Long Sunday

badiou: reactionary modernist

We don't do enough Radical Philosophy around here, I suppose because there's not enough on-line for us to link to. But it really is - along with NLR and n+1 - one of the few things I'm genuinely excited to see drop through the slot in the front door.

In the new one, a particularly lucid piece by Peter Osborne on Badiou. Here are the first paragraphs, all that's publicly available on-line:

Neo-classic Alain Badiou’s Being and Event
Peter Osborne

If anyone was in doubt about the continuing grip of French philosophy on the theoretical imagination of the anglophone humanities, the reception of the writings of Alain Badiou must surely have put paid to such reservations. The translation of his magnum opus, Being and Event, in spring 2006, brought to eleven the number of his books published in English in eight years – a period following swiftly on, not entirely contingently, from the deaths of Deleuze, Levinas and Lyotard (1995–1998), and coinciding with that of Derrida (2004).* However, it is not simply the number of translations that is remarkable (‘remarkable, but not surprising’, as Wittgenstein would say), but the fact that a philosophy such as this – for all its idiosyncratic philosophical charms – could so readily have assumed the role of ‘French philosophy of the day’ within the transnational market for theory.

Badiou’s philosophy takes a forbiddingly systematic form; it is anti-historical, technically mathematical and broadly Maoist in political persuasion. It has no interest in (in fact, denies the philosophical relevance of) ‘meaning’, and appears impervious to feminism. It takes a roguish self-satisfaction in its heterosexism.

Stylized individuality is a condition of branding, and ‘difficulty’ is a prerequisite of entry into this particular field, but there are more than market factors at work in Badiou’s successful transition to international theorist. It is a gauge of a number of things: the desire still invested in the English-language reception of French philosophy; the theoretical heresies that a new generation of the so-called ‘old’ Left will overlook in exchange for political solidarity (Žižek, master of this field, is Badiou’s mentor here); the strategic brilliance of two interventions – against Deleuze (The Clamour of Being, 1997; trans. 2000) and against the ‘delirium’ of ethics (Ethics, 1994; trans. 2001);1 the inherent brilliance of Being and Event, for all its ultimate philosophical madness; and last, but by no means least, the rhetorical power of ‘the (re)turn of philosophy itself’ – title of an essay of Badiou’s from 1992.2 It is in the profoundly contradictory character of the return of philosophy in Badiou – at once avant-garde and breathtakingly traditional – that the historical meaning of his thought is to be found.3 To anticipate my conclusion: Being and Event is a work – perhaps the great work – of philosophical neo-classicism. As such, at the level of philosophical form, it surpasses its ambivalent predecessor, Heidegger’s Being and Time, in the rigour of its reactionary modernism. The modernity of Badiou’s mathematics does not mitigate, but rather reinforces, the authoritarianism of his philosophical axiomatics and the mysticism of his conception of the event.

It really is a shame that we can't read this together on here. There's even a convincing bit on our perennial favorite, the history of big T little t theory, that I'm sure would produce a lovely comment thread. (The wonderful thing is, Osborne is able to 1) treat the subject "theory" while 2) never losing sight of the particulars, especially, the historical particulars of its rise and fall...)

If every one of you out there would just subscribe, we could talk a bit more about the piece. What are you waiting for?

Security and Rights in Canada

If Maher Arar's exoneration wasn't enough, the past couple weeks have seen more good news from Canada regarding the war on terror (youngest accused in 'terror sweep' has charges stayed and 'security certificates' squashed by Supreme Court).

Now, news that Parliament has voted against the government's efforts to extend 'terror law' by three years:

Opposition parties joined forces Tuesday to vote down the extension of two contentious anti-terrorism measures, ending an acrimonious political battle rife with accusations of dirty politics.

But the debate over national security versus civil liberties is sure to continue into the next election campaign.

Indeed, Prime Minister Stephen Harper predicted that the Liberals will be defeated in the next election because of their refusal to back a government motion seeking to extend the security measures for three years.

“This issue is not going to go away. It’s going to haunt the Liberal party from now until the election campaign,” Harper said after the motion was defeated by a vote of 159 to 124.

“Any party that doesn’t take the national security of Canadians seriously will never be chosen by Canadians to form the government of Canada.”

Understanding Incommensurability

(You guessed it! My latest cross-posting from I Cite.) Here is a paragraph from the middle.

Incommensurability need not be accepted or known by all involved (which would of course make it parasitic on a prior commensurability). In fact, the opposite is the case--inscribed into the situation is its own description, about which there is disagreement. So, there isn't an external point of truth or agreement that then allows for incommensurability to appear.

The whole post is below the fold (as it were).

Strong Beliefs, Weakly Held

(Yet another shameless cross-posting from I Cite)

In a critique of Scott Eric Kaufman's draft paper on the history of theory in literary studies (which I haven't read; I recommend, though, the terrific discussion over at Rough Theory)  Eileen Joy rightly draws attention to Stephen White's discussion of weak ontology. Indeed, to my mind, Scott's emphasis (as channeled by N. Pepperell) on "an aggressive commitment to strong beliefs, weakly held" is more akin to William Connolly's ethos of pluralization and commitment to the cultivation of an ethos of generosity (White discusses Connolly's work in detail in Sustaining Affirmation; White's notion of weak ontology in fact draws heavily from Connolly and attempts to mediate between Connolly's Deleuze-indebted 'immanent naturalism' and the work of other political theorists--in particular, Charles Taylor, Judith Butler, and George Kateb).

Is this interesting primarily as a matter of academic pedantry or turf warfare (along the lines of "gee, political theorists have already been talking about this for quite a while")? Perhaps. But there could be more at stake. Differently put, that Connolly has worked out these notions in several books that have been the subject of sustained discussion among political theorists for the last decade might shed light on potential ramifications of an "aggressive commitment to strong beliefs weakly held" (it is also likely that the disciplinary difference here is significant--Scott says that literary theorists are more interested in imagined worlds; political theorists, for all our engagement with ideals, remain imbricated in this one, for better or worse). Here are a few possibilities:

Help me make a list

of writers in whose work every image, every movement of thought, every recognition refers to death

the intemperate, the unconsidered, the undigested

My kiddo only naps in the car. Despite the fact that it's negative sumthin sumthin out there (wind chill adjusted), my wife and I take turns sitting in the driveway while she snores away. No fun. Except for the fact it's good pleasure reading time. No computer to take notes, etc etc. So today it was the newly arrived n+1 for me.

I'm going to write another post soon about a few individual articles, but first of all, I am wondering about how LS fits into their "Intellectual Situation" piece on "The Blog Reflex":

The accident waiting to happen to bloggers was most visible when they turned their attention to literature and ideas. The hope had been to democratize the intellectual sphere. Freedom of the press is for those who own one. But now all you needed was a laptop and some time on your hands. The idea was especially attractive in light of the consolidation of media holdings and the destruction of intellectual life in the '80s and '90s, when people began to work longer and harder for less, available public spaces and quiet cafes dried up, and argument in the academies gave way to 'respect'.

The blogs salved this ennui and created nourishing microcommunities. Yet criticism as an art didn't survive. People might have used their blogs to post the best they could think and say. The could have posted 5,000-word critiques of their favorite books and records. Some polymath might even have shown, on-line, how an acute and well-stocked sensibility responds to the streaming world in real time. But those things didn't happen, at least not often enough. In practice, blogs reveal how much we are unwitting stenographers of hip talk and marketing speak, and how secondhand and often ugly our unconscious impulses still are. The need for speed encourages, as a willed style, the intemperate, the unconsidered, the undigested. (Not for nothing is the word blog evocative of vomit.) "So hot right now," the bloggers say. Or: "Jumped the shark." The language is supposed to mimic the way people speak on the street or the college quad, the phatic emotive growl and purr of exhibitionistic consumer satisfaction - "The Divine Comedy is SOOO GOOOD!" - or displeasure - "I shit on Dante!" So man hands on information to man.

By the end of the second paragraph, it seems clearer that the writer's not talking about us and our circle, exactly... But what do others think? (n+1 affiliated lurkers, if you still come by, encouraged to come out of the woodwork etc...)

(UPDATE: After reading Scott Kaufman's new post on all this at the Valve, and having clicked through to his links to actual "litblogs," I now can totally see n+1's point... I guess I was thinking that we are a litblog. Fortunately, that doesn't seem to be the case....)

we must take the matter pretty deep

Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section VI, "Of personal identity"

There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. The strongest sensation, the most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from this view, only fix it the more intensely, and make us consider their influence on self either by their pain or pleasure. To attempt a farther proof of this were to weaken its evidence; since no proof can be deriv'd from any fact, of which we are so intimately conscious; nor is there any thing, of which we can be certain, if we doubt of this.

In the shadow of prosperity

As will soon be apparent, I have a new found interest in The Economist.  It started a few weeks back when I posted excerpts from an article on marketing and Post modernism.  Now we turn our attention to what might be called the "inefficient casualties" of globalization: 

NESTLED among the wooded Blue Ridge mountains in Virginia's far south-west, Galax is a town of bluegrass music, barbecue and hardscrabble living. It is home to an annual fiddlers' convention and, less happily, a huddle of textile and furniture factories. Over the past few years, globalization has hit hard.

Unable to compete with Mexican and then Chinese competition, the town's old industries have withered, taking thousands of jobs with them. Last year brought the biggest single blow. Three big factories closed their doors within months. More than 1,000 people, around one-sixth of the town's workforce, lost their jobs.

Learning to love the bomb

David B.'s La Bombe Familiale as translated by Edward Gauvin for Words Without Borders.

On another note:  a video of Derrida's speech from October 2004 on the 50th anniversary of Le Monde Diplomatique.  He touches especially on the theme of a "New International" among others mentioned in this post.

A (Not So) Startling Accusation

President Carter's old National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, is not someone known for his dovish inclinations regarding foreign policy.  In fact, he has publicly admitted that he advocated for CIA support of the mujaheddin before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and that such a policy was designed to prompt an invasion.  It was hoped that this would lead the Soviets into a Vietnam style quagmire, overstretch their military and ultimately lead to a humiliating defeat. 

So when Brezinski recently testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee one might be curious as to what he thinks the Bush administration is preparing for Iran: