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Who Killed Cultural Studies?
I had a number of complicated reactions to the recent article in the London Review of Books by Jeremy Harding describing the final day of Walter Benjamin’s life. Benjamin’s
death, perhaps more than any other of those theorists whose lives ended
in suicide or insanity (Nietzsche, Deleuze), holds me in a sort of
mournful thrall. I find myself obsessing over
the moment when Benjamin finally decided that there was no way out,
that he would be deported, loaded into a train, sent to a concentration
camp, and gassed—his body disappearing underneath hundreds of now
nameless Jews in a mass grave.
Harding’s article (a review of a recent memoir by
Carina Birman, one of the individuals who attempted to take Benjamin
across the Franco-Spanish border) meditates on what he calls the
“Walter Benjamin cult.” Benjamin’s death, according to Harding, is
symbolic to the point of unreality, an enactment more than an event, like the death of the Christain messiah and the disappearance of the ‘risen’ body, for so long a matter of ardent conjecture. In a ritual sense, Benjamin’s death is closer to Judaic purification than a redemptive sacrifice. Yet in the likeness of the scapegoat, he confounds even that tradition, evicted not by his own tribe but by their enemies, wandering a mountainous wilderness not with the misdemeanours of his people on his head-‘all their iniquities in all their sins’—but their innocence.
Benjamin is the Christ-figure of cultural studies, his unique writing style and eccentric concerns only heighten the sense of his otherworldliness: a materialist who nevertheless uses kabbalism and Jewish messianic thought to break open the homogeneous temporality embedded in much of historical-materialism. But it is in his death that Harding sees the birth of an academic messianic figure. Benjamin sacrifices himself attempting to deliver his final work (presumably a final version of The Arcades Project, but even this is heavily disputed by Benjamin critics) to the public. He, then, dies and his death magnifies the resonance of his work a thousand-fold. In Benjamin 's work popular culture meets the literary, the religious and the political, and it is in the wake of his death that all of these elements merge together in the ubitquitous and nebulous form of contemporary American cultural studies. American cultural studies is founded, in a large sense, in the haunting shadow of Benjamin's death. I can't help but wonder if my own work is not a mourning ritual for figures like Benjamin.
This
melancholy haunts the film documentation of what one could call "theory
culture." Being part of the English Department at the University of
Florida, and feeling the dramatic shift away from any single discourse
that one could easily describe with the increasingly nebulous title
'theory,' I experience the new genre of theory documentaries as a
consumer mourning the vanishing commodity of the 'theory sage.' Theory
has become, at least for me, the practice of a generation who is
quickly dying out--the recent deaths of Jean Baudrillard, Edward Said,
and of course, Jacques Derrida only underscore that 'theory' as it has
been conceived and practiced over the past thirty years might be slowly
approaching the dusk of its proverbial day. All that remains, for
so-called "theory culture" is to consume the dead, perhaps modify their
voices in the Audenian guts of living and new work. But, then again,
we see--only now--a desire to document on film the lives of these
theorists: a veritable Derridean Archive Fever dedicated to the
preservation of a moment in history where the importance of the
practice of theory was self-evident. In a quickly expanding genre of
films dealing with critical and literary theory celebrities (including
Kirby Dick's Derrida, Astra Taylor's Zizek!, Sophie Finnes' The Pervert's Guide to Cinema, and Paule Zadjermann's Judith Butler: Philosophical Encounters of the Third Kind) David Mauas recently completed the conspiracy theory-laden Who Killed Walter Benjamin? The
film heavily critiques the largely accepted idea that Benjamin
committed suicide and, instead, theorizes that he was assasinated by
agents working for Stalinist Russia. Harding mentions the film in his
article, but I think looking at the trailer gives us a sense of the odd
tone of the film:
How or why or even whether Walter Benjamin died is
not really my concern, though it is pleasing in a slightly cheesy way
to imagine hordes of conspiracy theorists convinced that Benjamin is on
a deserted island somewhere having tea with Elvis and John Lennon. It
seems, though, that Mauas's film, along with Harding's article and
Birman's memoir, all contribute to this odd mourning ritual for theory
that show me just how unwilling many people are to give up the
theoretical ghost. The conspiracy theory surrounding Walter Benjamin
seems to act as an embalming fluid for theory's corpus: to keep the
body intact, theoretical reflection focuses on biography and questions
and requestions the events surrounding Benjamin's death. While a
suicide seems Romantic enough for the godfather of 'theory,' a grand
adventure yarn involving unseen Stalinist agents angry at Benjamin's
critique of Soviet-style communism is even more titilating, and allows
me to forget my sense of loss and my uncertainty about the future of my
discipline in the compulsive repetition of the what ifs of Benjamin's
final hours.
By Roger Whitson | August 27, 2007 | Permalink
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» "The Christ-figure of cultural studies" and the twilight of "theory" from Before the Law
Jeremy Harding has an excellent review in the LRB of (yet another) personal memoir of Benjamin's final hours at the Spanish border as he attempted to flee France in 1939, an attempt that culminated in his death (most probably by [Read More]
Tracked on Aug 29, 2007 12:53:31 AM
Comments
This is very rich reading, Roger; also very weird. Thanks.
Posted by: Matt | Aug 28, 2007 7:37:18 PM
Roger, I commented on this over at Before the Law (link on my name below) -- I don't see things the same way, as you'll see, but I love your post --
Adam
Posted by: Adam Thurschwell | Aug 29, 2007 12:48:09 AM
Adam,
Interesting reading. I remember going to a talk by Frederic Jameson last spring and being wholly underwhelmed. Jameson spoke with his head turned down, in monotone, throwing one historical idea after another at the audience. The title of the talk was "The Dialectic Today," and it seemed to consist merely of a barrage of theoretical shorthand. "Deconstruction did this," and "Feminism accomplished that" in the construction of what the contemporary dialectic means. I turned to one of my dissertation readers and said, "it sounds like he's reading an autopsy." Jameson's talk signified a turning point in the practice of theory, one that reminded me of Deleuze's quote that the history of philosophy was philosophy's Oedipus Complex. If theory (or cultural studies) is truly dead, then people have to get serious and write histories of theory, right?
My sense is that--while I would love to return to philosophy (it's the reason I started looking at theory in the first place), I feel that theory, as an enterprise, already mourns/cheers the death of philosophy. Going back as far as Hegel, theorists have spoke to the death of philosophy. And the practice of "theory," had to, in a sense, kill daddy-philosophy in order to achieve legitimacy in the academy. How many theorists identify philosophy with metaphysics or capitalism or (even worse Plato...ewww) and then argue for the need to do something else? Derrida's statement that he is a philosopher is, of course, an exception. But thank you for the post, I really enjoyed the anecdote about the film screening, and I completely agree with your idea that theory commodifies the intellectual/academic.
Posted by: Roger Whitson | Aug 29, 2007 6:34:36 AM
Roger, great(although depressing) story about Jameson. My feeling about theory's Oedipal feelings toward philosophy is that they're based on a misunderstanding -- to be reductive, theorists thought that when theory-darlings like Derrida (who went on and on about the death of philosophy at the beginning of "Violence and Metaphysics") and Adorno ("Philosophy lives on only because its chance to realize itself was missed") talked about the demise of philosophy, they actually were saying that the enterprise of "philosophy" was defunct. But they in fact went right on doing philosophy (and were doing philosophy at the moment that they said these things), because they meant something much more interesting, which was that philosophy was in the process of killing itself off from the outset, by always turning out to be something other than what it claimed (rather like Oedipus, by the way, whose fate was sealed for the same reason, not because he wanted to kill his father). That is, philosophy was never in fact simply metaphysics, any more than capitalism can be purely and simply a realized market-model of human relations. That doesn't mean that it's illegitimate to criticize philosophy from it's "outside" (just as it's perfectly legitimate to engage in this critique by means of neologism (as Derrida so successfully did) as opposed to Benjamin's preferred course of "saving" old words). But it does mean that you can't just step over the body and leave the philosophical tradition behind, picking at its remains as the moment moves you, without running the risk of replicating in one's thinking the same structures that you claim to be criticizing (the commodity form of intellectual endeavor, the subjectification of value, and the resulting substitution of aesthetic pleasure (in the worst cases, narcissistic preening) for political meaning (and in the realm of art, the substitution of political meaning for aesthetic pleasure, but that's a whole other story)). (By "you," I hope it's clear, I'm talking about "theory" in general, not you personally!) Anyway, I'm up on a soapbox again and will step down -- the whole "theory" thing is a subject that brings out the raging fuddy-duddy in me . . .
Posted by: Adam Thurschwell | Aug 29, 2007 9:52:01 AM
Two thoughts
1. I completely agree with the idea of philosophy as an enterprise in death--like that Socrates quote that philosophy is a preparation for death.
2. While part of me agrees with you about the problem of simply attempting to move past philosophy (and the tendency of thinkers who think they have finally transcended philosophy to replicate philosophical structures), part of me is also suspicous of an argument that seems to be essentially conservative and is merely covering for a widespread lack of theoretical/political imagination. But that's just Deleuze and Romanticism whining through me (and, thus, a replication of earlier forms of thought masquerading as a plea for the new).
Posted by: Roger Whitson | Aug 30, 2007 10:42:38 AM
Interesting . . . the speculation surrounding the documents in Benjamin's suitcase when he died, the fact they have been misplaced . . . the finished manuscript of Arcades Project? He had morphine in his system, but was buried in a Catholic cemetary (so, could not have been suicide). So, poison? That's good stuff. Gets my conspiracy-theorist juices flowing! Of course, he did consider intoxication a means to "profane illumination". Hell, he saw the mere ACT of thinking as intoxication. I'm digressing now . . .
Excellent thoughts, Roger.
~Daniel
Posted by: Daniel | Aug 30, 2007 11:24:13 AM
Thanks, Daniel...Have you looked at _The Road of Excess: A History of Writers on Drugs_ by Marcus Boon? I think I might have talked about it on this website before, but it is an excellent history of just that topic. It talks about Benjamin's experiments with hashish (incidentally, his writings on hashish were just published a year or so ago by Harvard UP [weird])
And sure he had morphine in his system. Birman mentions that he kept the morphine with him throughout the journey just in case he had to use it. I guess that could be a means to cover up a murder--but that's just speculation on my part.
Posted by: Roger Whitson | Aug 30, 2007 12:40:22 PM
A little one: theory, philosophy, and history will continue more or less uninterrupted, irrespective or this or that articulated demise and death, be it by this or that person, for just as long the totem still stands strong, the positive, full, seizable thing, external, always in reach for us suchwise believers. Heidegger was no different. His Being is gigantic Platonism. What happens when theory, philosophy, and history --- outside no less than inside of academias --- are articulated as cues of a repression of the fact of nothing? History, any history, as the history of "nothing"? Such a history would furnish plenty incentives for theorizing this and that, historizing this and that. The screen inserted as a between, as a guarantee that behind the curtain is the Being, be it in this or that shape.
Posted by: nigraphist | Aug 31, 2007 8:31:08 AM
Nigraphist
1. It seems that you are ascribing an eternal, timeless stature to theory, philosophy, and history when I believe that all three have a history. And the fact that we can't "transcend" philosophy is not because it is timeless, but moreso because the history of philosophy is written in a kind of cultural unconscious that is tied to the history of Western Civilization (and its attendant racisms, sexisms, heteronormativity, colonialisms, etc). The practice of philosophy and history (especially) are tied into the development of Western Culture. So if this culture is interrupted, or radically changed (say most of the Western World is annihilated by nuclear war), then I think philosophy and history will be completed and something else will continue in its stead. Theory couldn't end philosophy because theory has an Oedipal Complex--it wants to kill philosophy but can only exist through its desire to become the new daddy discipline.
2. I'm intrigued by your concept of the HIstory of "nothing"--but I wonder if you could expand on what (bahaha) you mean by nothing. I'm thinking, right now, that this project is not as radical as the one envisioned by Derrida with deconstruction, which is not the history of nothing (such a history would invite all sorts of mystical connotations--i.e. the god of negative theology as a kind of metaphysical substratum for this history, etc). Deconstruction is not simply nothing, it is also and always (in the words of John Caputo) that prayer for the impossible. Then again, this may have nothing to do with your nothing, so I'll just let you talk.
Posted by: Roger Whitson | Aug 31, 2007 10:10:41 AM
Dear Roger Whitson, and others,
I would rather not ascribe any stature to theory, philosophy, history, &c such. I may have articulated myself somewhat unclear; pardon for that.
Even if talking about history yields some capital resources --- obviously a quite popular exercise the last decennia ---, we may still need to even historicize the notion of history. What is history? Is it something? However disarrayed and fragmented and anti-totalitarian a thought one wants communicated, it still remains a fact that in any case it seems that our conception of history is still rather of Plato’s making, no? or was it Socrates’?
Can we not transcend our historically conditioned Western-history? How so? And what is, indeed, the history of Western Civilization? Is it really unifiable? And is it not today a little farfetched to so easily and unproblematically ascribe racism, sexism, and such to the West as be its primordial determination? Is this our historical unconsciousness impossible to transcend? I mean, by other means than nuclear eximplosions? Is this really the completion of Western philosophy? Such a classical view, is, in my view, not only hypocritical and naïve but dangerous. And dangerous not only to the West. Oedipus is rather cultural, a way of life, a local invention; theory is not reducible to being constituted by an Oedipal Complex --- if this was what you meant. Was it? Freud’s metapsychology can be of many uses --- but never a reductive one. In any case, few other places have allowed such a criticism of one of the sexes. Important to remember this. Could we so unaffectedly talk about killing Daddies if we were not protected by certain “Western” institutions? Theory, philosophy, and history alike is very lucky seated. Heads are rolling other places; where, then, to seek inspiration?
‘History of nothing’: just a provisional notion, to be replaced by other notions for strategic uses. A history of nothing has been thematized many places, and not only in the West; what differs is the degree to which such an amonarchical thought has been “tolerated.” It has little resemblance or kinship with mysticism; the problem is rather that mystical thought --- by no means restricted to the religious and mythical realms --- has no demarcation criteria as to what to appropriate and assimilate and what not: it seems that anything can be of use. A familiar situation. The history of nothing is the history not of a rather Hegelian ‘everything’ but more an ‘anything.’ Which is what empirical life anyway tells us about, each and every day. If there are any riches in this world, and exceeding that of finances and powers, it is that of reasons. There is never a shortage of reasons. Still, nothing is about anything, that anything may come forth, depending on how our writing apparatuses are installed, situated, interested. But anything would never even think about the everything, which is a figure of thought no more distant from immanentist thought, say Spinoza and Deleuze, than from transcendentalist thought, say, Kant.
The history of nothing is foreign to any negative thought; this history is more what has furnished incentives for having us write all our positive discoveries at all. It is somewhere between minus and plus, no? With no hope for decision. Iff it is at all outside our immediacies it is not as the antecedent, a Big Bang causing everything, imaginable and registerable, and what not so. It is not from the “past,” has nothing radicalist about it. (Look to all the radicalists inhabiting politics, be they “left,” “centre,” or “right.” They are all radicalists, fighting much the same causes. Which is why we need to ‘irradicalize.’)
Could you please, then, expand on what prayer does here? Would you continue our talk?
Posted by: nigraphist | Sep 2, 2007 7:15:11 AM
Roger and nigraphist
It is correct that western philosophy has tended to be precisely that 'western' and yet it's also clear that this has been at the cost of avoiding imortant aspects of philosophy's actual history, notably through the careful avoidance of the philosophical relations to non-western cultures. Of course, we should accept that this was because of the quite obvious reasons that you have already mentioned.
However surely the concluding logic of your argument should be different than you presented in that we should be facing the exterior and continue the twofold task of uncovering the hidden non-European sources and secondly begin to understand the actual differences between western and non-western philosophies. Some of this work already exists, for example Mays 'Heidegger's hidden sources' and the work of Francois Jullien amongst many other lines of thought, but the crucial point is not it's exteriority but that these connections can be seen to exist and should be acknowledged and explored further.
Does your argument become more problematic when these historical and philosophical relations between western philosophy and its exterior are acknowledged ? I, of course rather think that it does but then I rather obviously would think that after suggesting this other line of escape from your quandry...
Posted by: sdv | Sep 2, 2007 1:37:57 PM
Roger and nigraphist
It is correct that western philosophy has tended to be precisely that 'western' and yet it's also clear that this has been at the cost of avoiding imortant aspects of philosophy's actual history, notably through the careful avoidance of the philosophical relations to non-western cultures. Of course, we should accept that this was because of the quite obvious reasons that you have already mentioned.
However surely the concluding logic of your argument should be different than you presented in that we should be facing the exterior and continue the twofold task of uncovering the hidden non-European sources and secondly begin to understand the actual differences between western and non-western philosophies. Some of this work already exists, for example Mays 'Heidegger's hidden sources' and the work of Francois Jullien amongst many other lines of thought, but the crucial point is not it's exteriority but that these connections can be seen to exist and should be acknowledged and explored further.
Does your argument become more problematic when these historical and philosophical relations between western philosophy and its exterior are acknowledged ? I, of course rather think that it does but then I rather obviously would think that after suggesting this other line of escape from your quandry...
Posted by: sdv | Sep 2, 2007 1:40:18 PM
nigraphist--
I'm sorry, but I fail to see how your "history of nothing" adds to the project of Derridean deconstruction. Perhaps because deconstruction is institutionalized in the West, and in a certain way, cannot help but reflect on its own institutionalization? At the same time, I didn't forsee my reflection on Benjamin inspiring a talk about the future of the theoretical enterprise (and I'm hardly a very good prophet). I understand that there are histories of nothing that come from outside the West. My work here is in delineating a specifically narcissistic and eurocentric tone to the current work on certain strands of theory, which in my view seem to take its cue from late-Derrida and obsess about its own death. Psychoanalysis is useful to me only as a way of understanding this (specifically Western) institutionalization and mediatization--and this is mostly due to my own limitations as an American scholar reflecting on a certain way of thinking about institutions and figures of theory. I don't mean to be reductive, just to note this limitation.
sdv--
Perhaps a historical study of your type could add to what I'm looking at here. At the same time, I think it is necessary to distinguish between philosophy and theory (as adam and I discussed earlier). In lit departments, one can practice philosophy and literature (and deal with historical aspects of the problematic you sketch out in your comment). However, to practice "theory" is something other than engaging with philosophy, because with theory comes the question of praxis and application. Theory, for me, is a particular insitutional invention used to cover up the perceived historical and cultural limitations of philosophy. Philosophy is a very particular type of discourse, produced in a particular time for specific, cultural needs. Theory, on the other hand and despite its own social and cultural contexts, aspires to be something more--to stand outside the relationships between what you term philosophy and its exterior--and engage that exteriority. So, yes, I think your study would help BUT your work still focuses on the archival and the historical rather than the philosophical. I would argue that the lack of imagination I recognized in the post is precisely the question of what to do with philosophy that is not simply archiving its history--whether that history be with its exterior or not. Perhaps in our "always historicize" present such a project is impossible, but my question remains.
Posted by: Roger Whitson | Sep 3, 2007 8:38:35 AM
Does one do Big P. Philosophy or Little p. philosophy? The thread participants here aim for Philosophy, and thereby neglect philosophy (the association of "western" is somewhat deceptive and manipulative. Is Euclidian geometry western? OR classical logic? maybe it's just correct. ). Hegel is P.; and Kant mostly p. Kant doesn't set philosophy apart from the sciences, but seeks reconciliation (as do the empiricists, however mundane). The 3rd Antinomy may be "western," but that's hardly the end of the story.
Maybe the p. story has flaws (we would say less than the P. story has), and lacks the historical amd political context that so many continentalists aim for. Maybe not. (is Carnapian semantics and language clarification, for instance, that more sinister than Hegelian--or Heidegger-- ontology? Perhaps to theists it is.........). Marx may have approved of a Carnapian sort of analysis, at least as applied to economics, before accepting the Dasein cult.............(Marx's closet positivism and pro-"scientism" some of the dirty secrets of marxism).
Posted by: Perezoso | Sep 3, 2007 12:21:29 PM
Some of us sometimes aim for a "lack of imagination" to avoid the problems associated with imagining that anyone could seriously propose that 'theory' (with what are it's recognizably Althussarian roots) can be said in 2007 to have a better theory/practice relation than philosophy itself.
However what I was really trying to suggest was that your concept of Western Philosophy not only serves no useful purpose in the present, but needs much greater interrogation than you've allowed for. Who knows perhaps then 'lit' departments might become the sites of theory/practice that supplants philosophy, however forgive me if I really doubt that you are really trying to take your students into the line of thought that Althussar argued for in 1967.
Posted by: sdv | Sep 3, 2007 2:06:22 PM
Perezoso--Could you tell me what separates big P from little p? I realize that there is something more than history and culture that constitutes any p, and I definitely don't want to throw out p (or maybe even P) in any way. I'd just like to hear what isn't "western" about p.
sdv--I'm afraid I didn't communicate myself very well in that last response. I don't mean to place theory "above" philosophy in terms of praxis, only to note that the question of the application to a reading (in the sense of reading a poem or a novel) is more apparent in "theory" than in studies looking at "philosophy and literature" in which the historical and cultural questions seem more pronounced for me. In my experience, at any rate, philosophy seems tied more to history than theory but this is probably changing.
And I absolutely agree that my hastily thought out shorthand "Western Philosophy" needs a more nuanced approach--I just don't know how to do that without doing a historical or cultural survey, which for me isn't philosophy but history of philosophy.
I'm resistant to the idea that all philosophy has to be history of philosophy simply because that seems to be mourning by another means a "loss" of philosophy.
Posted by: Roger Whitson | Sep 4, 2007 9:39:14 AM
Minds more subtle than my own have addressed that issue (Wm James for one, and, again, Carnap), but I think one could say , broadly, that Big. P. concerns itself with a Weltanschauung, with systems, the nature of Reality as a whole, God, etc. Plato and Hegel (and most german metaphysicians) are P. are they not.
Little p. avoids grand proclamations about metaphysical Reality (or Idealism), the Absolute, ultimate ends, God, etc., or the great abstractions of marxism (that's not to say that marxism is all BS: but Marx WAS fond of making some rather grand pronouncements (as Keynes realized). And in a sense marxism is as western as Hobbes or Hegel).
I don't think that little p. implies or is synonymous with analytical philosophy per se (for one, Frege was nearly as fond of grand platonic assertions as most metaphysicians, as was his disciple Russell). Little p. IS concerned with language, however, and for lack of a better term, Logic--and perhaps more congenial to scientific thinking and to research, rather than to Theory and Weltanschaaung.
Kuhn's "Structure of Scientific Revolutions" is little p., I would venture to say (and not opposed to a certain secular perspective). Carnap's writing on semantics, or even Wittgenstein's Tractatus are Little p.(tho' that's not to offer unqualified praise to the Tract., which is a rather perplexing piece of writing). While Quine the person may have been objectionable--politically, or what have you---his early writings (the essays in From a Logical P.O.V., say) are a model of little p.
The neo-Darwinians such as Dennett & C0. are little p., though Darwinism could be read as a sort of
secularized Weltanschauung perhaps--which, however vulgar it seems to some continentalists, might offer a bit more political efficaciousness than, say, the Catholic church, or psychoanalytical marxism. (LS on occasion seems a bit xtian itself---that's cool, but even Herr Zizek has proclaimed his atheism on numerous occasions. And Nietzsche off'ed JHVH before his syphillis got real bad, right.)
Posted by: Perezoso | Sep 4, 2007 12:55:47 PM
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