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Writing a book

A friend of mine has been talking with me about a book-writing project. She sums up her conversation with me as follows:

    * the book is about the crisis in thought caused by Enlightenment/Reason
    * the idea is to lay out the crisis and then, in subsequent chapters, show how various thinkers tried to ground Reason in reality through some kind of philosopical system which also maintained certain positive values (morality) from the pre-Enlightenment era.
    * that the book can speak to a popular audience and include organic links to Post-Modernism without being a book about why philosophy should be more broadly popular or why Post-Modernism has roots in western philosophy. [end comments from my friend]

One of the problems I have is that I worry about a "name-based" approach to these topics.  The problem is: if we start talking about the crisis mentioned above and we do it using names – as in, Hume says 'x', Kant says 'y', Fichte says 'z' – the impression easily forms that all we are dealing with are the seemingly eccentric and headache-producing blah blah of these individuals.  Why should we care about them?  Even if we mention at the beginning, "well, there's this crisis and here are these people responding to this crisis," the reader will have a hard time avoiding the inference that what we're doing is figuring out what these people say, for some reason.  It's hard to avoid the inference that what's really important is not the crisis that they respond to, but rather 'what they say.'  This drives us in the direction of specialization, and people can get awfully detailed and hair-splitty about what, for instance, Kant said.  But the assumption behind interest in hair-splitty treatments of Kant says is that it's really important to know what Kant said.  But for whom is that level of detail important? Kant scholars.  Just as if I were a big fan of Scientology I might get all detailed about my reading of Hubbard.  (I wonder if they have doctrinal disputes.  They must.  Doctrinal disputes destroyed Ayn Rand and the institutions she built up.)  But what if you are trying to do something different – not, certainly, avoid always and everywhere the mention of the name 'Kant,' but telling the story much more thematically and thus in a way that relates to everyday normal people.

Not that we're talking about a textbook, not that there's anything wrong with textbooks.

If you want to write something more general, and you decide to avoid overly-detailed explorations, you run the risk of being too superficial, and all those Kant scholars are ready to say "but wait a minute you've totally misunderstood Kant."  And that's not unfair on their part, especially if what is written does indeed totally misunderstand Kant.

What would it be like if a space traveler sent from another galaxy wanted to report to his home civilization about the development of human thought on earth.  This traveler is going to all sorts of planets where life has developed to the point where beings are not so totally tied to the daily production and reproduction of life, allowing them to think beyond basic and rudimentary illusions like God and myth.  Those illusions were needed to order the social activity of beings during the long childhood period of a race where fairly immediate necessity ruled everything, and 98%-plus of the population is engaged in the immediate and direct production of food and other necessities.  This traveler and his home civilization are interested in post-necessity civilizations.  He's preparing reports on a number of different worlds and earth is just one of them.  He's not going to get all hair-splitty about, say, the thing-in-itself.  (About which, in a certain context, it is completely legitimate to get all tangled up in.)  He's also not going to focus too much on names, not only because there's too many of them, but also because discussing the trail of thought in terms of names just misdirects the study.  In this way, the traveler wants to write a bit more like Marx.  Marx thinks it is a mistake to explain human history in terms of the intentions, desires, and foibles of this or that leader.  He prefers instead to point to the evolving background conditions located in the changes in productive forces to explain history's movement, just as Hegel does with Spirit.  With this approach, both Hegel and Marx might include what such-and-such leader says or does, but that's never going to be the heart of the treatment.  A lot of the details of what this or that person said or did -- which would be central to other kinds of historical accounts, as for instance with Woodward's three books on the Bush administration -- could be left to the side by Hegel and Marx, as they would focus on much more fundamental and influential 'waves.'  Something like this is what the traveler wants to do.  How would the traveler characterize the movement of thought in general, while including enough detail to give his readers a real understanding of what is going on, in the context of which more specific investigations could occur?

If I were that traveler, I would start with Hume.  A great post-necessity starting point for Western civilization -- not the only possible one, to be sure.  But there I am using a proper name! I would want to start with 'Hume' but not with "Hume the author" but rather with "Hume as symptom of, speaker for, carrier of" the post-necessity dynamics of thought, which would then be followed out all the way to today.  Or at least Derrida.

What approach to the presentation would the traveler take?  Treat it like a story?  Could it be made 'dramatic'?  What do we know in general about what allows readers and listeners to 'relate' to a story, movie, theatre, politics?  Plato was pretty good at this:  his dialectic in dialogue format allowed 'normal' people to 'have their say' against philosophy, while also subjecting them to the responses that philosophy has to those objections.  From Aristotle on, it's been treatise after treatise with very little back and forth.  For instance, no one takes Hume's dialogues on religion that seriously, especially relative to the position granted the Treatise of Human Nature and other monographs.  And he's one of the rare ones to try and use the dialogue format.  The difficulty and mutual frustration on this point is well-illustrated in the title to one of Fichte's works:  "An attempt to force the reader to understand the new philosophy."  And in that work Fichte uses, surprise surprise, a dialogue with a reader.

By Swifty | October 5, 2006 in Books | Permalink

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Swifty, I really appreciate what I think you are saying. As an outsider to the University, the specialization and obscurantism of the academy (Particularly the humanities) is a real turn off. For someone like myself, who wants to engage with thinkers working through the "crisis fo reason," the vocabulary and background reading required is daunting.

That said, I like the idea of looking for common themes, unrapping the logic of ideas as they have transformed and mutated over time. I believe you are right to reference Hegel and Marx for this project - as difficult as their work can be, they both are great at finding underlying tendencies, whether in thought or the material world, often bridging the apparent gap between thought and being.

I have thought it unfortunate that the most prominent contemporary thinkers to work on this subject for a broader audience have tended to be either Straussians (Bloom, Rosen) or Habermasians. The Straussian analysis has always particularly concerned me because it is so hostile to modernity. It seems to me that there ought to be a less pessimistic approach, one that does not minimize the current dilema but puts it within an historical and ideological context. It would be a neat trick if you (or anyone) could produce such a work that would still be accessible to a broader audience.

Posted by: Alain | Oct 6, 2006 2:11:28 PM

"This traveler is going to all sorts of planets where life has developed to the point where beings are not so totally tied to the daily production and reproduction of life, allowing them to think beyond basic and rudimentary illusions like God and myth. Those illusions were needed to order the social activity of beings during the long childhood period of a race where fairly immediate necessity ruled everything, and 98%-plus of the population is engaged in the immediate and direct production of food and other necessities. This traveler and his home civilization are interested in post-necessity civilizations."

*Cough, ahem* Say what? I hope you're not operating under that old savagery-barbarism-civilization idea of social evolution. What exactly do you mean by "necessities," anyway? I will die without food, but I'll also die without money, so filthy lucre is certainly a necessity in that sense. And many, perhaps most people are still engaged in direct production of their own food, so I don't see why you claim a qualitative difference between now and the past. Plus, the "illusions" that you refer to are still needed to order the lives of quite a few "civilized" people, unless you're suggesting spirituality is on the decline, which is an assertion refuted by a heap of empirical data.

Posted by: Sarapen | Oct 6, 2006 3:38:48 PM

Sarapen asks if I am operating under a savagery-barbarism-civilization idea of human (social) evolution. I wouldn't use such politically incorrect phrasing, but that aside, yes. There have been qualitative evolutionary leaps recently. From Encyclopedia Britannica:

The world population, which did not reach its first 1,000,000,000 until about 1800, added another 1,000,000,000 persons by 1930. (To anticipate further discussion below, the third was added by 1960, the fourth by 1974, and the fifth before 1990.) The most rapid growth in the 19th century occurred in Europe and North America, which experienced gradual but eventually dramatic declines in mortality. Meanwhile, mortality and fertility remained high in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Beginning in the 1930s and accelerating rapidly after World War II, mortality went into decline in much of Asia and Latin America, giving rise to a new spurt of population growth that reached rates far higher than any previously experienced in Europe. The rapidity of this growth, which some described as the “population explosion,” was due to the sharpness in the falls in mortality that in turn were the result of improvements in public health, sanitation, and nutrition that were mostly imported from the developed countries. The external origins and the speed of the declines in mortality meant that there was little chance that they would be accompanied by the onset of a decline in fertility. In addition, the marriage patterns of Asia and Latin America were (and continue to be) quite different from those in Europe; marriage in Asia and Latin America is early and nearly universal, while that in Europe is usually late and significant percentages of people never marry.

These high growth rates occurred in populations already of very large size, meaning that global population growth became very rapid both in absolute and in relative terms. The peak rate of increase was reached in the early 1960s, when each year the world population grew by about 2 percent, or about 68,000,000 people. Since that time both mortality and fertility rates have decreased, and the annual growth rate has fallen moderately, to about 1.7 percent. But even this lower rate, because it applies to a larger population base, means that the number of people added each year has risen from about 68,000,000 to 80,000,000.
[end encyclopedia excerpt]

The contrast with the past is quite striking. Not only are there more people, their distribution has changed dramatically as well. For most of humanity's history population distribution was heavily weighted in favor of rural life. But the modern era has in many places reversed this dominance, and where it hasn't yet happened yet, it is in the process of occurring.

Again from the encyclopedia article:

Also of significance in terms of geographical distribution is the division between rural and urban areas. For many decades there has been a nearly universal flow of populations from rural into urban areas. While definitions of urban areas differ from country to country and region to region, the most highly urbanized societies in the world are those of western and northern Europe, Australia, New Zealand, temperate South America, and North America; in all of these the fraction of the population living in urban areas exceeds 75 percent, and it has reached 85 percent in West Germany. An intermediate stage of urbanization exists in the countries making up much of tropical Latin America, where 50 to 65 percent of the population lives in cities. Finally, in many of the developing countries of Asia and Africa the urbanization process has only recently begun, and it is not uncommon to find less than one-third of the population living in urban areas.

The rapidity of urbanization in some countries is quite astonishing. The population of Mexico City in 1960 was around 5,000,000; it was estimated to be about 17,000,000 in 1985 and was projected to reach 26,000,000 to 31,000,000 by 2000. A rule of thumb for much of the developing world is that the rate of growth of urban areas is twice that of the population as a whole. Thus in a population growing 3 percent annually (doubling in about 23.1 years), it is likely that the urban growth rate is at least 6 percent annually (doubling in about 11.6 years).
[end encyclopedia excerpt]

These massive and quite recent changes have forever changed the human condition, tipping the balance decisively in favor of human freedom. If only we could mobilize the surging power of these changes in a more fully human direction. Why, we'd be right as rain.

Alain:

I think there's a valuable hint in Deleuze and Guatarri's What Is Philosophy? about the breakdown between 'natural' thinking (which is certainly not 'unreflective' or stupid in the least) and philosophic thinking. They complain there that too often philosophers talk about answers all the time without rooting what they are doing in *the question* or problem that supposedly motivated philosophic reflection in the first place. And just now I was looking at George Seidel, "Introduction," in Activity and Ground: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. These latter three thinkers are, some of the most "skullcracking" (to use Fichte's own description of Kant's writing) in the tradition.

Seidel is addressing the problem of communication directly at the end of his Introduction, in a section titled "Style and Lifestyle." If you have time to read it, below is an excerpt from Seidel. What struck me about it are his comments about the relation between philosophic and 'natural' consciousness, and the concluding comment about the ambiguous effects, benefits and costs, of philosophic self-analysis. The part I'd like to quote from comes just after Seidel has pointed out that during this this period (Kant and forward) philosophers became professionals, with salaries, thus bringing them into the middle class where it was possible to get married and live a social life with concomitant status quite different from what had been possible up to that time.

[begin Seidel]
The fact that the philosopher had become a professional had deep historical significance for philosophy itself. For with it came an increased questioning as to what, precisely, philosophy is. Hegel is aware of the increasingly professional character of the subject when he carefully distinguishes between "popular" and "speculative" philosophy. By the same token, the distinction between ordinary or natural consciousness and philosophical consciousness is central to the whole progress of Hegel's Phenomenology. One of Fichte's chief criticisms of Kant is of his lack of awareness of the meaning and vocation of philosophy: the critical philosophy did not examine critically what philosophy itself is. The increased self-consciuosness of the meaning and function of philosophy may also be seen in Schelling's remark that Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre [Science of Knowledge] is not philosophy, but the philosophy of philosophy.

In many ways, the German idealist thinkers were torn between the greater professional sense of their role as philosophers and their deepened social awareness, made both possible and necessary by the professional chairs they occupied. Fichte was convinced that everyone must do philosophy eventually, and that all do it implicitly, if uncritically....

The continued history of this deepening awareness of what philosophy is, and what the philosopher does when he thinks philosophically, is familiar from the highly self-conscious reflections of Wittgenstein. Indeed, the philosophical analysis of language may be seen as a consequence of this increased professional awareness. It has had the benefit of making the philosopher not only more aware of the instrument that he must use to express his thought, namely language; it has also had the benefit of making the philosopher more aware of the "instrument" of knowledfge that he himself is, as may be seen in the Daseinsanalyse [analysis of being] of Heidegger. This deeper self-awareness has had its drawbacks. Being overly self-conscious about the way in which philosophy is, or is not, to be done, has sometimes had the ill effect of turning the philosopher away from the actual problems of philosophy, and more toward philosophical self-analysis. However, an identity crisis will often turn the most pronounced extrovert into an introvert. (38-39)

Posted by: Swifty | Oct 6, 2006 5:11:00 PM

Swifty, thank you for the reference. I think the Seidel quote points to both the benefits and drawbacks of philosophy's professionalization. The drawbacks today are more obvious, perhaps, but the institutionalization of philosophy does provide the space for at least some people to reflect on life and its vissisitudes. But of course this leads to the classic dilema of the relation of theory to praxis, which is probably better left for another day.

Again thanks for the quote and I will try to track down the book.

Posted by: Alain | Oct 6, 2006 5:47:09 PM

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