Altruism and Selfishness

In response to Adam's question regarding the significance of the religious right, I thought of a brilliant article in the latest addition of Harper's.  David Graeber, an anarchist anthropologist, provides an insightful analysis of the relationship between economics and "values."  He succinctly argues that the right has been successful at appealing to populist sentiments because they effectively accuse liberals "of cutting ordinary Americans off from the right to do good in the world."

Though this may seem counter intuitive, Graeber makes three general Propositions:

Proposition I:

Neither Egoism nor Altruism is a natural urge; They in fact arise in relation to each other and neither would be conceivable without the market.

Broadly speaking, Graeber uses the terms "Egoism" and "Altruism" to reference not only patterns of behavior, but the social realms and institutions that support them.  This means he takes a historical approach, noting that these concepts generally arise in tandem with each other:

In the ancient world, for example, it is generally in the times and places that one sees the emergence of money and markets that one also sees the rise of world religions - Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam.  If one sets aside a space and says, "Here you shall think only about acquiring material things for yourself," then it is hardly surprising that before long someone else will set aside a countervailing space and declare, in effect: "Yes, but here we must contemplate the fact that the self, and material things, are ultimately unimportant."  It was these latter institutions, of course, that first developed our modern notions of charity.

Proposition II:

The political right has always tried to enhance the division and thus claims to be the champion of both egoism and altruism simultaneously.  The Left has tried to efface it.

This proposition is fairly straight forward if one simply looks at American politics over the last 30 years.  In general, the political left has attempted, in various ways, to eliminate the division by either creating economic systems that are not driven by profit (communism, co-operatives) or replacing private charity with the social safety net of the welfare state.  In contrast, the right thrives by constantly reaffirming the antagonism, and even championing it.

In the United States, for example, the Republican Party is dominated by two ideological wings: the libertarians and the "Christian right." At one extreme, Republicans are free market fundamentalists and advocates of individual liberties (even if they see those liberties largely as a matter of consumer choice);  on the other, they are fundamentalists of a more literal variety, suspicious of most individual liberties but enthusiastic about biblical injunctions, "family values," and charitable good works.  At first glance it might seem remarkable that such an alliance manages to hold together at all (and certainly they have ongoing tensions, most famously over abortion).  But, in fact, right-wing coalitions almost always take some variation of this form. One might say that the right's approach is to release the dogs of the market, throwing all traditional verities into disarray: and then, in the tumult of insecurity, offer themselves up as the last bastion of order and hierarchy, the stalwart defenders of the authority of churches and fathers against the barbarians they have themselves unleashed.  A scam it may be, but it is a remarkably effective one; and one result is that the right ends up seeming to have a monopoly on value.  It manages, one might say, to occupy both positions, on either side of the divide: extreme egoism and extreme altruism.

Proposition III:

The Real problem of the American left is that although it does try in certain ways to efface the division between egoism and altruism, value and values, it largely does so for its own children.  This has allowed the Right, paradoxically, to represent itself as the champion of the working class.

I must admit that at first glance, this claim seems counter-intuitive.  Progressives generally argue for policies that call for a fairer distribution of wealth and resources, along with programs that support working families having access to better health care and education.  But Graeber's argument is more subtle - from the end of World War II through the late 60's and early 70's, vast resources were put into expanding access to higher education.  This was done with the stated purpose of promoting social mobility, to provide the working class the opportunity to "move up" the economic ladder.  But by the 1970's, there was an end to the expansion, just as college campuses were exploding with radical, anti-capitalist sentiment.

Graeber believes the system offered many radicals a sort of "settlement."  These folks became "reabsorbed into the university but set to work largely at training children of the elite."  As education costs have increased exponentially, the number of working class students at major universities has been trending down for decades.

And this brings us to the key to answering a larger question: "Why do working-class Bush voters tend to resent intellectuals more than they do the rich?"

They can imagine a scenario in which they might become rich but cannot possibly imagine one in which they, or any of their children, would become members of the intelligentsia.... A mechanic from Nebraska knows it is highly unlikely that his son or daughter will ever become an Enron executive.  But it is possible.  There is virtually no chance, however, that his child, no matter how talented, will ever become an international human-rights lawyer or a drama critic for the New York Times.  Here we need to remember not just the changes in higher education but also the role of unpaid, or effectively unpaid, internships.  It has become a fact of life in the United States that if one chooses a career for any reason other than salary, for the first year or two one will not be paid... The custom effectively seals off such a career for any poor student who actually does attain a liberal arts education.  Such structures of exclusion had always existed, but in recent decades fences have become fortresses.

If "the mechanic's daughter" wishes to pursue a career that maybe "higher" or "more noble" she only has two realistic options:  she can either try to find employment at a local church or she can join the army.  Graeber's point is that to pursue a "high-minded, altruistic" career, it is best not to have to worry about money.  This also helps explain how 60's radicals became so easily compromised:

Campus radicals set out to create a new society that destroyed the distinction between egoism and altruism, value and values.  It did not work out, but they were, effectively, offered a kind of compensation: the privilege to use the university system to create lives that did so, in their own little way, to be supported in one's material needs while pursuing virtue, truth, and beauty, and, above all, to pass that privilege on to their own children.  One cannot blame them for accepting the offer.  But neither can one blame the rest of the country for hating them for it.  Not because they reject the project: as I say, this is what America is all about.  As I always tell activists engaged in the peace movement and counter-recruitment campaigns:  why do working-class kids join the army anyway?  Because, like any teenager, they want to escape the world of tedious work and meaningless consumerism, to live a life of adventure and camaraderie in which they believe they are doing something genuinely noble.  They join the army because they want to be like you.

Comments

[old]

Wow. Right on target (and one of the targets is many of us).

[Gabriel Sanchez]

Neither Egoism nor Altruism is a natural urge; They in fact arise in relation to each other and neither would be conceivable without the market.

This is an interesting proposition to be sure, but where’s the proof? Casually pointing to “the ancient world” absent contextual analysis and, more importantly, a thoroughgoing exploration of how those people viewed both the rise of markets and the rise of the religious traditions the author seems to believe they are associated with. Otherwise, what you have here is merely a forced correlation divorced from the reality of the actors who (allegedly) brought these institutions into play. These sorts of flippant statements are eye candy for the choir, but they hardly dislodge—to steal a bit from the modern parlance—“competing narratives” of how history has unfolded in the last two millennia.

The political right has always tried to enhance the division and thus claims to be the champion of both egoism and altruism simultaneously. The Left has tried to efface it.

This proposition is no doubt easier to prove than a sweeping transhistorical claim, but it still suffers from the fact that it doesn’t want to press the analysis beyond the point of a casual observation. Also, one can certainly agree that the Republican Party has created divisions without submitting themselves to a rosey eyed view of the political Left. After all, the Left’s vision of effacing the division comes at the cost of the “values” that those who tend to gravitate rightward esposue. As hard as it may be for someone on the Left to believe, “values” are not supposed to be empty vessels into which a group pours in their subjective wants and fancies. Some are supposed to be weighted over others and, on a similar note, some are seen as objectively real as opposed to whimsical. But even this line of analysis has problems insofar as “values” implies a market-based system of right where certain preferences can be weighted against others, and like most things in the market, lose or gain worth with the flow of time. But it’s difficult to say whether or not those who espouse “values”, i.e., traditional morality rooted in The Bible, see it that way. Perhaps one could argue they lack the conceptual language to wrest their moral faith free from the venacular of relativism (which is where the “values” language comes from), but at the end of the day I would imagine that most faithful believe in the absoluteness of the claims they (try to) defend (e.g., abortion is murder, homosexuality is a perversion, prayer is good, etc.). If the Left was honestly trying to eliminate the divisions, they would have to do the one thing their program renders them incapable of doing: take Biblical faith and morality seriously and not replace it with a new set of “values” that fits comfortably with their social engineering.

The Real problem of the American left is that although it does try in certain ways to efface the division between egoism and altruism, value and values, it largely does so for its own children. This has allowed the Right, paradoxically, to represent itself as the champion of the working class.

This is also intriguing but for the fact that the Right being the “champion of the working class” seems to have more to do with the working class’s Biblical morality more than their market interest. The observations about the restructuring of higher education seem to be spot on, though with regards to the Nebraska farmer example, it seems doubtful that his “values” would put any positive weight on his son becoming an international human rights lawyer or a drama critic. Those pursuits are probably not seen as very worthwhile based on the “values” of the farmer and his family. In fact, those pursuits—especially the human rights lawyer—are probably not valuable to anyone except those reared on the “values” of the Left. After all, international human rights requires one to believe in at least the following: state sovereignty and nationalism are outmoded concepts, human rights are more important than human security, rights are determined not by any “Laws of Nature or Nature’s God” but by man, homosexuality is a human right, abortion is a human right, etc. It shouldn’t sound strange that any number of these propositions are at odds with the American working class and its “values”, especially as those “values” are rooted in Biblical morality. The economic consideration is secondary to the abhorrence one who takes those “values” seriously would (ought to?) have in the face of that line of work.

[pebird]

Identity politics (as opposed to populist politics) has played a signficant role in establishing a common perception of a narcissistic, egoist left.

To be fair, identity politics practice is distored by media while also used by estabished liberal institutions (e.g., Democratic Party) as a way to respond to issues without addressing them, providing "psychological" comfort instead of political power.

For those either outside of identity categories, or those with populist leanings (e.g., working class), the "left" then is not a space where those concerns can even be raised, much less deal with.

Other observations:

Proposition I:

Whether egoism or altruism are 'natural' urges is irrelevant - these behaviors exist and shift in both individuals and societies. I don't understand why this opposition - self vs. social make more sense.

Proposition II:

This implications of this argument is clearer to me when I use self/social - the right unleashes the self (while restricting parts of the social), then uses a perverse form of the social (authority) to "fix" the problems the unleashed self created.

I do like the way that Ego/Altruism corresponds to value/values, that's good.

Proposition III:

Rather than "own children", I would say "own tribe". Which of course plays into the right's view of the left as only out for itself without the country's interest at heart.

The implication that the working class resents the left's non-paying university interships is a ridiculous proposition with the ring of truth. Certainly the UC Bakke case in the 70's (white guy not admitted to med school) was the harbinger of working class mobility restriction. These bitter feelings are more generalized toward the "left's" groupings, their tribes, then any particular manifestation. But the point is well-taken.

[HighLow Between]

Great posting - lots to think on. I referenced you heavily - and Graeber on a recent post.
http://highlowbetween.blogspot.com/2006/12/skid-marks-heres-to-hoping-in-new-year.html
Thanks!

[troutsky]

It's been my belief that working class conservatism and the values associated with that position is derived less from biblical text than from an instinctual traditionalism which needs grounding in a tangible spiritual and material terrain.Patriotism, faith, rewarding hard work etc are all deeply rooted,traditional concepts challenged by modern attitudes and intellectuals are the "messengers" of this modernity.Kill the messenger is the new ethos.The death of unionism and the advent of the "ownership society" have decimated any class conciousness that workers had.

[Gabriel Sanchez]

Troutsky,

I think you're skipping a step. Actually, I think a lot of what passes for "theory" today skips a lot of steps.

You mention "instinctual traditionalism", which may exist, but that still doesn't answer the question, "What tradition?" I don't recall any society in history upholding tradition absent context and/or grounding. Anthropological criticisms may argue all the day long that religion is just a vehicle to transmit and ground a society's norms and laws (i.e., their tradition), but even so, it's still the religion that needs to be examined then. Whatever the "true" source of those norms and laws were has been "lost in the sauce" of history; the experiences of those now living and the source of their "values" is what's ultimately relevant.

All of the concepts you listed are concepts that Christianity or, rather, Protestant Christianity, can and has readily supported. People don't hold to them "just because." As fond as social scientists are of positing the mindless, unwashed human being who helps make up "the masses", I have yet to meet such a person so radically divorced from his experiences that his entire array of opinions and beliefs float freely in his mind. I have no doubt such constructions are easy to mold and manipulate to fit in with grand theories of social engineering, but their touch with reality is, to put it mildly, off.

[John Emerson]

I can't comment in detail right now. Two points: Graeber's analysis of the Republicans is pretty limited, leaving out country-club Republicans (including scam artists and semi-criminal entrepreneurs) as well as militarists.

The problem with education or social mobility as the solution for inequality is that there always will be someone driving trucks and so on. Democratic egalitarianism leaves them behind personally to the extent that it's education-oriented, though it can help their children.

More broadly, Democrats often seem to be people who have some kind of credentials or institutional connection, whereas small businessmen, poor small-town people, and some workers (especially un-unionized ones) feel left out.

At the same time, working-class Republicans are not typical -- they're a wedge factor weakening Democrats. And some conservative Christians are very prosperous. But often they feel that they missed out on education, even if they are educated, because their education was all technical and business-oriented.

In Minnesota the most conservative Republicans seem to come from prosperous exurban districts. The three most rural districts are represented by Democrats, one of them quite liberal. To a degree, however, Minnesota is atypical.

[Matt]

Thank you for posting this, Alain.

The comments about an effective "settlement" being offered to radicals in the seventies are especially accurate as historical diagnosis. Only it was not just radicals, I would argue, but an entire mainstream emancipatory ideal. Most unfortunate is how this stalling in the emancipatory project has given birth to so many spurious calls for blame, so much wasteful chattering and bickering and so on, as we try to justify it, and our position in it, to ourselves. We should be ashamed, but after Reagan where the real blame lies is fairly damn well obvious.

Not to sound too pretentious, hopefully, but do you ever wonder, Sanchez, how the "values" of the Nebraska farmer might evolve and expand in a system of true economic mobility? That is to say, how the clinging to "values" in hard times would begin to relax? Furthermore, how certain founding fears, left-over provincialisms, literal security blankets, etc. might eventually dissipate?

If the Left was honestly trying to eliminate the divisions, they would have to do the one thing their program renders them incapable of doing: take Biblical faith and morality seriously and not replace it with a new set of “values” that fits comfortably with their social engineering.

Hm. Curious how "social engineering" replaces "thinking" here. The standard reply: if only unthinking Christians were to take these things half as seriously as they deserve to be taken, there would be plenty room for dialogue.

An intriguing phrase, "eye candy for the choir" – although, it's unclear what Ted Haggard has to do with all of this.

[Sean McCallahan]

Many leftists--academic, or not-- tend to favor or promote altruism (or worse, some type of spiritual/psychological "movement" instead of political strategies), and it could be argued that altruism-fetish is one of the perennial obstacles to economic and political reform. Hobbes was unwilling to grant that any effective political actions could be based on altruism or compassion; and his contractualism (which is more socialistic than most in Lit. land realize) is premised on enlightened self-interest, however bor-ring that might be to postmods. Alternatives to politics via self-interest seem to diverge into left and right versions of Hegelian-statist day-mares.