are therefore entitled to do whatever they like to whomever they think is non-Christian. And, of course, any politician using the signifier "Christian" can then manipulate these folk however the might like, in very non-Christian ways towards very non-Christian ends. So why not cut the signifiers and myths out of the picture altogether? What does one gain from this mythology, save the narcissistic satisfaction of being the object of a divine gaze?

One can rejoin by saying "but that's not true Christianity, that's not the sophisticated Christianity I *know*", and express outrage when one hears Christianity being critiqued saying "not all Christians are like that", but this entirely misses the point that it's religion at the level of sittlichkeit, at the level of its actual practice (rather than scholarly presentation) that's being critiqued in the first place, and that this rejoinder reactively helps to reinforce those very practices that the apologist himself denounces by making such criticism offlimits for fear of hurting the feelings of those tender souls that "aren't like that"... Always the endless mantra of the true inner core that's been corrupted and the corrupt actuality of the thing, never recognizing that it's belief and attachment to this true inner core that functions as the support of the corrupt actual practice. Following Kierkegaard, I'm inclined to argue that the only true Christian is that Christian that does not call himself a Christian and that takes on all appearances of being an atheist. Only this person is capable of avoiding fetishization and all the narcissistic traps, the "team spirit" (that always has to have its rival), that accompany these signifiers.

All of this, however, has gone far astray of the original topic of the thread.

[Adam Kotsko]

You're right that this is off-topic, but I have one more thing to say off-topic: I would simply note that Paul was not a myth, but an actual real man -- most likely, Jesus was a real person as well, although it's hard to know exactly what he taught or did, through all the layers of propaganda added by the gospels. It doesn't seem to me that Badiou is treating Paul as a myth, since Paul actually existed and did stuff in the real world.

If you don't want to read a Christian thinker on the topic of myth, Nancy's essay on the topic in Inoperative Community is pretty good. (That is to say, if we assume that Nancy is not in some sense a "Christian thinker." I get the feeling that he served as an altar boy in some past life....)

"is Zizek a believer or a Christian, or is he attempting to lift something out of Christianity that he sees as relevant to political engagement? I take it that Zizek's espousal of atheism and materialism, coupled with his claim that the big Other does not exist support the latter reading."

Yes, and the Golgotha Tale obviously may be read as a political metaphor, with the roman and jewish jurists playing the part of various corrupt statists of the day, etc. Tant pis. And consider Kid Galilee as the paragon of virtue and innocence, wrongfully convicted: that goes down in probably 20% of American court cases, but where is the Zizek du jour discussing incarceration and the court bureaucracy? More fact-aversion. The political, materialist Zizek may be deserving of some respect; the psychoanalytic Zizek often seems at odds with his materialist Other.

Indeed, it could be argued--or at least suggested-- that psychoanalysis of early Freud or Lacan varieties, of ego/depth psychology concerning all those hypostatized concepts-- repression, "desire", the subject, the unconscious-- is itself a sort of dogmatic position, and in ways closer to Cartesianism (if not an immaterial phenomenology) than to materialism, of either the scientific/empirical or dialectical varieties. The late Freud of Civilization and Its Discontents had mostly rejected the ego psych. and claims regarding the unconscious, and has shifted to pure observation, and more limited inferences: eros/thanatos as sort of fundamental, biological-based drives/instincts (that may not be completely correct, but at the very least an assertion that might be discussed/disputed/confirmed) . The postmodernists seemed to forget Civ. and Its Dis.--not to say stimulus/response theory and behaviorism as a whole-- ever was brought into light.....

[Sinthome]

Adam, Thanks for the Nancy reference. Have you read Michel Henry's book on Paul? Is it worth the time? When I refer to "myth" I'm certanly not suggesting that these Paul or Jesus didn't exist.

[Adam Kotsko]

Where's "the discretion of the post's author" when you need it?

I've not read the Henry book, but it's on one of my exam lists, so it's only a matter of time.

[Sinthome]

To He-Who's-Name-Shall-Not-Be-Typed,

The short answer is that I'm not a reductive materialist. I take it that cultural formations, of *whatever* sort, are material formations, but formations such as these cannot be adequately addressed through the resources of neurology or behaviorism. Sign-systems are material systems that are organized according to their own material principles, not strata beneath them such as neurological connections. Thus, while I'm sympathetic to the thesis that neurological systems are *necessary* conditions for social systems of larger scale, I do not think they are *sufficient* conditions. Moreover, the sort of empiricism you advocate sounds a lot like positivism to me. I take it that Quine demonstrated why this particular positivism is untenable in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". In short, I don't see that we can draw a neat line between those who have foresaken metaphysics and simply observe and measure, and those who speculate. Every observational statement already embodies a theory. I take it that your rather reductive and simplistic denunciations of what you call "postmodernism" miss this point.

Second, following Zizek, I'm of the position that all ideologies contain a non-ideological kernal or longing for something better. This would include Christian fundamentalist (of which Adam is not an instance). Ideology critique should aim at releasing this non-ideological kernal. It is for this reason that materialists have something to learn from religious discourses. Here you might do well to read Hegel's essay "Who Thinks Abstractly?", focusing on the passages about the murderer, as you sound a good deal like someone who thinks abstractly:

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/
works/se/abstract.htm

Of course, given what you've said of Hegel, I suspect you'll have your blinders on if you bother to read it at all. I would argue that there's a non-teological, non-religious, Hegel just waiting to get out.

Third, if I didn't bother to acquaint myself with the work of those with whom I disagree, I would deny myself the enjoyment of having pleasurable, contentious discussions with intelligent individuals such as Adam who know far more about a certain subject than I do. While I might disagree with Adam on some of his positions and how he gets to them, I wager that I agree with him on a number of other positions. Were I to approach Adam or those similar to him abstractly, I would thus be denying myself the opportunity to learn and a potential ally with regard to other issues.

[Jodi]

I've exercised some discretion and deleted 4 comments from the un named apostle of Quine.

why not be honest and simply admit, like Kostko, you have nothing of any real depth or insight to contribute. Even assuming Two Dogmas as a guide, you offer no confirmable theories (and TD does not at all refute empiricism, but merely expands it), nor any real data-based research, nor , say, analytical types of inquiries. At least like some of the frauds around here you could do Nostalgia Hour and bring up some of the few decent sections of Capital or, egads Leviathan.

yeah, when it comes down to the wire, those arguing for empiricism, materialism, secularism, evidence, even a sort of verifiable form of marxism are "moderated" and deleted, and those upholding Heidegger, Hegel (the great champion of Luther), psychoanalysis, and the tradition of Xtianity keep on keepin' on..

What-evs. Delete this too pleaze.

[?]

I have to agree with the "unnamed apostle of Quine" (is that Unaqui ;-) in substance if certainly not in tone.

To move from "the media", "the academic debate" or even worse "the artistic expression of Zeitgeist" (as aesthetically appealing as this may certainly be, your front page artwork bears witness to that) to empirically founded social science is very unlikely to be a mistake... some of the "Lockian vulgarism" you see in fields such as economics or the pretty awful but very popular attempts to build a social theory of the Web would benefit greatly from articulate theorists like you guys here.

Any offhand pointers to people 'round here doing empirical stuff combined with Theory?

[Matt]

CT's policy, fwiw.

[pseudonym]

Jeez, why are you so *i-dont-know-what*, Matt?

May is the forum at all if it's not open to outsider who want to challenge your jargon, your preconceptions or whatever?

Are you *above* debate, or something?

Sorry, that should be

Why is this forum open at all if it's not open to outsiders who want to challenge...

[Nate]

hi Jodi,
This is interesting. Synthome mentioned Anglo-American philosophy departments that do Anglo-American work. It's been a minute, but in my experience in those environs people describe themselves by types that are not proper names (virtue ethicist, anti-realist, etc). Thinking of that in relation to what you wrote, I'm curious to hear what you think: does a lot of proper name talk have to mean there is a presence and propogation of mastery? And, does the absence of proper name talk mean the absence of a discourse of mastery? (Presumably at least some of what goes on in at least some Anglo-American philosophy departments could be susceptible to charges of propogating structures of masterful hegemony.) Lastly, on your view, is the university capable of much other than mastery, at least the actually existing university?
take care,
Nate

[Lars]

Dogma: rules for papers in continental philosophy:

http://spurious.typepad.com/spurious/2006/09/dogma.html

[Matt]

Small note, but isn't the study of God - at least seen properly - always rather by necessity already the study of the study of God?

And while:

Lit theory had its day, but it was just an episode -- at this point, divinity schools and religion departments are going to be the places to study European philosophy, outside of the handful of explicitly continental departments.

strikes me as something of a dramatic overstatement, and moreover a trend for good reason to be extremely wary of, one could certainly add to Adam's list of names of people doing meaningful work, e.g. Kevin Hart, and in the process deepening the meaning of the discipline.

That said it seems obvious to me there are reasons why the study of literature and philosophy will always intersect, whether this relationship is merely tolerated, oppotunely castigated and feared, genuinely explored and questioned or otherwise. (But then what else *is* there, really?)

[Matt]

(cf. The death of God is "not nothing," and so on...)

[Matt]

Oh, and just in case my silence wasn't quite loud enough for some: I am so totally above debate with groundlessly whining and unimaginative "psuedonyms." And that was just a luke-warm pointer to CT's policy! As in, "it's not bad as a realistic starting-point, but it could be improved upon."

But Mr. pseudonym/ ? /no-name, or should I say warszawa, seems genuine enough, so, fwiw, re: social theories of the web, is there a particular one you have in mind? It's sort of rude and failing to pass muster as a comment to demand an engagement from strangers without first offering one's own take.

I'm probably less well-versed than some, but tend to agree from what I've seen of the easily divided into phorias and phobias they often appear lacking.

If this thread (and site) hadn't gone silent I'd feel less guilty about derailing further off-topic. But still, suppose there's no great burden to respond.

I take Jodi's post to be mostly tongue-in-cheek, and while it's tempting to snidely unenthuse, "Zizek" in response to the primary questions (though the academic politics also seem clear enough), the only sort of half-obvious thought I'm capable of adding right now might be: "How hollow the masters become, once they have been mastered. Or put differently, how the burden shifts, how veneration (however charmingly self-deprecating) becomes something entirely less self-serious, once the "master" or master's thought is gone through or heard well enough to return the master to hir body, and even then how death unsettles everything - especially hir thought - again."

[Jodi]

I don't know what to make of your addition, either it's content or its position of enunciation.

[Matt]

Jodi, apologies for being potentially opaque. The death of God is "not nothing" is, of course, a line from Heidegger.

Again though, short of knowing precisely what you are referring to, or, in your words, your own "position of enunciation" may be, it's a little hard for me to clarify.

(God forbid that we ever speak from one exclusively.) Thanks for the post.

[-drm-]

Jodi, I thank you for this, though I have little to add. I agree with you.

I've considered from time to time writing a constructive book using nothing but relatively short quotations and without reference or bibliography.

[Matt]

Why is it that even the most post of the posties end up caught up in adulation of or resistance to single great thinkers?

But do they really? That is, I think your question is at least potentially–if we are to take it "seriously" and somewhat out of context, as opposed to primarily leading or a conversation starter–too easily mistaking or conflating genuine scholarship and engagement and study with "adulation." You might very well agree (fwiw, that's what I meant by "tongue in cheek"). One assumes you don't think everyone writing in a, say, Heideggerian idiom today is simply drooling over or resisting Heidegger! And what of those scholars who dogmatically resist a certain Nietzsche whilst embracing another; there is more than one "master," one voice or one direction in each thinker...That is to say, isn't it always to some degree the discreet tensions remaining either unresolved or unthought in a body of work that demand our attention/something other than either veneration or condemnation? Pardon me if this is all extremely obvious. Of course on some level I think it is actually quite difficult.

Probably there are many reasons why an organic intellectual of for instance Derrida's or Wittgenstein's or Heidegger's caliber does not come along every day: they were after all rather, you know, exceptionally committed, exceptionally hard-working, and ultimately exceptionally original and brilliant.

Why is the hold of a Master so strong even after decades upon decades of critiques of the subject, of agency, of originality, of individuality, of authenticity? Is it precisely because of these critiques? That answer seems too easy.

Actually that answer seems quite possible, at least in part (although not at all in a Zizekian reductive fashion of simplistic (and inevitably simplifying) reversal). One thing all these critiques do accomplish, after all, for those who follow them through to their conflicted and aporetic "end", is a certain re-affirmation of the subject, of agency, etc. (cf. Derrida) albeit there where the subject, etc. is never quite the same, nor for that matter of course the "hold of the master." Speaking more broadly critiques may often result in a deeper appreciation for an idea, and the way this idea then gets disseminated and referenced, marketed and cited is of course on the surface superficially, with a tendency to trivialize in popular speech, making the task of remaining faithful and attuned to its spirit, timbre and tone ever more difficult. Which is one reason why Debord dropped citation altogether and opted in favour of plagiarism, one supposes?

Your questions seem to anticipate these and other answers to some degree, without being entirely self-certain or closed off. This was nice, in fact. Thanks again.