How is one to make sense of John Locke's political philosophy today? Although Locke's politics are widely understood to be the very beginnings of political liberalism, I wonder what is generally understood about his thought. To be perfectly honest, I understand little myself. But I thought it would be beneficial to ask tonight: what is Locke's philosophy of the state of nature, and, what does Locke say about slavery or 'the Indians'? These are questions that I have only begun to ask and answer. (In other words, these are questions that begin with the basic inquiry regarding which particular exclusions make Locke's thought possible at all; - that is, what thought or existences is he arguing against?). I still wonder if it is important to understand Locke at all, and what can be gained by a close reading of his work?
In any case, I found the following remarks to be perfectly put, precisely in regards to both the question of "Indians," as well as that of the state of nature. In the Second Treaties of Government Locke writes:
I doubt not but this will seem a very strange Doctrine to some Men: but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by what Right any Prince or State can put to death, or punish an Alien, for any Crime he commits in their Country. 'Tis certain their Laws by vertue of any Sanction they receive from the promulgated Will of the Legislative, reach not a Stranger. They speak not to him, nor if they did, is he bound to hearken to them. The Legislative Authority, by which they are in Force over the Subjects of that Common-wealth, hath no Power over him. Those who have the Supream Power of making laws in England, France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the rest of the World, Men without Authority: And therefore if by the Law of Nature, every Man hath not a Power to punish Offences against it, as Magistrates of any Community, can punish an Alien of another Country, since in reference to him, they can have no more Power, then what every Man naturally may have over another (Cambridge U. Press, 1960, 313).
It seems to me that Locke is arguing against the logical possibility of international (or even natural) law in this passage? Does this suggest that sovereignty is always (something like) national and local in Locke's view? Does this characteristic have important implications or consequences?



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