A few weeks ago I took exception to the following comment by John Emerson to this post:
To me when Schmitt writes "Let us assume that in the realm of morality
the final distinctions are between good and evil, in aesthetics
beautiful and ugly, in economics profitable and unprofitable" on the
way to the "friend-enemy" political distinction, he's using a
simple-minded logic to stack the cards in favor of conflict and war.
In response to Emerson, I asked him repeatedly to substantiate his claim regarding Schmitt. According to my memory, he never did so, yet kept insisting that, for Schmitt, the point of politics was war - or, in a softer version, that Schmitt was all for war. Rather than substantiating his own claim, Emerson asked me to substantiate my own, which I did, but I never provided a direct reference.
Anyway, while re-reading through Schmitt's The Concept of the Political, I was reminded of the following passage (a mere seven pages after the passage cited by Emerson):
It is by no means as though the political signifies nothing but devastating war and every political deed a military action, by no means as though every nation would be uninterruptedly faced with the friend-enemy alternative vis-a-vis every other nation. And, after all, could not the politically reasonable course reside in avoiding war? The definition of the political suggested here neither favors war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism. Nor is it an attempt to idealize the victorious war or the successful revolution as a 'social ideal,' since neither war nor revolution is something social or something ideal.
Schmitt, of course, could very well be wrong about his own concepts, but, if Emerson (or others - Emerson's claim is common enough) wants to sustain his reading, the ball is, as they say, in his court.
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