dualism in phlosophy

Everyone is familiar, even if they haven't come across this particular quotation from Rorty, with the comment that Western metaphysics is grounded in 'dualisms.'

'Platonism'...refers to a set of philosophical distinctions (appearance-reality, matter-mind, made-found, sensible-intellectual, etc.): what Dewey called a 'brood and nest of dualisms.'These dualisms dominate the history of Western philosophy, and can be traced back to one or another passage in Plato's writings. Dewey thought, as I do, that the vocabulary which centers around these traditional distinctions has become an obstacle to our social hopes. (Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, xii)

What do we think of this claim? It's a characterization about fundamental ways of thinking specific to the West. A geographically specific area is being talked about. Not everyone, in other words, on the planet earth who thinks about philosophic topics employs the kinds of dualisms Rorty says mark Western philosophy. "Europe" is the specific territory where we come across this kind of thinking.

Is it valuable to speculate about the unseen unfelt habits of thinking that characterize the Western tradition? If so, what does learning that European philosophy is rooted in dualisms, as Dewey claims, help us with?

Imagine an alien arriving to survey Earth as part of an inter-galactic project to collect studies of species that have developed a self-consciousness along the lines of Fichte's description of it. The researcher doesn't want the most detailed depiction of philosophic developments -- that's too much data to handle. Instead, reliable general characterizations of the mental 'environment', if you will, of fichtean-level beings are needed. (This then gets compared to a wide range of other instances that have been collected so far.) Would such a researcher be well served to refer to arguments like Rorty's? The Researcher (that's what we'll call the character. The Researcher. Can a graphic novel be far behind? Everyone seen 'V' for Vendetta?) could write:

We have about ten thousand similarly situated worlds in our database that roughly correspond to what is found on earth: that is, a world that has been taken over and redirected to serve the needs of a hominoid population that has achieved 'level seven' mental capacities. [The Researcher is on level ten. Figures. - swifty] But there's one subset of this population, located geographically in an area known as 'Europe' (though migrants from this area have also established themselves elsewhere), that has adopted a way of thinking that we've rarely seen in so highly developed a form on other planets. Quite recently, the more advanced thinkers among them have even themselves become aware of the overarching pattern of 'European thought' that has ruled it, unawares, for almost three millennia. This is the phenomenon of a stark dualism that produces fixed, uncompromising absolutes on either side of a potential scale. The result on this planet especially, but also on others that share this foundational approach to thinking about the world, is a strong tendency to reflections about 'essences,' whether the topic is something obscure like 'truth' or more day-to-day, such as gender. We also note a lively streak of near schizophrenia especially among religious types who wrestle with an especially unforgiving earth-heaven dualism.click here & go to verses 7-24 .

Would the Researcher's characterization of European thought above be a valid one?

 

Comments

[Craig]

The previous time we did this I provided you with an argument. I see no reason to do so again except to point out (by the way, how the number accumulates - first just one book, then three, then five, soon all of them and everything ever written about him) the obvious.

It seems to that a number of uncharitable readings of Strauss are presently in circulation. Straussians are often fond of Kojeve's reading of Strauss (in On Tyranny) and many read what Lefort has to say about him. Of course, there's nothing to say that a Straussian knows what he's talking about. Same goes for a Heideggerian, a Deleuzian, a Marxian or anyone else.

[John Emerson]

"First just one book, then three, then five, soon all of them and everything ever written about him)"

Go fuck yourself, Craig.

Agamben, Homo Sacer.
Agamben, State of Exception.
Schmitt, Political Theology.
Strauss and Schmitt, Concept of the Political, I.
Strauss and Schmitt, Concept of the Political,II.

I may have read "Political Theology" in between times. The Concept of the Political is one piece, though I've read two books about it. Sometimes I counted Agamben, and sometimes not.

You're just digging around for things to fling at this point.

This thread is actually about Rorty and dualism, anyway. I used the Schmitt example because it's completely apropos. I realize that you are of the opinion that no one but Schmitt specialists should say a word about Schmitt, but that isn't how it works.

[Craig]

John, first you are dishonest with respect to Schmitt's position and now you are dishonest with respect to my position. And, please, is swearing necessary? Also, pardon me, John, but I was under the impression that whenever a comment was thrown out for consideration by others, it was fair game - you know, for other people to comment on it. My mistake!

[John Emerson]

Jeez, you're a prissy fucker. The specific point I was responding to was silly and shallow enough for swearing to be appropriate, yes.

There was nothing dishonest about my 4:43 comment.

My Schmitt citation was quite reasonably given as an example of dualistic thinking in a discussion of dualistic thinking. If I had been aware that a Schmittian attack dog was on the premises who was still mad at me about something I said a month or two ago, I would have used a different example.

By now it seems unlikely that dualistic thinking will be discussed again in this thread, but I can dream.

[Adam Kotsko]

I daresay any educated person should be able to assess whether Augustine really said that evil is the deprivation of good. You don't need to study his writings in Latin for 30 years to figure that one out -- it's one of the most basic and well-known ideas of one of the most widely discussed thinkers in human history.

[John Emerson]

I was hedging, Adam, in case an Augustinian as fierce as Craig showed up. I hedged the Schmitt thing too ("To me"), but not enough.

[Phritz]

Russell held that Plato's ideas on Logic were to be distinguished from his ideas on, er, Ideas--platonism is not yet Platonism. Indeed, universals and
"abstract entities" are still considered rather viable by most in the philosophy biz, though abstract entities are hardly equal to the great metaphysical and causal Forms (including not only mathematical/logical universals but ethics/aesthetics-- Goodness, Justice, Beauty, and so forth) outlined in the Republic. Nonetheless, whether only abstract mathematical entities, or the Platonic metaphysical scheme of the Forms, these objects are taken to be independent of individual minds, not "psychological" per se, and not really part of the brain--and that transcendent, mind-independent quality is the aspect of platonism (or, Big P Platonism) that should offend anyone who upholds any sort of empiricism, whether the "vull-gar" scientific/economic/Darwinian sort, or the more historical/dialectical marxist-materialist flavors.

Plato himself occasionally seems to hint (perhaps unintentionally) that understanding or recognition of the Forms begins with perception: a person watches the shadows in the Cave (and once out of the cave, the person sees the Sun-Truth--there is still a concern with vision). Socrates, in the Meno (perhaps one of the most concise presentations of Platonic epistemology, however flawed) scrawl the geometric figures in the sand for his student to see. Empiricists--even leftist ones--have to proceed with the starting point of perception. The student in Meno begins his calculations by perceiving--having some acquaintance with-- the drawn figures. Perhaps a blind person might eventually learn to do geometry or physics, but the normal process of learning mathematics begins with observation, and any speculations regarding innate universals are merely inferences subsequent to that observation process.

Like many metaphysical systems (i.e, Kant), then, Platonism is profoundly
a-historical. Not only is the student's learning process more or less replaced with speculations regarding the soul and immortality, the history of mathematics is never touched upon. Mathematical knowledge developed out of specific-- and dare we say economic-material situations-- over 1000s of years--whether architecture, agriculture, military situations, or markets (is an abacus platonic?), though the great metaphysicians rarely bothered to mention that. The supposed platonic dualism, or the more refined cartesian sort--should be read then as a construction, or model, as say Kant's 3rd Antinomy is a model and not really a valid claim

[John Emerson]

Let me just state my opinion that this might have been an interesting thread if it had not been derailed. For prudential and rhetorical reasons, I heartily regret using Schmitt's name in vain.

Someone might tell me why this statement by Schmitt (which builds up to the "friend-enemy" distinction as the defining political distinction) is not dualistic:

"Let us assume that in the realm of morality the final distinctions are between good and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in economics profitable and unprofitable"

[Swifty]

Hello John Emerson:

It seems to me that the quotation from Schmitt is not misplaced in a discussion of dualistic thinking in the West. That doesn't mean Schmitt is a dualistic thinker necessarily. Someone might come along, like Craig, and say "despite superficial appearances, it turns out Schmitt does not think in dualistic terms about politics, morality, or beauty." (N.B.: that's not an actual quotation from Craig). But even so, how the quotation from Schmitt is disqualified ahead of time from being part of a discussion about dualism in Western thought is hard for me to see.

My bigger question is: "How would an extraterrestrial characterize Western thought at a high level of abstraction?" If the 'alien' conceit seems silly, there's always the future: "How will theorists a couple of hundred years from now characterize the Western philosophical tradition? In particular, will the extraterrestrial or future theorists find the characterizations of Western thought by postmodernists such as Derrida and Rorty telling?"

[Phritz]

Rortyrian pragmatism is plagued by many of the somewhat obvious issues that plagued the earlier and not-so-hip pragmatists such as James or Pierce. The pragmatist, according to Rorty, has an interest in challenging both platonic Realism and common-sense empiricism (based on a correspondence theory of truth) of the Hobbesian-Uncle Meat variety, though often the prag. appears to be a sort of ultra-empiricist, who includes in his correspondence theory a sort of utility or functional criterion--- statements and claims in various discipline then don't merely refer and correspond to an external reality, but function, and entail, result in some measurable effect (as arch-fiend Russell yawped, the pragmatist's "cash value of truth" [cost/benefit analysis maybe?] is well suited to the needs of American business).

Obviously it is difficult to understand how a pragmatist can hold to his functional definition of "truth" (or warranted assertibility as per Dewey) in all contexts, especially in regards to scientific or axiomatic issues (not merely mathematics and logic, but say programming syntax--quite more pervasive than many philosophic types usually grant). The pragmatist does, perhaps admirably, want to save big P philosophy without recourse to a idealist/realist framework and without resorting to "mere scientism". Yet he must grant (and I think Rorty mentions this in a discussion of Dummett somewhere) that in some well-defined contexts (such as programming languages) a non-correspondence theory of language (or Truth as a whole) based on utility/functionality would be very hard to perceive or apply: there are certain precise operations defined in advance which leave no room for interpretation or endlessly vague pragmatist speculations on the actual measurable effects (though there is a critical point on contingency raised by the pragmatist, but one could say verificationists of all types--even Popper have touched upon that). By turning on and then using a keypad attached to a computer one seems to lend support to the nonminalists, alas.

One might ask what are the goods or results of programming or computing, yes: the pragmatist then has something to say about the macro level or economics or planning--- or even teleology--but in many if not most micro, technical contexts, one-to-one definitions, functionality and a sort of syntactical nominalism is taken for granted (though perhaps some energetic Realist might assert the identities and definitions and axioms of programming languages --or formal logic/mathematics do themselves entail certain objective relations beyond mere nominalism or empiricism--which is to say most humans are not common-sense empiricists as Wm James or Rorty would have us believe, but crackerbarrel platonists, whether in regards to the objectivity of Pi or the guilt of Scott Peterson).

[John Emerson]

What Rorty said is that the pragmatists did not offer an alternative theory of truth, but arguments why a theory of truth is not needed. (Russell's "criticism" can be ignored.) I don't see why an operational or pragmatist understanding of programming is problematic -- programs have procedures of various types, not "theories of truth", and the effectiveness of working programs is operationally understood. Pragmatism doesn't function at the programming-widget level.

I think that Dewey's reading of the history of Western thought is keyed to his contemporary interests when he wrote. The "western" part of the comparison is probably based on some kind of comparison with Chinese thought, possibly including Buddhist thought. A far as I can tell, Hundu thought was often "Platonist" and dualist (thoughnot always) but less connected to physical science than European thought, and Islamic thought really is part of Western thought by most reasonable criteria.

Plato's dualism was mostly rejected by Aristotle, and also by Cynics, Skeptics, Epicurians, Stoics, and the other more practically oriented philosophies, and then Christianity (the trinity and the persons of Christ) mushed up things terribly, as did neo-Platonism, Gnosticism, and alchemy. I think that a lot of the humanists (Montaigne, etc.) were non-dualist, but they aren't counted as philosophers any more.

So in general I wouldn't say that there's West/East contrast, though some Chinese philosophies make a very sharp contrast to the Platonist tradition which is indeed very powerful in the West.

I think that Dewey's criticisms are still relevant to scientistic philosophies such as logical positivism and its descendants. Contemporary philosophy of science seems to minimize the exploratory, experimental, empirical aspect of science in favor of formalization and system-building (notably in economics). Most working scientists I've met are not terribly friendly to philosophy of science in general.

[Phritz]

It's unfortunate there are not more old-school Platonists--or even Frege-Russellians--around to defend the Realist tradition (my own views are more Hobbesian-via-Quinean naturalism), but at least in terms of the micro-realm of epistemology, the Realist camp still has a lot of sway in academia, as the concern with set theory and mathematical foundations demonstrates. And however quaint or silly or sinister Russell and his ideas seem to either the Rortyians or continentalists (or analytical types), his criticisms of both traditional empiricism (especially Millian associationism) and pragmatism are not completely worthless.

Pragmatists often seem to suggest that the law of the excluded middle does not hold in all contexts, and it's unlikely even the most hardened positivist or scientist would disagree. Great: probability, contingency, fallibility, "truth process" are concerns. Even Hume then rates as a pragmatist if concern with contingency is one of the defining marks (include some summation signs and Gauss curves in Hume's Enquiry and bada bing--statistical epistemology-pragmatic, schagmatic) Who ever doubted that in the last 100 years?

The positivists were not asserting that Platonism was somehow to be resurrected because Mill and the empiricists (or the german idealists) had not succeeded: the point was that empiricism, either traditional or pragmatist (and Quine himself calls himself both a radical empiricist and upholder of Piercean pragmatism--) could not account for the objectivity of mathematics and formal logic. As Russell says, the student learns to associate the word "chair" or "tree" with the corresponding objects in the world, but what does the child associate a addition/conjunction sign (or conditional or integral, etc.) to? (It's rather absurd that those sort of powerful if obvious epistemological objections--sort of Ayers 101-- are not considered by either empiricists/scientists or the marxist-continentalists).

[Craig]

The point about Schmitt was the wrong conclusion John drew from the distinction between friend and enemy. For as long as John keeps insisting that "war" is the only possible conclusion and further that Schmitt wants nothing but 'war and war again,' then I will keep resisting John's interpretation because its basis is not found in Schmitt's texts, but, rather, in the American liberal reception of Schmitt. (I pointed to Mark Neocleous' article as an example of this poor interpretation.)

Insofar as a discussion about dualisms is concerned, certainly Schmitt is admissable. However, with Schmitt it isn't so much as a dualism of the either/or form, but, rather, a continuum or polarity. He repeatedly speaks of "as the antagonism approaches the extreme" and variations upon this. Hence, it isn't simply a matter - as we have in TV shows and movies about fighter pilots - a matter of "friend or foe," but also the qualitative assessment of what type or how extreme the friend/enemy distinction is, as Schmitt says, "in the concrete situation" that is, as the lawyers says, from time to time. The relative autonomy of the political from other spheres only further exasberates the problem - the political enemy need not be ugly, evil, or whatever; indeed, the political enemy could be quite nice - even good - and a wonderful business partner. It is possible that one could productively read Schmitt with the methods of classical structuralism setting up a table of every possible permutation, but I'm not about to do that and I don't think it was Schmitt's point.

Indeed, the only way to parse the friend/enemy distinction at its extremes is to include Schmitt's science fiction about humanity as a whole becoming a political concept - which is only possible in the face of an alien invasion. (A point that, when Adam made it a few months ago, was greated with an unfriendly reception, although I think he was absolutely correct.) Returning to your original question, as it were.

[John Emerson]

Since Russell's dig about pragmatists being like businessman has already been cited, I'll get my digs in on Russell.

In his autobiography Russell spoke of his disgust at humanism, and his belief that mathematics gave him access to a world of purity totally unlike the human world.

He also had a terrible need to accomplish something great, specifically in mathematics, and at one point his failure to solve the liar's paradox caused him to believe that he should commit suicide, since he was only "cumbering the earth".

His ambition, however, is clearly a result of his all-too-human origins in the British liberal aristocracy, which demanded that its sons accomplish something big. It was a form of conventionism and bourgeois ambition. (I think that the same is true of Nietzsche.)

And certainly, if he judged himself that harshly, he could hardly have much respect for his lessers. When he devoted himself to the discussion of human problems (e.g. war) in his later life, he was doing this from compassion, but without much respect for those he was compassionate about. And he never even hoped (except briefly with his 1938 book "Power") that his interventiosn in social questions would have any real intellectual merit by his own standards.

To go a little further: his yearning for purity strikes me as a late effect of Victorianism. Lewis Carol also spoke fervently of purity, but he was a perv who photographed naked little girls. Russell did escape from that kind of repression and became a serial monogamist, but I think that he bore the marks of Victorianism (he was raised by a devoutly Christian aunt, IIRC.)

[John Emerson]

Craig, you may well be right about Schmitt, but your tone before now has been insulting, and I've been coming back at you the same way, with interest (as per my policy in such case). You seemed to be objecting to the fact that I dared to say anything at all (as did the Straussian I argued with elsewhere).

[Craig]

Let us try to avoid repeating what we've already been through. A last restatement and, I hope, we won't have to revisit this issue for another couple of months. What I object to is your claim that the friend/enemy distinction for Schmitt necessarily leads Schmitt to endorsing war as the mode of politics. My claim is that reading, even just The Concept of the Political, reveals that not only does Schmitt not endorse war for the sake politics (or even for its own sake) but argues against such a conclusion on both moral and empirical grounds. Hence his repeated use of examples of 'humanity as a political concept,' references to 'police actions,' and aliens from outer space.

Do say whatever you want, but don't whine when someone says you're wrong. And, in this particular case, you are wrong. There is no textual basis in Schmitt for the claim you are making about him.

Now, we can pursue the line of discussion regarding the character of Schmitt's thought: is it dualistic? As I stated in my previous comment, I don't think it is. In part because of your quoting practice regarding the distinctions Schmitt does make; i.e., you take a single summarizing sentence and extrapolate it to the entirety of his thought. The argument of the book from which you draw the quote argues repeatedly that it is impossible as an either/or configuration - except in the case where we have a rise of the machines (be they terminators or cylons) or an alien invasion - but is only possible along a continuum of "more friend" or "more enemy" determined from time to time in what he calls "the concrete situation."

[Phritz]

Oh. Interesting Russellian bon mot there, but I thought we were discussing whether there were any grounds for Platonic realism, not biography (how does the pomo jurisprudence of Schmitt have any bearing on this at all?). BR, however victorian (and his Carrollian aspects are, indeed, part of his charm, except perhaps to liberal or marxist moralists), along with other anal. phil. people (including, perhaps most forcefully, Herr Doktor Frege) put forth various criticisms of empiricism (and I think by extension, to pragmatism). One of the most powerful is that based on the objectivity of math/logic. The Empiricist camp--whether trad. Locke/Mill or pragmatists (Wm. James upheld radical empiricism), and marxists, or biologians/behaviorists-- would seem to hold that the axiomatic and seemingly objective knowledge of math./logic is merely conventional or provisional (even Quine the radical empiricist--i.e. 2 Dogmas-- seems to suggest that). Frege (retro-fitted platonism if you will) insists otherwise.

Without getting long-winded about it, I suggest --pragmatically if you like--that the "use" of math/logic ( and reall Justice as well) does generally affirm objective views of axiomatic knowledge. "It is raining or it is not raining" or "the first derivative of a sin is a cosine"-- "the computer is on or it is off"--are tautologies, in any language, and any geographical locale: here, Paris, or in Madagascar. I tend to think "it is wrong to cut off people's heads" can, with quite a bit more difficulty, also be interpreted/read as an objective statement. If you or any empiricist/pragmatist/marxist care to deny the objectivity of either of those statements, great, but at least cop to your subjective-relativist position.

[John Emerson]

The conflict Schmitt seemed to be zeroing in on was internal conflict. I think that every single one of your interventions to date would ahve been better if you had spoken more about Schmitt's actual writings, possibl;y even quoting them, and less about the superiority of your knowledge to mine, or aboput your annoyance at me. I (and others) might have even learned something from that.

Phritz, this is a wide-ranging discussion. As I said, my bio info was justified by your citation of Russell's silly dig about James. Russell was a purist and James wasn't. Advantage: James.

It is my understanding that mathematical Platonist deny that mathematical truths are tautologies.

i have no idea why moral absolutists use some version of "killing is wrong" as their example of a moral absolute. It isn't one; except by absolute pacifists, killing is regarded as justified in various circumstances, and pacifists are a rare and marginalized breed. So etep one is to declare an absolute, and step two is to enumerate the exceptions.

[Swifty]

Craig writes:

"Insofar as a discussion about dualisms is concerned, certainly Schmitt is admissable. However, with Schmitt it isn't so much as a dualism of the either/or form, but, rather, a continuum or polarity. He repeatedly speaks of "as the antagonism approaches the extreme" and variations upon this."

Don't we still have a 'metaphysical' dualism in play if the continuum or polarity in both directions results in an Absolute? For instance, Adam Kotsko argued earlier (above) that in the cave metaphor we do see a kind of continuum, complete with 'more' and 'less' *true* knowledge of the Form of the Good available to the ex-prisoner who is forced to ascend the cave. Both the ascent and the activities outside the cave involve more and better knowledge each step of the way. But I still think of Plato as a 'dualist' thinker because for him the *real* real world is qualitatively beyond this one. The idea I have here is that the presence of a continuum of knowledge or of truth does not, by itself, exclude a philosophical position from a dualist *metaphysics.*

[Phritz]

There may be a terminology issue: some writers use tautology, others analytical truth or axiom or identity . Regardless, "either x (the computer is ON) or ~x (the computer is OFF)" is a necessary and most would say a priori truth statement; if not, we might as well bark, or chant arpeggios, or (nor?), agree (the agreement which is not agreement?) with the D-Man's "Of (and not Of?) Grammatology." Even the basic leftist's blogchat classification/ taxonomy game is more or less predicated on the law of the excluded middle.

There is no magic pragmatist conceptualism, though many, including Rorty, seem to think there is. Most of the positivists were well read in Hume, anyways, and any half-way competent Humean inductivist soon realizes that the pragmatists concern with operationalism is more or less another type of inductivism. If you are discussing politics or economics and not epistemology per se, even the platonic "purist" would probably grant there are some grounds for pragmatic sorts of considerations: humans should be aware of the effects at large (or in miniature) of any proposed policy or law, and in many contexts, various policies/strategies/plans are merely provisional/fallible. But this discussion began with a specific concern with platonic realism, not politics.

[Craig]

Agamben's version of Schmitt is certainly a metaphysical Schmitt insofar as he suggests that Schmitt's political categories are present in all political communities. I'm not so sure Schmitt himself would agree with "metaphysicalizing" his concepts. In Weimar Germany, one was either a historicist or a neo-Kantian. And Schmitt certainly wasn't a neo-Kantian. The question then is whether or not his categories, despite their particular historical and empirical manifestations, are nonetheless possessing a real essence that is timeless. I'm not so sure - anthropology, for instance, points to a number of societies wherein these concepts are not found. And I'm sure Schmitt would agree with that assessment. Of course, I'm not a philosopher and certainly not a metaphysician - I could be wrong!

[John Emerson]

I think that separation or disconinuity is necessary for dualism. On the one hand a separation between opposites (good and evil, etc)so that they are different things and not different ends on a continuum , and secondly separation between ideality and actuality. In idealist dualism there's also often a dualism between the historical (epiphenomenal, transient, unreal) and the eternal (real). I think that one thing that Dewey was getting at was the drive of philosophy and science toward ahistorical truths about everything, even about history.

[Phritz]

You are once more, as they say, conflating the epistemological issues with the metaphysical. It's not about creating/constructing some grand metaphysical schema that "works", or Osiris forbid, mysticism; it's about what is true. The "discontinuity" (and possible dualism) arises from the different status of analytical and synthetic truths, or, as Hume asserted, the distinction between relations of ideas (necessary/a priori truths), and matters of fact (synthetic/a posteriori "claims"--not really true in the sense that non-empirical knowledge is). Plato and Aristotle were not unaware of that issue, though platonism is more about the existence of the objective, individual-independent realm of the Reals, and not really a dualism of the Cartesian sort; Descartes more willing to grant that empiricism does account for some knowledge of a purely mechanical universe. But one could argue that Aristotle had already thrown a monkeywrench into the Noesis with all of his taxonomies and concern with natural science. Perhaps it's footnotes to Aristotle along with--or instead of-- footnotes to Plato.