why bother with Being?

Heidegger is quite aware that asking about Being raises the question of relevance. What motivates him to write about it? First, he points out, there is the fact that this is a theme addressed by Aristotle, and a certain respect for giants in the field inclines us to take it seriously when, not just anyone, but a giant raises a topic. Also, the available answers to the question of what Being is seem unhelpful – it's undefinable, it's the most general thing around. Heidegger puts it this way:

Up to now the necessity of a retrieve of the question [of Being] was motivated partly by its venerable origin but above all by the lack of a definite answer, even by the lack of any adequate formulation. But one can demand to know what purpose this question should serve. Does it remain solely, or is it at all, only a matter of free-floating speculation about the most general generalities – or is it the most basic and at the same time most concrete question?
Bisher wurde die Notwendigkeit einer Widerholung der Frage einmal aus der Ehrwürdigkeit ihrer Herkunft motiviert, vor allem aber aus dem Fehlen einer bestimmten Antwort, sogar aus dem Mangel einer genügenden Fragestellung überhaupt. Man kann aber zu wissen verlangen, wozu diese Frage dienen soll. Bleibt sie lediglich oder ist sie überhapt nur das Geschäft einer freischwebenden Spekulation über allgemeinste Allgemeinheiten – oder ist sie die prinzipiellste und konkreteste Frage zugleich? (§ 3)

And of course the italicized part is Heidegger's own view. Additional support for the importance of the question of Being can be found in the fact that, according to Heidegger, there is an "average and vague understanding of being / durchschnittliche und vage Seinsverständnis" (§ 2). The "question of Being" is one that we all share; in writing this text, Heidegger is addressing a theme that is present everywhere in our own lives, and in this sense the inquiry is not 'meta' 'physical' (not 'above' 'life'). As he says: "No matter how much this understanding of being wavers and fades and borders on mere verbal knowledge, the indefiniteness of the understanding of being that is always already available is itself a positive phenomenon which needs an elucidation. / Dieses Seinsverständnis mag noch so sehr schwanken und verschwimmen und sich hart on der Grenze einer bloßen Wortkenntnis bewegen – diese Unbestimmtheit des je schon verfügbaren Seinsverständnisses ist selbst ein positives Phänomen, das der Aufklärung bedarf." (§ 2)

Much of § 3 is taken up explaining the relation of Heidegger's book to the sciences and other philosophic attempts to discuss being. Just a couple of moments that seem important to me:

A science's level of development is determined by the extent to which it is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts. In these immanent crises of the sciences the relation of positive questioning to the matter in question becomes unstable. Today tendencies to place research on new foundations have cropped up on all sides in the various disciplines.
Das Niveau einer Wissenschaft bestimmt sich daraus, wie weit sie einer Krisis ihrer Grundbegriffe fähig ist. In solchen immanenten Krisen der Wissenschaften kommt das Verhältnis des positiv untersuchenden Fragens zu den befragten Sachen selbst ins Wanken. Allenthalben sind heute in den verschiedenen Disziplinen Tendenzen wachgeworden, die Forschung auf neue Fundamente umzulegen.

The above reminds us a bit of Thomas Kuhn's book on Scientific Revolutions, no? Could we say: when science is not in crisis, its 'being' is hidden. When there is a crisis, when we are in transition from one paradigm to another, previously hidden being is to an extent available for viewing? Heidegger continues:

The discipline which is seemingly the strictest and most securely structured, mathematics, has experienced a "crisis in its foundations."....Relativity theory in physics grew out of the tendency to expose nature's own coherence as it is "in itself." As a theory of the conditions of access to nature itself it attempts to preserve the immutability of the laws of motion by defining all relativities; it is thus confronted by the question of the structure of its pre-given area of knowledge, that is, by the problem of matter.
Die scheinbar strengste und am festesten gefügte Wissenschaft, die Mathematik, ist in eine "Grundlagenkrisis" geraten....Die Relativitätstheorie der Physik erwächst der Tendenz, den eigenen Zusammenhang der Natur selbst, so wie er "an sich" besteht, herauszustellen. Als Theorie der Zugangsbedingungen zur Natur selbst sucht sie durch Bestimmung aller Relativitäten die Unveränderlichkeit der Bewegungsgesetze zu wahren und bringt sich damit vor die Frage nach der Struktur des ihr vorgegebenen Sachgebietes, vor das Problem der Materie.

The implication of the above is that "matter" itself has become problematic as a foundation for science. Or am I misreading Heidegger here? Am I right in thinking that Heidegger is mentioning these developments in science to buttress the case that the problem of being is important and should not be dismissed as airy speculation? If he's right that there is an average understanding of being that just isn't worked out, can we, Heidegger's readers, make the issue of being more explicit ourselves, even before we go further in Heidegger's discussion of it? Can we think of 'examples' of being?

Perhaps there is a hint in Heidegger's discussion of sciences that enter into crisis, such that "the relation of positive questioning to the matter in question becomes unstable / das Verhältnis positiv untersuchenden Fragens zu den befragten Sachen selbst ins Wanken."

It's in the transition from one kind of being to another that we can glimpse 'being'. Take a fictional example: Tony is a highly regarded professor who gets his way a lot where he works. But every weekend he goes to his parents for dinner, and there the conditions are recreated in which what he does professionally isn't taken very seriously, his will is disregarded, and he finds himself engulfed in an environment he cannot escape, obeying rules and playing roles that would surprise his co-workers.

Is that the kind of thing Heidegger is talking about when he suggests being is "the most basic and at the same time most concrete question / die prinzipiellste und konkreteste Frage zugleich"? Or is that a trivialization of it?

Comments

Fundraiser anyone?

[Phlojo]

Nice evasion, if not Annie Coulterish (and LS is, for all its supposed progressiveness about one step away from "Hermann Goering, reconsidered" (I wager Vati Heidegger did not detest the Reichmarshall either, at least until after '45, when he had to) . Let's put it this way, onnie: does orthodox Marxism (call it economic materialism, or dialectical materialism, or even empirical realism) have any resemblance whatsoever to the bizarre metaphysical system offered in Being and Time? (hint: nyet).

[Nate]

Put me down for one of those books, truly a commodity I would fetishize.

Another fundraiser would be for Long Sunday to sell the code for the Troll Generator, or to charge a fee per line of text - "Troll your friends' blogs, only a dime a word!"

[Phlojo]

Yes Natie you are such the bon vivant. 'Fore we get to Dasein, tho' or even Marky Marx, howze about you and the LS crew offer like 1000 words refuting the first 20 chapters of Leviathan or so..........

[Nate]

The problem, Phlodge, is that you violate the local norms for respectful conversation, so that no one cares about what you say. Kind of like shouting at strangers on the bus or putting your hand on their knee, it makes people tune out as the propositional content of your utterances.

I think it's a shame, because I for one am genuinely interested in some of the stuff that you know about, but I've got what you probably think are overly narrow standards of conversational manners as a precondition for seriously engaging with someone. I think that's generally the case w/ you with others who read this blog.

It's doubly a shame because I think you know all of this, which means you know this isn't a great use of your time. Speaking of worthwile uses of one's time, I'm going to stop now.

[CBR]

I would add that these aren't really just "local" norms...aphoristic taunts and gnomic jibes at one or another philosophical corpus that are too vague to be pinned down; never offering more than the shadow of a critique and then retreating behind another vague reference to another major philosopher; irrelevant comments that don't address the topic but demand a wholescale apology for the philosopher that has been mentioned.

Perhaps it was a bad idea to get involved in this, but just in case the individual doesn't know he's a troll and is just conversationally challenged, here is my diagnosis.

[Pozo]

Au contraire. I simply asked for a working definition of Dasein, other than the vague reference to "Being," or Being which knows itself as Being etc. Let's put it this way: Heidegger seems to posit an a priori Res Cogitans-like mind-stuff (this is from Basic Writings, and some sections of Being and Time), but he doesn't even bother with the careful arguments of Descartes (which are I think undefensible, at least if Res Cog is read as ghost-like subject); also, the Dasein-thesis (and related issues, the thrownness, etc) is really not even refutable, and thus might be considered a type of dogma. There's no convincing proof that consciousness is transcendental or immaterial; additionally, I think Heidegger the anti-humanist (see Basic writings, and even his objections to Sartre (not that I approve of that marxist freak)) was interested in theology, or in buttressing theological claims, which are themselves not arguable in any sort of normal fashion.

In traditional Kantian terms (knowledge depends on perceivable phenomena) I do not think Dasein may be defended either: for one, is it synthetic or analytic? However outside the norm or perhaps un-subtle my comments were, I was pointing to what I think are the, as y'all say, onto-theological roots of Heidegger's system: you can't argue with supposed revelations or mystical insights; and those mystical or perhaps gnostic aspects of Heidegger (and german idealism really) are quite counterproductive in terms of preventing substantial political and economic discussion.

[Swifty]

The whole point of trolling is to express unqualified contempt. What is said is only said as a carrier, a vehicle, for the contempt. Maybe such-and-such troll thinks it's a good idea to include reference to some other thinker as a way to establish bona fides; other times they just say "Wanker!" This is reflected, too, in the way they write. They don't want to write the words they are using, because writing out words is a sign of respect for the discourse, and so they misspell and miswrite on purpose. One writes the word "I" when referring to oneself in a conversation; one replaces that with "ah" to show that actual words, correctly spelled, are reserved for real conversations. They often end up with the syntax and tone of a pirate:

"Ay, maty, yer crank's as warm as toast, but I'll nay task yer nazi-hidigger wot tie the shoo of Master Hobbes, I reck."

[Pozo]

Why not respond to my posts instead of caricaturing then Swifty? I am saying transcendental Dasein cannot be defended, if even disputed. Even Sartre thought it was anti-humanist; Carnap was a bit more on-topic when he claimed that the entire Heidegger system was comprised of meaningless propositions which could never be demonstrated to be true or false. Or are we not even allowed to object, like Padua 1300 or something? That is what much continental theorizing seems to suggest.

And in a very profound sense the economic materialism of a Hobbes should be contrasted against the massive pipe dreams of the continentalists--Dasein does sound rather sublime, perhaps to some chubby old Bavarian militarist with a pension and plenty of pils and bratwurst at hand. People need things, like food, housing, employment, mates, etc; that is first philosophy. Hobbes realizes that, as do Marx (and Nietzsche in a different form). Not sure if Heidegger does, or Kierkegaard does. When ghost replaces meat, some of us reach for our Darwin.

[Swifty]

Pozo writes:

Au contraire. I simply asked for a working definition of Dasein, other than the vague reference to "Being," or Being which knows itself as Being etc.
[end Pozo]

Yes, but this has already been provided. Here it is again:

In Section 4 of Being and Time I think Heidegger provides a pretty good definition.

Da-sein is a being that does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its very being.
Das Dasein ist ein Seiendes, das nicht nur unter anderem Seienden vorkommt. Es ist vielmehr dadurch ontisch ausgezeichnet, daß es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht.
[end quotation of already-provided material]

Dasein is a being that can be distinguished from other beings by the fact that it cares about its being. Dasein is care - ful.

First, that's a definition. Second, it is not tautological -- it doesn't just say 'being that knows itself as being'. Third, it is not obscure.

Here I am (let's say) in my apartment. It's been a few days since I watered my plant. I get up to refill my coffee and I notice the plant looking a little withered, a little dry. "Poor plant," I say to myself, "what's the matter with me that I can't take a darn moment to put some water in it?" And so I drag myself over there and give the stupid plant some water. Well, what just happened? I'll put Heidegger's approach up against Hobbes's any day. Do you know why? Because Hobbes' stupid epistemology is so restrained and restricted by his ludicrous political project ("let's give all power to one randomly chosen person who will be above the law!") that he is unable to handle or account for even the most common, everyday activities and experiences. Here's what he says in Ch. 11, paragraph 2, of Leviathan: "So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death." But Hobbes is wrong. It is immediately contradicted by even the faintest experience of human beings, where the "perpetual and restless desire of power after power" is restricted to a very small group. In fact, we can get at the kind of phenomenon Hobbes is talking about and the kind seen in the plant story, much better with Heidegger's comments on Dasein. Heidegger is much richer; he captures a much wider range of actual human "comportments."

Reference is made to the first twenty chapters of Hobbes' Leviathan. Here's what he says in Chapter IV; would that those who throw Hobbes in our face act accordingly.

"But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of SPEECH, consisting of names or appellations, and their connexion; whereby men register their thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation; without which, there had been amongst men, neither commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves."

[Swifty]

"also, the Dasein-thesis (and related issues, the thrownness, etc) is really not even refutable"

Well of course it's refutable. Why wouldn't it be refutable? Here's Marx saying the same thing:

"At each stage there is found a material result: a sum of productive forces, a historically created relation of individuals to nature and to one another, which is handed down to each generation from its predecessor; a master productive forces, capital funds and conditions, which, on the one hand, is indeed modified by the new generation, but also on the other prescribes for it its conditions of life and gives it a definite development, a special character. It shows that circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances." German Ideology in The Marx-Engels Reader, 164-165.

"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past." 18th Brumaire in The Marx-Engels Reader, 595.

What else is Marx talking about but being "thrown?" Marx's idea can be refuted; so can Heidegger's. Someone can say, "I don't think it's right that we're thrown or that we're determined by the conditions we happen to find ourselves in when we are born. I think that underestimates the initiative and creativity of individuals and groups way too much."

[Swifty]

"Why not respond to my posts instead of caricaturing then Swifty?"

It ill-becomees someone who writes this:

"No the problem is you're a marxist who doesn't know sheeit abot philosophy, even the shit you pretend to know: Heidegger is NOT down with marxism. You got that? Say troll to may face, byatch. I doubt you've read Kant's 1st critique, much less Nietzsche. You sound a hairdresser for the Cheka."

to complain about being caricatured, and to ask that such posts be taken seriously.

[Pozo]

Cool. Then following Hobbes' bare-bones nominalism, let's ask what Dasein denotes, names, designates. OR for that matter, what the following means: """Dasein is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its very being.""

First, where is the Being? What are its space/time coordinates, Mass/bio-chemical properties? Hobbesian nominalism means one does not predicate about unseen or unprovable or merely speculative entities. Either some event or object is observable, perceivable, or its demonstrative knowledge, provable via axiom, etc. Dasein sounds like an existence claim (certainly not an axiom ala Euclid), thus subject to observation: Dasein exists (supposedly in time). OK, where? Or rather , how is it confirmed or proven? No a priori givens: that is what the empiricists taught (and the germans ignore for centuries).

Secondly, how does one establish "the supposed "concern" of Being with Being, even making the grand assumption that Dasein does exist (as say consciousness exists). Could the concern be quantified or even named via Hobbesian nominalism? Nicht. When does the concern kick in: at birth? Before? at 18? DO all people have it to some degree etc. That can hardly be established. That's Kierkegaardian spook jass, and anti-political. But of course to merely object to the clerics means one is a rustic, outsider, Trolll............

[Pozo]

"""Heidegger is NOT down with marxism."""

Oh a bit raw eh. I wager more than a few non-vichy frenchman who were aquainted with Herr Heidegger's thoughts may have thought in those terms when Heidegger's nazi pals were invading paris.

I am no Marxist, but marx was a materialist, remember. The conditioning is economic, historical, and biological. Not mystical. You seem to hold that marx's refusal to embrace a pure determinism implies he is some sort of idealist or metaphysician. He is not; and takes great issue with the idealists (even in Capital--read the intro for starters), and denies the a priori and immaterial "subject" that Heidegger takes for granted.