Still More on The History of Madness

As is always the case when matters such as this arise, the criticism of particular works or, indeed, of entire corpuses of works gets tied up with issues of academic politics. This is clearly the case when the "anti-Theory" (whatever that is, of course) dogmatists at The Valve go on the offensive. For them, questions of criticism are always tied up with their institutional location and, hence, it is not without relevance when one rebuts claims raised by some by pointing out that the polemic is more about the practice of literature in American PhD departments than it is about the texts ostensibly under discussion. Such is clearly in evidence when it is possible to write, "Also, the claim that all these mean people are attacking Foucault's "dissertation" or "near-juvenalia" is disingenuous, because the book's still taught and cited regularly as authoritative, no matter what you call it."

What SEK misses here - the precise point of my original comments - is that an oeuvre is not a static entity. An oeuvre is open to challenge; it changes throughout time. Anyone who has spent any time in a social science or humanities department in the Western world since the end of the Second World War have seen this very principle in action with respect to Marx's writings - the "early" or "young" or "humanist" Marx versus the "late" or "mature" or "scientific" Marx. It is also clearly in evidence when consideration is turned to Freud - Jungians versus Kleinians versus Lacanians. Indeed, one even sees this in relation to lesser figures: Durkheim's works prior to 1900 against The Elementary Forms. What unites these disparate thinkers in this regard - Marx, Freud, Durkheim and, indeed, Foucault himself - is that they are what Foucault calls a "founder of discursivity." That is, the limits of the discourse become a stake in the discourse itself. The meaning of "Marx's discourse" or "Foucault's discourse" is open to questioning: it cannot be fixed and is not static. The "central" texts have changed and will change - in part in response to contemporary issues of interest.

Internal to Foucault's own discourse, it is generally accepted that there are a number of phases (the limiting of these phases can themselves become an issue, of course): the archaeological, the genealogical, and the problematization. This, of course, does not capture all the texts: there are four significant texts that do no get included in this periodization - Foucault's first published piece on Biswanger and existential psychoanalysis called "Dream, Imagination and Existence" (1954), his first book published as Maladie mentale et personnalité (1954), his minor dissertation on Kant's anthropology (1961), and his major dissertation published (in the recent translation) as The History of Madness (1961). Thus, it is only in 1963, with the publication of The Birth of the Clinic, that Foucault begins to use the word "archaeology" in any coherent way and in 1966, with the publication of The Order of Things, that he begins to use the word "discourse" in any coherent way. However, it isn't until 1969, with the publication of The Archaeology of Knowledge, that he attempts to explicitly theorize either concept.

While there is certainly a degree of continuity between The History of Madness and The Birth of the Clinic, namely a concern with the institutional sites of specialized and rarefied knowledges, there is also a large break that isn't fully realized until The Order of Things. The question, therefore, is whether the continuity or the discontinuity prevails. In my view, it is the discontinuity that prevails: first, the theoretical apparatus changes extensively; second, the object of analysis changes; and, third, Foucault himself begins to disavow his early works. (I'd note in passing, that contrary to some comments on The Valve, Foucault repeatedly disavows his previous works at each identifiable stage of his career - see, for instance, the first lecture in 'Society Must be Defended' and the late essays published as "The Subject and Power." Rather than being his biggest fan, Foucault comes across as his own biggest critic.)

Let us, for the time being, bracket the question of his works after 1963 and turn to his early works; that is, the group of works which have come to be dominated by The History of Madness, that are at the center of the current controversy. The question, it seems, is whether or not these works can be characterized as "juvenalia" or otherwise questioned in relation to his other works. The answer from the other side - that some of these works are presently taught in seminars - does not provide a convincing reply: the mere presence on a syllabus does not indicate that the instructor considers the work authoritative. It is entirely possible to imagine someone - saying Scull himself - teaching a course on the historiography of psychiatry in which students would study landmark works in the writing of the history of psychiatry. Per Scull's own review, The History of Madness would of necessity be included in such a syllabus as it was the work that opened up these sorts of questions to later scholars. Thus, it is entirely reasonable to include the book on a syllabus as important, but to teach it as flawed - it asked in important questions, but it failed to answer them. Hence, the mere fact that book is taught is not indicative of its authority in a positive sense: it could be taught because it is wrong; wrong in interesting ways. A form of wrong-ness, I'd suggest, that is more interesting than books that are technically "right."

On the face of it, SEK's objection fails: that it is taught indicates little or nothing about the book itself. The more interesting question, then, is whether it is possible for those who don't care for the book or Foucault and for those who don't for the book, but care for Foucault to agree on this point: The History of Madness was a good dissertation, a good book written in late fifties and early sixties, published in the early sixties, that it propelled his career, but is, ultimately, not a book that will stand the test of time. It seems to me fully possible and reasonable to concede this point: the book was once important, but its importance has since declined. As indicated in my original post on the subject, I don't see The History of Madness as an essential work in Foucault's oeuvre.

The problem, of course, is that while we can agree that the book is insufficient, our respective grounds for this judgment will not coincide: for many opponents of Foucault, it isn't the work that is the problem, but the man. When Scull writes against The History of Madness, he isn't attacking a book, but, rather, is attacking Foucault's oeuvre and, hence, those who work with Foucault's discourse. Consequently, Scull's position is overdetermined by faculty politics. Likewise, those who take up Scull's position - whether they agree with his particular claims - are likewise already imbricated in these politics. And, thus, those who would defend Foucault are caught in an inconvenient position: they must defend what is more likely than not an unsatisfactory work and they must deal with the subtext of faculty politics. Given the existing relations of force within the academy, the defenders are already at a disadvantage.

This is the point at which one claim spills into another: The History of Madness is flawed for its citation practices and, hence, any work of Foucault's that makes use of comparable citation practices is likewise flawed. Thus, if one work can be rejected, so too can the rest. This is, in essence, the point of contact between Scull and SEK.

Let's turn to SEK's point. He quotes a passage from an essay, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," and then claims that The History of Madness is not a genealogical work - it doesn't live up to Foucault's own methodological statements. We have two replies to this: first, you are completely right - The History of Madness is not a genealogical work! and no one claims it is; second, what methodological statements are you talking about? That The History of Madness is not a genealogical work should be granted - let's also throw in The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, and The Archaeology of Knowledge. The problem with this criticism is that it isn't: it isn't a criticism at all. The whole point of the turn to genealogy was that the previous archaeological works were not entirely satisfying. And, of course, from the perspective of the archaeological works, the previous works were likewise unsatisfactory. This criticism is, then, nothing but show - an apparent contradiction is found and the nasty Frenchman is revealed as a dishonest fraud. The problem, of course, is that it doesn't reveal dishonesty on the part of Foucault, but on the part of his critics.

We've already discussed one reason why this is dishonest; viz., the work criticized for not being genealogical does not claim to be genealogical. The second reason is that Foucault provides no methodology at all. Hence, to criticize Foucault for failing to live up to his methodological precepts is likewise dishonest. Contrary to some opinions, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" is not a "methodological" text. It is a short essay on Nietzsche's philosophy of history written quite ironically for a volume dedicated to a Hegelian scholar. That is, the question of the essay is not, "What is Foucauldian geneaology? What is it that I, Foucault, mean by genealogy?" but is, rather, "What does Nietzsche mean by genealogy? How does this relate to his philosophy of history?" Thus, in the first instance, the criticism that The History of Madness does not live up to the standards of Foucauldian genealogy does  not pass muster.

But, one might reply that even if "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" does not provide a methodology, can a genealogical methodology be found in Foucault's works? Afterall, he does speak in passing about the relationship between archaeology and genealogy taken as a method. The problem to be resolved is whether or not Foucault practices this "method" and if lays out this method. With respect to the latter, he clearly does not. Alongside Foucault's constant disavowal of his previous works is a constant refusal to, as he calls it, "lay down the law" - that is, to provide "Foucault's theory" of so-and-so or to provide "Foucault's methodology." It seems to me that Foucault's refusal is a necessary position: his genealogy taken seriously requires that he not create a method.

The problem then takes on a new face: what are we to make about his claims to be doing archaeological or geneaological (or, indeed, problematizations) work if he refuses to specify what he means by this? The answer to this, by normal standards, would be to question if his work is recognizable as "sound" - that is, does it conform to disciplinary norms or, again, is it "right"?

Such a question - internal to Foucault's discourse - is incoherent. This is why you will not be able to find a supporter of Foucault's work who will be able to provide a coherent and acceptable answer. To this question, a Foucauldian can only be puzzled. It misses the point. The whole point of, first, archaeology, and then geneaology, was to question to the prevalent modes of writing history. Indeed, it isn't even clear if Foucault's discourse is "historical" (or, indeed, "philosophical" or even "sociological"). Disciplinary arrangements and standards are explicitly questioned and challenged by his work. Hence, it is possible for a Foucauldian to write a book wondering if he was a philosopher or a historian! Further, the charge of the critics is that his work employs poor citation practices, that it misuses sources, and that it isn't true.

The Foucauldian reply is can only be "Why does this matter to you? So what." To the first, there is the problem of extending primarily North American citation practices to other national traditions (it is not uncommon, especially during Foucault's lifetime to actively refrain from citing contemporaries - only the dead are cited - and, so, the criticize Foucault for not citing the Annales is misplaced). To the second, it is pointed out that the nature of sources themselves are questioned (hence, the whole thing of "from below," the "minor knowledges," the forgotten manuscripts that aren't part of the official history, etc). To the third, we have the Nietzschean question: what is the value of truth anyway? Why should a genealogy privilege truth over falsity? Why should truth be valued as such? What is the power claim that is being made in an appeal to truth? That is, critics give the appearance of, on the one hand, criticizing non-genealogical works for not being genealogical and, on the other hand, criticizing genealogical works for being genealogical.

One is, of course, not required to take Foucault seriously. One is, of course, not required to take all of his works seriously even if one takes other of his works seriously. One is, however, required to take him seriously on his own terrain if one seeks to criticize or critique him. This is not to say that criticisms originating external to his own discourse are not valid - they most certainly are - but to do so requires a demonstration that one has already considered Foucault internal to Foucault's own discourse. This, of course, does not apply merely to critics of Foucault, but is a standard that should be taken into account in any critique or criticism. It is clearly illegitimate for a Foucauldian to criticize a Habermasian for not being a Foucauldian.

(Cross-posted to theoria.)

Comments

[JRGBruno]

That’s an excellent post….But I still can’t figure out why conservatives have been so inspired by Scull’s review in the first place. I mean, a past critic of Foucault, commissioned by an anti-Foucault conservative newspaper to write a review of the “long version” of a book that he already disliked in abridged form? How is Scull’s review new or noteworthy, given these circumstances?

That is weird, but far more insulting is the implication that Foucault or his followers were arrogant or oblivious to the complexities and difficulties of his own project. As you mention, Foucault was probably his most forceful and most unrelenting critic, something that is recognized even by many of his (reasonable) intellectual rivals. Take this passage from G.E.R. Lloyd’s 1986 review of volume 2 of the History of Sexuality. Now, Lloyd’s review is generally *negative,* but this doesn’t stop him from noting Foucault’s disarming “capacity for self-criticism.” Indeed, Lloyd thinks that “so far as the methodology of his investigations goes, he had probably been his own most unsparing critic.” Moreover, Lloyd correctly notes that there is virtually no book or subject matter that does not go through a very public display of self-criticism:

“Thus the introduction to The Archaeology of Knowledge devotes several pages to a radical critique of Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, and The Order of Things, criticizing the last of these, for example, on the grounds that at the stage at which it was written he had not made fully explicit the methodology on which the study of the subjects it investigated had to be based. Indeed, what passes for a conclusion to The Archaeology of Knowledge takes the form of an imaginary dialogue in which the very possibility of the investigation it attempts is questioned.”

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/5180

In other words Scull’s criticism of Foucault’s work is not only out of context, it is also relatively tame when compared with the questions that Foucault posed to himself. Worse, Scull’s critique becomes even tamer when one takes into account the fact that it is 2007, and Scull’s inane observations are still premised on the notion that the youthful, 1960s Foucault represents a potential future “threat” to historians, philosophers, and truth-seekers everywhere.

[Luther Blissett]

Your penultimate paragraph disturbs me. Citational practice is not some mere convention, is not simply icing on a cake. That it has been reduced to mere convention by plagiarists and undergrads is a sign of the times.

You can't excuse a scholar's failure to cite recent scholarship by appealing to some French custom -- any more than you can excuse wife beating by appealing to some patriarchal custom.

Finally, what to make of the whole "why value truth over falsity" claim? Of course, a scholar will often be forced to deal with what is false: historical accounts that distort the truth, bad science, bad philosophy, mysticism, religion, etc. But if you're writing about asylums or prisons and you elide the difference between how an institution represents itself and how it actually operates, then you're simply wrong, not some brave defender of Nietzschean illusion over the will to power of truth-seekers.

[Anthony Paul Smith]

"You can't excuse a scholar's failure to cite recent scholarship by appealing to some French custom -- any more than you can excuse wife beating by appealing to some patriarchal custom."

What is this caled? This form of argument? It has to be invalid. I saw something like this over at Crooked Timber where they compared giving nuclear power to Iran like giving a knife and fork to Hannibal Lector. It's not really a good analogy.

Luther, wouldn't it depend on the reason for that French custom?

God, do I not I have a dog in this fight.

[Luther Blissett]

Anthony, you're right, my comparison is too hyperbolic.

But I think it's basically true, so here's a revised version:

"You can't excuse a scholar's failure to cite recent scholarship by appealing to some French custom -- any more than you can excuse any bad behavior by appealing to custom."

Sure, there might have been a good reason for the French custom of limiting citation to accepted, canonical sources. It's not a French custom, in fact -- you'll often find Camile Paglia criticizing 80s lit crit for its failure to cite any sources before 1970. It's a conservative, belle lettristic convention that rests on the mistaken belief that what's old and commonly read has "stood the test of time" and so is an acceptable source.

I'm sure French scientists and doctors of Foucault's day did cite the most contemporary research on their topics. Which brings me to the issue of professional politics addressed above. Foucault's often shoddy research is very much tied to his essentially belle lettristic heritage. What is neither historian nor philosopher nor sociologist? In France, the answer is: essayist. And for all of Foucault's professional machinations, his work is best read -- like Derrida's and Lyotard's and Baudrillard's -- in the tradition of Montaigne. The scholar, whether historian, sociologist, or philosopher, has a duty to the truth; the essayist has only a duty to be interesting.

[jholbo]

Following up on Luther's point, Nietzsche didn't regard his question, 'why truth over falsity?' as an ever-playable 'get out of critical thinking jail free' card, as it were. You're supposed to think about it: what is the value of truth?

So: what is it? Such that you would be willing to stand by your thinker, right or wrong?

(Anthony. Dude. What are you talking about? This is your thing all over. This is your dog. This is your hunt. Me? I'm outa here. I've said my Nietzschean piece.)

[Anthony Paul Smith]

Bad behaviour? Really?

God is this debate tired. And now you're making Foucault an enemy of truth, beauty, and goodness. I just don't know how to argue when the stakes are that high.

I will ask, regarding this "The scholar, whether historian, sociologist, or philosopher, has a duty to the truth; the essayist has only a duty to be interesting." How is this the case? It seems to suggest that the truth is not interesting, or that to be truth it must be made to be not interesting. Doesn't ring true or interesting to me.

John,

If you leave now you won't be able to tell me all the things you so want me to learn.

[jholbo]

Just when I thought I was out ... they pull me back in! Good point, Anthony.

But not about what Luther said. So here is your logic lesson for the night. To say that Smith has a duty to x and Jones has a duty to y is not to imply either that Smith has a duty to not y or Jones has a duty to not x. Get it?

[Swifty]

Craig writes:

Foucault repeatedly disavows his previous works at each identifiable stage of his career - see, for instance, the first lecture in 'Society Must be Defended' and the late essays published as "The Subject and Power." Rather than being his biggest fan, Foucault comes across as his own biggest critic.
[end excerpt from Craig]

Unless my notes are flawed -- which is possible but I doubt it -- Foucault does not criticize his work on madness so much as he provides an overview that integrates that work into his overall effort. See p. 208 of the Dreyfus and Rabinow text, where (to paraphrase!) Foucault says he is primarily interested, not in 'power' per se, but rather the history of different means by which in our culture human beings are made subjects. And then Foucault goes on to schematize his work in relation to this goal, starting with Order of Things which treated the "objectivizing of the speaking subject." Or as the subject who labors in the analysis of wealth and of economics. Then the subject as "divided" is treated in his work on insanity. Now using the domain of sexuality to investigate how human being turns him or herself into a subject [end Foucault paraphrase]. A similar treatment of his career is found in "On the Genealogy of Ethics" in Foucault Reader, p. 351.

Foucault also refers favorably to Madness and Clinic in the interview "Truth and Power." In both works, he says, he was really working with a concept of power that was, however, insufficiently thematized in both. See Foucault Reader p. 57.

In "Body/Power" in Power/Knowledge, p. 61, Foucault comments that both his study of madness and the prisons contributes to his work on how power works.

In "Polemics, Politics, and Problemizations," from the Foucault Reader, Foucault puts it roughly this way; but see pp. 387-388:

"Madness, delinquency, sexuality--three examples in which three fundamental elements of any experience are implicated: a game of truth; relations of power; forms of relation to oneself and to others. With each of the examples emphasizing one of the three aspects. With field of madness organized as primarily a field of knowledge; of crime as an area of political intervention; with sexuality defined as an ethical position. But each time the other two elements present."

See also "Preface" to The History of Sexuality, Volume II, contained in The Foucault Reader, esp. p. 336, where Madness is again treated as an important element of Foucault's thought as a whole.

There is a very interesting comment by Foucault in Threepenny Review, which can be found, I think, in Foucault Live. Again I am relying on my notes, but I think they are reliable. Foucault says, in response to a question:

"I am not merely a historian, nor a novelist. What I do is a kind of historical fiction. I know, in a sense, that what I say is not true. Take madness: I know very well that what I have done from a historical point of view is single-minded, exaggerated. But the book had an effect on the perception of madness. So the book and my thesis have a truth in the nowadays of reality.

"What I want is to provoke an interference between our reality and the knowledge of our past history. If I succeed, this will have real effects in our present history. My hope is my books will become true after they have been written--not before."

I am not sure, then, that Foucault disavows his earlier work to the extent you suggest.

Scott also says: "The History of Madness is not a genealogical work! and no one claims it is."

Why wouldn't Madness? qualify? The usual complaint about Madness is that in the face-off between the mad and society, Foucault plays around with the idea that the mad have a more original, more authentic, more human access to being. But I really don't think that note plays so loud in the text, and there are plenty of other moments that deal with themes very familiar to a reader of one of Foucualt's later books, like Discipline and Punish.

[John Emerson]

My feeling is that Scott Eric, along with a lot of other people, is tired of hearing about Foucault so much and took Scull's review as an opportunity to say so. I don't think that either Scull or Scott were primarily interested in M&C; it was an opening shot in the battle against all of Foucault (The History of Sexuality was also mentioned) which was part of the war against Theory.

I actually am a Theory-hater of sorts, but I like Foucault. (It's Lacan I hate). But not being under academic discipline, I'm not required to lump the two either way.

When I read Foucault I'm always impressed by the breadth of his research and am willing to give him a pass on thorough mastery of the present state of the field. He always brings new things to the table.

Everyone at the Valve seems to think that people are opportunistically minimizing the importance of M&C in order to ignore criticism. Like Craig, though (probably), before this all happened I'd already concluded that M&C was an apprentice work of mostly historical or biographical interest. (For example, I'd never recommend that anyone read it as an introduction to Foucault). If people want to zing Foucault, they really have to look somewhere else.

[Anthony Paul Smith]

Thanks John!

Still, the way you put it doesn't seem to include everything that Luther said.

John,

You forget, the people at The Valve are the final arbiters of scholarship. They are The Deciders League. If you disagree with them you just disagree with everything that is good and right in the world. This is why John likes to follow me around and try and teach me things.

[SEK]

John,

I think you do me a disservice. I did write, after all:

Far from being tired ... I think we should have more such conversations, and more frequently.

That's not quite what you'd expect from someone "tired of hearing about Foucault so much." I directly said I'd like to talk about him more. I consider this distinction important.

As for Craig's rambling undergraduate meditation on the Meaning of Truth -- you can smell the reek of bad bud all the way across the internet -- the less said the better. Still, I could point out that he consistently misrepresents 1) what I wrote, 2) my reasons for writing it, and 3) the conclusions I drew.

I could point out the density required to claim that because Foucault said he had no methodology, we must believe him; or that no conclusions about that methodology can be drawn from what he wrote about others; or that evaluations of that methodology can be made, and preferences for one articulation of it over another can be expressed.

I could respond to the obscene statement of the obvious -- that I missed Craig's original point "that an oeuvre is not a static entity" -- by noting that this very, very obvious point is implicit in my original critique, inasmuch as unflatteringly applying later standards to earlier works suggests that I understand this very, very obvious point (which nonetheless takes Craig five paragraphs to make).

I could point out that the continued existence of The History of Madness on syllabi means that debates about madness are still being framed by it, no matter what Craig's opinion of its place in the Foucauldian canon.

I could point out that employing the heroic rhetoric of the self-marginalized dovetails nicely with the overall whiny tone of this post, right down to the weird choral effect of shifting into the (evidently beleaguered) second-person mid-post; to which point I could add that this is indicative of the very thing I criticized, namely, the inability of the acolyte to treat Foucault's work with the attention it demands.

I could do all of these things, but then Craig would respond again, and I can only be proven right so many times before even I tire of the unintentional hilarity.

[Rich Puchalsky]

Those meanies at the Valve! They are the "'anti-Theory dogmatists", they are the "Deciders League". Someone should tell Dan Green and Joseph Kugelmass and Miriam B. to back off of Craig and Anthony. How dare they bully you like that.

There is one aspect of Craig's diatribe that does share something with one other particular LS writer -- I've seen the same cozy insularity in Jodi's position:

"One is, however, required to take him seriously on his own terrain if one seeks to criticize or critique him. This is not to say that criticisms originating external to his own discourse are not valid - they most certainly are - but to do so requires a demonstration that one has already considered Foucault internal to Foucault's own discourse. This, of course, does not apply merely to critics of Foucault, but is a standard that should be taken into account in any critique or criticism."

That's why Luther Blissett is being ruled out of bounds, apparently. You can't claim that there are academic universals that apply whether they are internal to a discourse or not. If someone wants to claim academic problems with a work, they need not consider the work internal to its own discourse. There exists a socially universal context which applies to all academic discourses.

John Emerson is well-positioned to disagree with this, of course, since he explicitly takes an anti-academic stance. Craig -- well, who knows.

[Rich Puchalsky]

Please read the first period in the second-to-last para above as a "--"; i.e. "That's why Luther Blissett is being ruled out of bounds, apparently -- you can't claim that there are academic universals that apply whether they are internal to a discourse or not." In other words, that position is what I read Craig as writing. The rest of the paragraph is my position: that almost everyone in academia agrees on a universal context for the purposes of communication and collaboration.

[Anthony Paul Smith]

I'm willing to put money on this - in most situations where, for whatever bizzare and twisted reason people are talking about blogs, The Valve were to come up the first thing that leaps to people's minds is not "Oh, that website that Dan Green writes for?"

[john c. halasz]

The Colin Gordon review of the new translation in the Notre Dame Review offers a much different view than Craig's of the significance of the work in terms of Foucault's subsequent oeuvre. It can be found at ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id/=8904. I prefer Gordon's take.

[john c. halasz]

"There exists a socially universal context that applies to all academic discourses".

Well, I guess that settles it. No need to read Foucault at all. Now move along, folks. No need to get all excited about this wreckage.

[jholbo]

Anthony: "This is why John likes to follow me around and try and teach me things."

I think you give me too little credit for love of the absurd, Anthony. And yourself too little credit for love of learning. (Secretly, I think you don't mind it so much.)

[Matt]

My feeling is that Scott Eric, along with a lot of other people, is tired of hearing about Foucault so much and took Scull's review as an opportunity to say so. I don't think that either Scull or Scott were primarily interested in M&C; it was an opening shot in the battle against all of Foucault (The History of Sexuality was also mentioned) which was part of the war against Theory.

Yup. I mean, seems obvious enough.

I could respond to the obscene statement of the obvious -- that I missed Craig's original point "that an oeuvre is not a static entity" -- by noting that this very, very obvious point is implicit in my original critique, inasmuch as unflatteringly applying later standards to earlier works suggests that I understand this very, very obvious point...

I think this is a terribly poor cop, given the predictable, if predictably flawed depths to which you were plunging this piece of junkfish to begin with (the rather large barbed hook the bloated and pale piece of steroid-sustained bait that allowed you to draw any blood at all from Scull's unoriginal little exercise.

I further think this confirms you have not understood Craig's point, in its strongest sense. After all, the concept of a non-static oeuvre correctly understood rather cuts against the grain of New Historicism generally - that is, if we permit SEK even that charity of self-declared association absent much original proof - in some important ways.

As for the rest, well, just wow...talk about the less said the better.

[Matt]

I agree with Foucault Blog btw; this is considered post (about which I hope to say more later). Thanks Craig.

[SEK]

Did someone dump stupid in the water? How has "let's talk more about Foucault" turned into "let's not talk about Foucault"? Are you practicing to be a Republican?

I think this is a terribly poor cop...

Think it all you want, but anyone who reads the post -- which, I should note, Craig didn't link to, making it a little difficult for people to see his misrepresentations for what they are -- will think otherwise, no matter how many rotten-fish metaphors you employ.

I further think this confirms you have not understood Craig's point, in its strongest sense. After all, the concept of a non-static oeuvre correctly understood rather cuts against the grain of New Historicism generally - that is, if we permit SEK even that charity of self-declared association absent much original proof - in some important ways.

Why, thank you for the charity. Much appreciated. Of course, you haven't actually given any, but let's not dwell. Instead, I'd love to hear how "the concept of a non-static oeuvre" is incompatible with new historicism "generally ... in some important ways." You truly lap the field when it comes to hazy insinuations devoid of intellectual content. (This, of course, is not a good thing.)

Still, you circle the wagons around Craig's circled wagons well -- "well" isn't quite the word I'm looking for, what is it now, "unthinkingly"? Not inaccurate, but not quite it. "Uncritically"? Also not inaccurate, also not quite it. Wait, I have it: predictably. That's the one.

[Matt]

Scott: nevermind.

[Rich Puchalsky]

John C. Halasz, both Scull and SEK have read Foucault. Craig's answer to a criticism based on academic standards is to write "Such a question - internal to Foucault's discourse - is incoherent." But that misses the point. In an academic context one discourse exists inside the other. You have to read Foucault before writing a critique of his work, sure, but you don't have to consider him internal to his own discourse.

I think that Luther Blissett and John Emerson have it basically right -- whatever the problems (if any) with Foucault academically, that doesn't change the interest in or influence of his work as an essayist -- but that's really what Scott was saying too, although the usual people who want to turn it into Our Gang vs Their Gang desperately want to avoid reading that.

[Anthony Paul Smith]

Shorter Rich: Why can't you just accept that we, I mean, they set the terms of debate? You can have Foucault, but only as an 'essayist', for I know scholars and Foucault is no scholar.

John,

Another clever one-liner. How do you come up with this stuff?

In terms of the debate between SEK and Craig - I ain't touching that. It seems way too personal.

[jholbo]

Matt, I think you are making a rather simple mistake: you yourself find objections to Theory to be objectionable, tout court. (That is, they irritate you.) But it does not follow that it is an objection to what Scott is doing that what he is doing might be construed as the opening move in a larger objection to Theory. (All that follows from this latter point is that it will irritate you, not that there is anything intellectually wrong with it.)

To put the point another way: it is question-begging to take 'objecting to Theory is wrong' as a premise in an argument to the conclusion that 'objecting to Theory is wrong', from which you will then work back to: so there must be something wrong with this critique of Madness and Civilization, since anything that leads to something wrong must have something wrong with it. Clear?

To put it yet another way, you are conflating your sense of irritation with Scott with possession of an argument to the conclusion that your irritation is justified. But I do not see that you have the latter, as opposed to the former - which I am more than willing to concede to you, in spades, as it were.

The point about the 'non-static ouevre' is obviously not it, since - whether or not Scott has granted it already - he can certainly simply grant that Foucault's ouevre is non-static, and then proceed with critiquing it to whatever degree he deems warranted. What you - and craig - are reaching for, which I don't think is wise, is some justification for, as it were, a hermeneutics of suspicionlessness. That is, there will be a set of figures - or discourses - concerning which it will be deemed illegitimate to have suspicions about any part of the overall ouevre, on the basis of faults anywhere else. This is obviously not the sort of standard you would apply to an ordinary author, even though ordinary authors are as non-static as anyone else; so 'non-static' turns out not to be the crucial factor and the question becomes: what is it about figures like Foucault, Freud, Marx, and their associated discourses, that mandates hermeneutics of suspicionlessness, as it were? I think the answer is: a certain sort of hermeneutics of suspicion is felt to be crucially important, so one does what one can to ensure the possibility. (A certain irony now obtrudes, if I make no mistake.)

[Ah! I love the smell of learning in the morning.]

[Craig]

What you - and craig - are reaching for, which I don't think is wise, is some justification for, as it were, a hermeneutics of suspicionlessness. That is, there will be a set of figures - or discourses - concerning which it will be deemed illegitimate to have suspicions about any part of the overall ouevre, on the basis of faults anywhere else.

Huh? Where did you get that from? I'm happy to provide a great deal of critiques and criticisms of both Foucault and Foucauldians - my comments and thoughts on this are well established here at Long Sunday, my own site, and in various comments scattered throughout the blogosphere. The point here is that a rejection of THM isn't the knock-out blow that Scull (and others) claims it to be.

Here are a few criticisms of Foucault: politics is a residual category; the use of "social body" is just strange; sovereignty is under-theorized given its prominence in his work between DP and the end of the seventies; his "analytic of power" pre-supposes an unstated prior theorization of the difference between "analytic" and "theory;" there is no sense of a collective subject, especially in the late ethical works; and I'm increasingly convinced by the "crypto-normativism" charge.