dualism in phlosophy

Everyone is familiar, even if they haven't come across this particular quotation from Rorty, with the comment that Western metaphysics is grounded in 'dualisms.'

'Platonism'...refers to a set of philosophical distinctions (appearance-reality, matter-mind, made-found, sensible-intellectual, etc.): what Dewey called a 'brood and nest of dualisms.'These dualisms dominate the history of Western philosophy, and can be traced back to one or another passage in Plato's writings. Dewey thought, as I do, that the vocabulary which centers around these traditional distinctions has become an obstacle to our social hopes. (Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, xii)

What do we think of this claim? It's a characterization about fundamental ways of thinking specific to the West. A geographically specific area is being talked about. Not everyone, in other words, on the planet earth who thinks about philosophic topics employs the kinds of dualisms Rorty says mark Western philosophy. "Europe" is the specific territory where we come across this kind of thinking.

Is it valuable to speculate about the unseen unfelt habits of thinking that characterize the Western tradition? If so, what does learning that European philosophy is rooted in dualisms, as Dewey claims, help us with?

Imagine an alien arriving to survey Earth as part of an inter-galactic project to collect studies of species that have developed a self-consciousness along the lines of Fichte's description of it. The researcher doesn't want the most detailed depiction of philosophic developments -- that's too much data to handle. Instead, reliable general characterizations of the mental 'environment', if you will, of fichtean-level beings are needed. (This then gets compared to a wide range of other instances that have been collected so far.) Would such a researcher be well served to refer to arguments like Rorty's? The Researcher (that's what we'll call the character. The Researcher. Can a graphic novel be far behind? Everyone seen 'V' for Vendetta?) could write:

We have about ten thousand similarly situated worlds in our database that roughly correspond to what is found on earth: that is, a world that has been taken over and redirected to serve the needs of a hominoid population that has achieved 'level seven' mental capacities. [The Researcher is on level ten. Figures. - swifty] But there's one subset of this population, located geographically in an area known as 'Europe' (though migrants from this area have also established themselves elsewhere), that has adopted a way of thinking that we've rarely seen in so highly developed a form on other planets. Quite recently, the more advanced thinkers among them have even themselves become aware of the overarching pattern of 'European thought' that has ruled it, unawares, for almost three millennia. This is the phenomenon of a stark dualism that produces fixed, uncompromising absolutes on either side of a potential scale. The result on this planet especially, but also on others that share this foundational approach to thinking about the world, is a strong tendency to reflections about 'essences,' whether the topic is something obscure like 'truth' or more day-to-day, such as gender. We also note a lively streak of near schizophrenia especially among religious types who wrestle with an especially unforgiving earth-heaven dualism.click here & go to verses 7-24 .

Would the Researcher's characterization of European thought above be a valid one?

 

Comments

[Alain]

As with almost all of Rorty's comments about "European thinking," this discription has some basis in fact but really tells us almost nothing about how such dualisms have been thought about or worked through. Even a closer look at Plato's dialogues would reveal that Plato was not really a Platonist, at least not in terms of the charicature that Rorty presents. The relation between being and appearance, or thought and being, at least as it is discussed within "European thought" is not accurately glossed in a sound bite. That said, it isn't a bad place to start a discussion. But Dewey might provide a better articulation of the point being made.

[Adam Kotsko]

I'm pretty sure that Neo-Platonic thought, as represented by Plotinus, Proclus, etc., was actually triadic in form rather than dualistic. The synthesis achieved in Neo-Platonism is generally what people mean by "Platonism," in my experience -- since that is in fact the version of Plato that actually influenced later thought more directly.

This is perhaps irrelevant to the strictly philosophical conversation, since I'm basing my view of "what people say about Platonism" on the (mainly) 20th-century phenomenon of Christian theologians believing that the key to making Christianity good again is to get rid of all that terrible Greek stuff, especially the Platonic stuff. Specific texts of Plato are never cited, from what I can tell -- rather, various figures in the history of the church are convicted for what "everyone knows" are Platonic patterns of thought.

Give me Plato over Aristotle any day.

[Adam Kotsko]

In fact, thinking about it more, we only really get dualism, strictly speaking, in the modern period. Just look at the list: appearance-reality, matter-mind, made-found, sensible-intellectual. Every one of these pairs, except maybe made-found, is a distinctive concern of modern philosophy -- for example, it was only in Descartes that the matter-mind distinction became so stark that he had to go back and come up with what amounts to a really stupid explanation of how they connect.

[Swifty]

But what do you think, Adam, about Plato's realm of the Forms versus sensual reality expressed in the cave analogy? Then Jesus's critique of this world in favor of the next. And then we get Augustine's two cities. As he says:

"Yet I trust we have already done justice to these great and difficult questions regarding the beginning of the world, or of the soul, or of the human race itself. This race we have distributed into two parts, the one consisting of those who live according to man, the other of those who live according to God. And these we also mystically call the two cities, or the two communities of men, of which the one is predestined to reign eternally with God, and the other to suffer eternal punishment with the devil." (Augustine, _Two Cities_, Chapter 15, first paragraph)

Aquinas appears to modify the scheme by introducing a 'chain of being.' Though perhaps something can be reasonably inferred from Plato, even in the cave analogy. For anyone interested in a look, the 'cave analogy' is available here:
http://urlsnip.com/695136.

[Adam Kotsko]

But there is communication between the two realms in the cave metaphor. The "chain of being" type of stuff seems to be more typical of Plato as he was actually received in the ancient world -- for instance, the stuff in the Timaeus, which doesn't strike me as being sharply dualistic.

Augustine's case is complicated by the fact that empirically the two "cities" are intermingled, as in Jesus's parable of the wheat and the tares -- let the two grow together, and we'll sort it out at the last judgment. The dualism doesn't become a sorting mechanism for present reality. Even in Calvin, who has a much stricter "double predestination" theology than Augustine, you're supposed to treat everyone you meet as though they're among the elect.

There's a difference between having "two things" and having the unbridgable distinction between those two things be determinate for thought and analysis. In the modern period, the distinction between mind and matter is sharp, well-defined, and a starting point for analysis and knowledge. The problem with dualism isn't just the number two.

[Adam Kotsko]

Yet far be it from me to impose a strict "modern/pre-modern" dualism here.

Ah it's the new and improved Long Sunday hick-theology blog. Even orthodox marxism preferable to this sort of lightweight metaphysical cabbage, courtesy of the Xtian Cabbage King, Adam Knavesko.

[Alain]

Swifty I think the Allegory of the Cave does point to a dualism, but I would suggest it is more about a division of how we approach the world itself. The journey of the philosopher is such that she must turn away from the immediate concerns of the polis, both physically and spiritually, in order to gain insight into how the world truly is, not simply as it appears to the average citizen. Once proper vision is gained outside the cave the philosopher returns to share her discoveries with the other citizens. And the irony, of course, is that the citizens response is that the philosopher is not only crazy, but a danger to the community. As a result, they are killed (obvious nod to the life and death of the historical Socrates).

Regarding epistemology, the shadows on the wall are mere images of the true objects (forms) which exist outside the cave. But ultimately both the objects on the wall and the forms outside the cave reveal the same objects, but one is more true than the other. To the degree that the shadows show something of the true nature of things, they also partake in things showing themselves as they are. This applies not only to material objects but also to virtues like Justice, moderation, or courage. What ultimately unites the supposed "realm of ideas" to the material world is Logos. I think this is ultimately the philosopher's belief, whether it is the Plato or John Searle.

[ZiZi]

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[Alain]

I just should add that my problem with Rorty is that he wants to completely do away with the idea that we can or should want to describe the world as it is - that such a project is not only a fantasy but has become "an obstacle to our social hopes." His brand of bourgeois liberal pragmatism seems overly invested in the various assumptions and prejudices of the day to be a useful source for engendering social hope. I would suggest that we need a lot more critical distance to work toward such a goal.

[Swifty]

Alain writes:

"Once proper vision is gained outside the cave the philosopher returns to share her discoveries with the other citizens."

Just a textual note here, I don't think it's right that the philosopher returns to share her discoveries with other citizens. The other citizens are not capable of philosophy. Plato does talk about what happens when the philosopher does go down into the cave, where she is made fun of for not being able to make out the shadows on the wall that the prisoners take for reality. But the philosopher is never seen attempting to educate anyone. Unless I'm wrong.

Also: "But ultimately both the objects on the wall and the forms outside the cave reveal the same objects, but one is more true than the other. To the degree that the shadows show something of the true nature of things, they also partake in things showing themselves as they are."

I'm not sure that's right. The shadows on the wall are the result of a very artificial procedure that I'm sure you know about. I don't think the usual reaction to the cave analogy is that Plato is recommending the shadows on the wall (not that you said he's 'recommending' them) as a link to a truer reality.

[Alain]

Swifty, thank you for the feedback. It has been many years since I have read the Republic so I apologize for my presumption. I am conflating a discussion that takes place later in the dialogue, where Socrates talks about forming the ideal state in the soul of those willing to study and explore justice. This is a distinct discussion apart from the Allegory so you are correct that this call to teach and share is not stated there. Also, I am thinking of Socrates interpretation of the allegory, in which he indicates the philosopher ought to be compelled to go back in the cave in order to either create or maintain the Just State:

"Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the cave, and you will know what the several images are, and what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth. And thus our State which is also yours will be a reality, and not a dream only, and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst."

Regarding the relationship between the shadows and the forms, I would need to do some digging but I think that there are sections of the dialogue that indicate even the artifical figures in the cave participate in truth, but to a far lesser degree than the forms outside the cave. Whether I can find the passages I am thinking of is another matter. In my view, this is a key argument as to whether Plato was truly a Platonist.

I am at work but I will try to find some passages this evening and get back to you. Thanks again.

Aw man, yass, the mutha-f-n Forms. I wager there's lots of us who been missin' 'em. O Faire Form.

[squibb]

I was taught that the theory of the forms is at its most impoverished in the Republic. The republic as a text is exceedingly simplistic and arguably not intended as the final statement on Plato's metaphysics - rather it is more of a textbook, a straightforward and accessible primer to Plato's ideas - an intention revealed in the intellectual poverty of the interlocutors. Every subject Plato touches on in the Republic is developed more fully in other dialogues - thus the allegory of the Cave is, to be blunt, what it is, an allegory and it loses much in the way of specificity for so being.

[John Emerson]

The contrast to dualism is polarity on a continuum, which often can be thought of as relativism.

In logical dualism is expressed as abstract tautology -- "a v ~a". But in various sorts of unsystematic thinking a and ~a are expressed as independent terms, as good and evil, friend and enemy, etc. These are not real logical oppositions, since "good" and "evil" are independent natural-language words -- "good" means more than "not at all evil", and "evil" means more than "not at all good".

The famous examples of non-dualist thinking are Taoism and some forms of Buddhism. Loy's "Nonduality" develops these ideas in a South Asian context.

I ahve something up about Plato at my link.

To me when Schmitt writes "Let us assume that in the realm of morality the final distinctions are between good and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in economics profitable and unprofitable" on the way to the "friend-enemy" political distinction, he's using a simple-minded logic to stack the cards in favor of conflict and war.

[Swifty]

John Emerson:

I'm very interested in your comment about good and evil not being logical opposites. It's suggestive but I have trouble following the idea. I have a strong intuitive sense that good and evil are effectively opposed to each other. Ken Lay committed evil acts. Other CEOs who refuse to employ the same illegal tricks to enrich themselves reasonably consider themselves 'good' in opposition to Lay's 'evil' conduct -- though they may not use the awkward sounding word 'evil,' due to its religious connotations. 'Unethical' is the term they would use.

I think your comment about Schmitt really hit the nail on the head. That's exactly what's wrong with Schmitt -- this use of opposites. But your way of putting the point expresses it very well.

[Craig]

Schmitt, of course, is doing no such thing. John E., why do you maintain this line about Schmitt in full reocognition that you haven't bothered to read Schmitt?

(For what it is worth, you aren't the only one who adopts this line. The instrumental Marxist, Mark Neocleous, says Foucault and Schmitt are essentially the same - see his essay "War and War Again" or somesuch. At least Neocleous, unlike you, has at least read Schmitt. However, in his case, it is a rather poor reading.)

Of course, none of this suggests that Schmitt is correct. It only suggests that your grounds for rejection Schmitt aren't very good.

[John Emerson]

Craig, I'm always running into experts with a proprietary interest in various thinkers, and they always tell me I'm an idiot, and I always ignore them.

I've read three books by or about Schmitt, and that's what I take away from them. The statement I cited here has exactly the binary skew which is the topic of this thread. If you're basic political concept is "friend/enemy" how does that not stack the cards for conflict?

Swifty, good and evil are natural-language words which have lives of their own and have accreted various qualitative aspects. They're both complex concepts. Good is never evil and evil is never good, but if you took one or the other and simply negated all of its various defining qualities, you wouldn't end up with exactly its opposite (~a) unless you made a deliberate effort to do so.

Of course, in every systematic philosophy that talks about good or evil, one will be defined in terms of the other, but these won't be the natural-language concepts.

Augustine did say, I think, that evil is simply the privation of good, but his definition is not universally accepted. In particular, good/evil probably has a survival of Persian ideas where evil has an ontological status of its own and is one of two opposed forces in the universe. (I guess I'm assuming that no thing is simply the absence of some other thing).

The more powerful part of the polarity critique of dualism, as I put at my link, is that all actual things are a mix of both qualities: "less short" = "more tall", "less good" = "more evil". Absolute ethics doesn not like this kind of mixedness.

[Craig]

John, I didn't call you an idiot - only malinformed. That is, making claims you can't substantiate. In this case, you are making unsubstantiated claims about Schmitt. I'm not in a position to evaluate your other claims - say your most recent reference to Augustine. If you took your above claim from reading Schmitt, then you didn't pay much attention or weren't willing to extend him any form of charity whatsoever. (To his thought, of course, as a human he is, pretty much, a despicable opportunist.)

[John Emerson]

When I read the Schmitt-Strauss-Benjamin trialogue, in light of what I know of subsequent European history, I was not inclined to be charitable to any of them. These were historical players, after all.

At the theoretical end, my default belief is that someone who pushes his ideas to the logical conclusion will probably be wrong.

[Craig]

As I said, he might very well be wrong, but he's not wrong on the grounds you suggest. Your reading is motivated and imputed having little resemblance to the argument put forward by Schmitt in his Weimar era, Nazi era or post-War era writings. As I've pointed out before, his book is more about avoiding war than going to war. But that would entail actually considering the book beyond the first dozen pages.

[John Emerson]

All of my readings of anything are motivated.

[Swifty]

Craig, you didn't say he was an idiot, but you implied it with the old cliche, 'this proves you haven't read such-and-such author.' This especially doesn't work when someone is quoting the author in question. Hard to claim someone hasn't read something when they quote from it. How has a claim not been substantiated when a quotation to the effect has been provided? I remember I once said something in an advanced philosophy class about Kant and the professor said, well, that proves you haven't read Kant. He was right, and I have done my best to improve on that since. But boy did I sure feel like an idiot when he said that. (Unfortunately, on this particular, the professor was right.) So in general telling someone that what he says shows he hasn't even read it or listened to the thinker they refer to is a charge of fundamental intellectual vacuity. From the point of view of discussion, it makes sense for such charges to be rarely employed. And Emerson is right, isn't he, that claiming someone "hasn't even read so-and-so" is a staple of discussions that flame out? I mean if we're at a conference and someone has just given a paper on Marx, and a commentator says "this paper on Marx proves the author has not read the works by Marx being discussed," the room would get kind of tense, right? That's because a basic charge of rank incompetence has been made, correct?

[Craig]

Swifty, surely you'll agree there is a difference between reading and reading. The charge isn't one of incompetence, but one of dishonesty.

[John Emerson]

Craig has a charming way of absolving people from accusations of ignorance.

When I read Schmitt, it was a good-faith effort (motivated by the quite considerable interest in Schmitt in the ruins of the Left) to decide whether there would be something of value there for me. After reading the three books (actually five), I decided that there wasn't. I was not intending to make myself an expert on Schmitt and don't claim that I am one.

I read Schmitt in the context of Strauss (and Agamben, to a lesser degree). I have a fairly good background in Strauss, with whom I am also not at all in sympathy. I've probably read ten books by and about Strauss, as well as a couple by his epigoni. And yet I've had exactly the same debate about Strauss: I've been accused of not having read the material.

(In the case of Strauss, he's an advocate of esoteric writing, and one presumes that he wrote esoterically himself. Thus, no one understands Strauss unless he wants them to, and outsiders who venture to talk about Strauss are always all wrong. No one should have to put up with that kind of crap.)

I will continue to think what I think, and frankly all I have from Craig is the assertion that I'm wrong because I haven't read enough. Not much real argument there.